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  Chapter one 
1 General Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 General context: the global financial crisis 
The financial crisis that began with troubles in the US mortgage market almost brought down the 
entire world’s financial system. Most of the world’s banks were threatened with bankruptcy, a 
shock which propelled most developed countries into severe recession. The global financial crisis 
is considered to have been the largest contraction in the global economy since the Great 
Depression. It had major consequences for international financial markets, and then more 
generally, on the world economy. There was a profound effect on investment, consumption, jobs 
etc. The collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a domino effect in Wall Street with the 
consequence of a rise in risk aversion in market participants. The outcome was reduced liquidity 
and self-reinforcing panics, which underpinned the market turbulence. Financial institutions 
stopped lending to each other due to the resultant crisis of confidence. Bond markets fell, cutting 
the industry’s revenues by a third. Non-financial companies saw the supply of loans reduced 
 Page12 
dramatically, leaving many unable to pay suppliers or workers. This forced them to cut their 
spending, leading to further harmful impacts on the real economy.  
 
The financial crisis had serious long term negative consequences for the Eurozone. In the decade 
prior to the onset of crisis, economic growth in Europe had been generally strong, fiscal deficits 
were limited and the euro area did not appear to have a public debt problem. The debt levels rose 
only modestly in most Eurozone member countries prior to the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
According to Lane (2012), in 1995 the ratio of gross public debt to GDP for both the euro area and 
United States were quite similar (60 % for US and 70% for European countries1). However, after 
2008, this figure rose more quickly in Europe than in the US, and this trend began to intensify 
during 2010. Many European banks had borrowed substantial sums on the American money 
markets before the crisis, often using this to make what proved to be excessively risky investments. 
Due to the interconnection in the financial markets, the troubles in the US thus transmitted 
themselves to Europe. Furthermore, Europe had its own underlying internal imbalances. When the 
Eurozone was created, the countries later grouped together with the acronym “PIIGS”2 tended to 
have large budget deficits, while countries in northern Europe tended to have budget surpluses. 
Thus, Eurozone member countries had the same monetary policy but different fiscal policies, 
enabling countries like Greece to benefit from cheap funding costs, equal to those of Germany. 
This helped exacerbate overindebtedness of these countries. Furthermore, cheap interest rates in 
Spain and Ireland helped create a housing bubble similar to that in US. All these imbalances where 
amplified with the spread of US credit crisis.   
The recent events point out the fact that the rise in the complexity and globalization of financial 
services contributes to stronger interconnections, with potentially dramatic consequences in the 
financial markets and the whole economy. The effects are still being felt, seven years on. It took 
huge taxpayer-financed bail-outs to shore up the industry. In several rich countries GDP is still 
below its pre-crisis peak. Fear of financial contagion and an economic breakdown was the major 
motivation behind massive bailouts and other interventions provided by governments during the 
1 These ratios were calculated by the author how used IMF public Debt Databased  ( https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/) 
2 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain.  
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recent financial crisis. In Europe, aid measures to banks and other financial institutions amounted 
to more than 900 billion euros in 20083. These financial injections fended off an economic 
depression, but were only short term solution.  For the long term, better risk management and 
complete rewriting of the rulebook for financial services is required to prevent future crises and 
ensure the financial and economic stability. In this thesis we only focus on Europe. 
Risk management is the process of identifying and analyzing exposure to risk and determining the 
optimal way to manage such exposure in order to prevent (or at least minimize) the exposure. 
Financial and non-financial institutions face different types of risks: Market Risk, Credit Risk, 
Liquidity Risk, Operational Risk, Legal Risk, etc. Given the major role of credit risk in the recent 
financial crisis, this thesis focuses on analysing different perspectives of credit risk in Europe 
during the financial crisis. We consider different markets: Credit Default Swap (CDS), options on 
equities and exchange rates, and finally, the equity markets. We also look at the impact on different 
entities: corporates, banks and sovereigns however, we focus more on banks. Credit risk is the risk 
of loss on a claim. More generally, it is the risk such that a third party does not honour its 
contractual commitments. It is a function of three parameters: the amount of the debt, the 
probability of default and the proportion of the debt that will not be recovered in case of default. 
Analysing credit risk during the financial crisis has to start with an investigation of the causes of 
the global financial crisis. The exact causes are a continuous debate. Many papers address the 
question of the causes of the financial crisis (see further Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, Calomiris, 
2009, Claessens and Kose, 2014, Eichengreen, 2010, and Claessens et al., 2014).  
The financial crisis was the result of a multiple and interlinked causes. It is hard to enumerate them 
separately because, in reality, most are interconnected, but for a pedagogical purpose we will try 
to cite some of the key causes. Firstly, banks were responsible for reckless lending. Secondly, the 
fast growth of credit derivatives, in particular the CDS market, became dominated by speculation. 
In addition, these complex financial products has enabled risk transfers that were not fully 
understood by financial regulators and by institutions themselves, thus complicating the 
assessment of counterparty risk. Thirdly, the ratings agencies miscalculated the risks associated 
with mortgage-backed securities to which they often gave generous ratings. In addition, the 
3 European Commission Internal Market and Services  
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government indirectly encouraged moral hazard risk to be taken by systemically important banks 
through an implicit government guarantee. Lastly, central bankers and other regulators also bear 
blame for lax regulatory policies. 
All these elements together had added to the complexity and interconnection of the financial 
market, accentuating the systemic risk and endangering overall financial stability. In this thesis, 
we will focus on credit derivatives and the credit rating agencies which were significant 
contributors to the outbreak of the crisis. In the next section, we first define the concept of 
"systemic risk", the reason why the subprime crisis became a global crisis through a domino effect. 
Then we present the CDS market and credit rating agencies, and show their role in the stability of 
the financial market. 
 Financial stability  
There is no widely agreed definition of financial stability. They vary significantly in academic 
papers and among policy makers. The European Central Bank, for instance, defines financial 
stability as “a condition whereby the financial system is able to withstand shocks without giving 
way to cumulative processes, which impair the allocation of savings to investment opportunities 
and the processing of payments in the economy.”  
In order to enhance financial stability, there has been an increased focus on systemic risk as a key 
aspect of macro prudential policy and surveillance (MPS). Government and financial regulators 
have established entities like the Financial Stability Oversight4 Council in the U.S., the European 
Systemic Risk Board in the European Union (2013), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 
G20.   
1.2.1  Definition of systemic risk  
There is no consensus about the definition of systemic risk. Several definitions are proposed in the 
literature where some are qualitative and others are quantitative definitions.  
4 In July 2010, the U.S. Congress enacted the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank Act), the most 
comprehensive financial reform bill since the 1930s. Among other things, the Dodd Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR) 
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The Bank of International Settlements (BIS)5 views systemic risk as “the risk that the failure of a 
participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default, with 
the chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties”. While Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 
2008) define systemic risk as the risk of default of the banking system, considered as a whole. 
According to DeBandt and Hartmann (2000), systemic risk can be rather an external effect hitting 
one institution, market or system which then spreads onto others, or, a wide systematic shock 
which badly affects many institutions or markets at the same time.  Another strand of the literature 
proposes a wider definition, Borio et al., (2001), Perotti and Suarez (2009) view systemic risk as 
propagation risk where shock effects go beyond their direct impact, causing disorder in the real 
economy. According to Borio et al. (2001), financial system turmoil can rarely raise from failure 
of a unique financial institution due to an idiosyncratic chock. Nevertheless, financial system 
problems are due to financial institutions underestimating their exposure to a common factor, most 
notably the financial business cycle in the economy as a whole. 
These definitions above show that the concept of systemic risk is not yet clearly defined, which 
makes its measurement challenging. Furthermore, the estimation should include the complex 
nature of the financial system (cross-section dimension as well as the time-dimension). From a 
quantitative perspective, systemic risk corresponds to losses in the financial systems that go 
beyond a certain threshold. These huge losses are quite unlikely to occur but can have great harm 
to the financial system and the real economy, as noted by Drehmann and Tarashev (2011). The 
systemic risk measures are designed to capture the tail risk that reflects the interconnectedness 
within and across sectors. Giesecke and Kim (2011) define systemic risk as the conditional 
probability of failure of a large proportion of all financial institutions. This definition points out 
that the cause of systemic distress is the correlated failure of institutions to meet their obligations.” 
According to the ECB (2009), systemic risk limited to the banking sector should consider several 
factors. Firstly, a common shock that affects the whole banking system and then is transmitted to 
the real economy. Secondly, the outcome of an idiosyncratic shock to a financial institution that is 
propagated to the rest of the financial sector and ends up affecting the real economy. Thirdly, as a 
5 Bank of International Settlements, 64th Annual Report, p 177 
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slow buildup of vulnerabilities in the banking system that may affect the real economy. Thus, we 
observe that the definition of systematic risk is a topic of ongoing debate among researchers and 
therefore accurate measurement of such risk involves complexities.  
Now we would like to draw the attention to the role of the CDS market and credit ratings during 
the global financial turmoil in undermining financial stability. 
1.2.2  Corporate and sovereigns CDS Market  
Credit derivatives played a major role in the global financial crisis. They are defined as contracts 
where the payoff is related to the creditworthiness of one or more counterparties. They can be split 
into two categories: unfunded credit derivatives and funded credit derivatives. The first category 
is a bilateral contract between two counterparties. The second transaction involve a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) to transform claims into securities that can then be sold to investors at different 
levels of risk using securitization and synthetic securitization. Credit derivatives are instruments 
that allow the transfer of part or all of the credit risk associated to an obligation (a claim) without 
allowing for a transfer of ownership. The price of the derivatives credit depends directly on the 
credit quality of the issuer. Credit derivative markets have grown exponentially in recent years. 
According to a BIS report (2010), the gross notional amount of outstanding credit derivative 
contracts rose from about $4 trillion at the end of 2003 to roughly $62 trillion at the end of 2007 
i.e. an increase of 1 450%.  
CDSs represent the most common type of credit derivatives. They were designed to transfer the 
“risk of default” of a particular reference entity (underlying debt instrument or debtor: a company 
or a sovereign entity) from a party which is seeking insurance protection (protection buyer) to the 
party that is willing to offer such a protection (protection seller) in exchange for a contractually 
determined fair premium (CDS spread or premium). Through a CDS contract, not only the “risk 
of default” can be insured, but also several triggering events against which protection can be 
bought, namely default, bankruptcy, restructuring, repudiation or moratorium and obligation 
acceleration or default. Once one of these credit events takes place, the contract has to be settled 
either via physical or cash settlement, as specified in the contract. CDS spread is quoted in basis 
points per annum and is paid in quarterly installments. It represents a credit risk proxy for the 
issuer: corporate or sovereign. A higher spread on the CDS implies a greater risk of default by the 
reference entity. It reflects the perception of the financial market on the corporate and sovereign 
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debt. Blanco et al. (2005) suggest that CDS spreads tend to respond more quickly to changes in 
credit conditions compared to bond credit spreads. According to Longstaff et al. (2005) and 
Ericsson et al. (2009) CDS spreads seem to be a more accurate and cleaner indicator of the firm’s 
real creditworthiness or default risk. At sovereign level, Pan and Singleton (2008) show that 
market prices of CDS spreads reflect the perception of financial markets about the economic-
political stability of a country, and thus about the creditworthiness of a given sovereign. The credit 
default swaps market has grown subsequently in recent years, with the total amount outstanding 
at the end of 2004 at 6.4 trillion US dollars raising to 57.9 trillion US dollar in June 2007, 
representing a growth rate of 805%.  
Initially, in the mid-1990s when CDS were introduced to the market, commercial banks used CDS 
to hedge the credit risk associated with large claims, such as corporate loans). Gradually this 
market became dominated by speculation. During the European sovereign debt crisis, speculation 
based on the distress of sovereigns had exacerbated the risk of sovereign default of ‘vulnerable 
countries’ particularly the “PIIGS”.   In addition, credit derivatives are used as a way to take 
additional risks without having to set aside additional capital requirements as they transfer toxic 
assets to investors. This kind of instrument creates interdependencies, complexity in the financial 
market and hence they increase systemic risk. A good example is the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
Due to its exposure to one of the largest CDS market counterparties (the sub-prime mortgage 
market) and since it was an important CDS reference entity itself, its breakdown lead to the near-
collapse of other entities though a domino effect that went hand-in-hand with worldwide financial 
panic.  
The crisis we are living through shows how harmful consequences can result from the credit 
derivative market and thus the necessity of carefully analyzing this market in order to better control 
it through regulation. For this reason, chapters two, three and four are dedicated to analyzing 
sovereign and corporate CDS markets. 
Previous research suggests that informed traders prefer equity option and CDS markets over stock 
markets to exploit their informational advantage. As a result, equity and credit derivative markets 
contribute more to price discovery than stock markets. The objective of chapter two is to 
investigate the dynamics behind informed investors’ trading decisions in European stock, options 
and credit default swap markets based on a sample of 91 financial and non-financial, investment- 
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and non-investment grade companies. This allows us to identify the predictive explanatory power 
of the unique information contained in each market with respect to future stock, CDS and option 
market movements. A lead-lag relation is found between the CDS market and the other markets, 
in which changes in CDS spreads are able to consistently forecast changes in stock prices and 
equity options’ implied volatilities. This includes how the fast growing CDS market seems to play 
a special role in the price discovery process. Moreover, in contrast to results from US studies, the 
stock market is found to forecast changes in the other two markets, suggesting that investors also 
prefer stock market involvement to exploit their information advantages before moving to CDS 
and option markets. Interestingly, these patterns have only emerged during the recent financial 
crisis, while before the crisis the option market was found to be of major importance in the price 
discovery process.  
Chapter three seeks to examine whether the information contained in deep-out-of-the-money put 
options (DOOM) put options can be combined with information on CDS contracts to estimate 
default arrival rates. Using a sample of European banks, it exploits a theoretical link between the 
equity DOOM and CDS contracts proposed by Carr&Wu (2011) from a different angle with a 
view to gauging their credit riskiness. In addition, we analyze the differences between the 
estimated default arrival rates and those rates emanating from the market (historical default arrival 
rates). We then find that the financial guarantees provided by governments to systemically 
important institutions are a significant factor in explaining those differences. The government 
guarantees also explain the differences in the levels of our estimates across banks. Ultimately, our 
results suggest that the estimated default arrival rates do not only reflect the angst of the financial 
markets with respect to the deteriorating credit risk profile of  European banks, but can serve, at 
times, as early warning signals.  
In chapter four, we investigate empirically the impact of the credit risk of Eurozone member 
countries on the stability of the euro. In the absence of a common euro bond, euro-area credit risk 
is induced though the credit default swaps of the member countries. The stability of the euro is 
examined by decomposing dollar-euro exchange rate options into the moments of the risk-neutral 
distribution. We document that during the sovereign debt crisis changes in the creditworthiness of 
member countries have significant impact on the stability of the euro. In particular, an increase in 
member countries’ credit risk results in an increase in volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rates, 
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along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. We find that member 
countries’ credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk, as measured by the risk-neutral 
skewness. We propose a new indicator for currency stability by combining the risk-neutral 
moments into an aggregated risk measure and show that our results are robust to this change in 
measure. We highlight that during the sovereign debt crisis, the creditworthiness of countries with 
vulnerable fiscal positions were the main risk-endangering factor of euro stability.  
1.2.3   Credit ratings agencies  
The financial crisis also highlighted the importance and implications of bank and sovereign ratings 
assigned by the rating agencies. Moody’s Investors Service, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch 
Ratings dominate the global credit rating industry. Moody’s and S&P account for 80% of the 
market, while Fitch’s share is 15% (Duff and Einig, 2009). These ratings represent an estimation 
of the rating agency regarding the ability of an institution or a sovereign to meet its obligation. In 
other words, ratings reflect the creditworthiness of the bond issuer and signal improving and 
deteriorating fundamental credit quality. In this sense, the rating issued by credit rating agencies 
are considered as a credit risk indicator and determine the institutions’ and countries’ financing 
costs. The three agencies have different scales of ratings and different methods to assess credit 
quality. 
Credit rating agencies played a key role in the financial crisis. They were blamed for precipitating 
the crisis, by giving excessively high ratings to risky mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The risk 
models on which these ratings had been based were overoptimistic about default risks on the 
underlying mortgages and about correlations between the different assets. These derivatives were 
new and were not fully comprehended or appreciated by the rating agencies. Furthermore, there is 
a conflict of interest; the agencies are paid by companies that issued bonds (CDO, MBS), giving 
them an incentive to please their client rather than giving a true assessment of risk.  
Despite recent criticisms, rating agencies play a crucial role in the global financial markets and the 
economy in general. For these reasons, it is essential that credit ratings correctly reflect the credit 
risk embedded in bonds and countries, taking into consideration all the elements that could affect 
the creditworthiness of the issuer. In the last chapter of the thesis we investigate whether Distance 
to Default and systemic risk are a good predictors for banks and sovereign credit ratings.  
 Page20 
Previous research has documented that Distance to Default from Merton Model is informative to 
predict future changes in credit ratings. In chapter five we analyze the impact of Distance to 
Default (DD) and systemic risk on the probability of downgrading banks and sovereigns using the 
panel probit model. We estimate Distance to Default using a standard option pricing framework 
and the systemic risk indicator by an aggregation procedure which is the standard practice in 
financial stability publications. For this purpose, we consider a set of 41 banks from 14 European 
countries over the period from 2007 to 2013. The results show that both indicators affect the 
downgrade probability of banks and sovereigns, however, systemic risk goes beyond Distance to 
Default to explain deterioration of the financial stability of banks and countries. The results show 
also that the three rating agencies react differently to the deterioration in banks’ credit risk proxies 
by Distance to Default and systemic risk. Regarding banks’ ratings, among the three agencies, 
Moody’s is the one that reacts least to an increase in banks’ systemic risk and Distance to Default 
in comparison with its competitors S&P and Fitch. As to sovereign ratings, S&P is the agency that 
takes the banks’ systemic risk factor most into account in its assessment of the countries’ risk 
profiles, with Fitch coming next.  
 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter we investigate the dynamics behind informed 
investors’ trading decisions in European stock, options and credit default swap markets. In chapter 
three we exploit a theoretical link between the equity deep-out-of-the-money put and CDS 
contracts to estimate default arrival rates. Chapter four seeks to analyze the impact of countries’ 
credit risk on the stability of the euro. In chapter five we analyze the impact of Distance to Default 
and systemic risk on the probability of downgrading banks and countries. Finally, in chapter six 
we conclude and discuss our future research directions6.
6 Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5 are extended versions of the following papers: 
Amadori M., Bekkour L., Lehnert T., ‘The Relative Informational Efficiency of Stocks, Options and Credit Default Swaps’, 
Published in Review of Risk Finance, volume 15, Number 5,510-532 (2014) 
Bekkour L.,Lehnert T, Nadal F, Rasmouki F., ‘CDS Contracts versus Put Options: A Robust Relationship?’, 2014. Working paper 
Bekkour L., Lehnert T., Rasmouki F, Wolff C., Jin, X., ‘Euro at Risk:  The Impact of Countries’ Credit Risk on the Stability of the 
Common Currency’, 2012. Working paper 
Alsakka, R., Bekkour L., ap Gwilym, O, ‘Does systemic risk affect credit ratings of sovereigns and banks?’, 2015. Working paper 
                                                          
 Page21 
Chapter Two 
2 The Relative Informational Efficiency of 
Stocks, Options and Credit Default Swaps 
during the Financial Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
A relatively new stream of literature tries to explore the connections between the different equity, 
options and credit derivatives markets with respect to informed traders’ investment decisions. 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) study the phenomenon of insider trading in the credit derivatives 
markets. They find evidence of its existence, especially when more banks are lending to an obligor. 
In fact, in the case of higher credit risk, they show that credit default swap (CDS) spreads lead 
stock returns. Therefore, insiders (in this case the lending institutions) tend to exploit their (insider) 
knowledge, which reveals their significant incremental information in the CDS market. Following 
this line of reasoning, Cao et al. (2010) hypothesize that if informed/insider trading is the common 
underpinning of price discovery in the option and CDS markets and considering that both CDS 
and equity options offer a low cost and effective protection against downside risk, then we should 
expect a contemporaneous link between CDS spreads and option-implied volatility (IV). Using a 
sample of US firms over a three year time span, their findings are consistent with this main 
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hypothesis. Similar results are also obtained by Consigli (2007). The preference of informed 
traders for option markets over stock or bond markets is also documented in previous studies such 
as Pan and Poteshman (2006) and Cao et al. (2005). In an earlier version of their paper, Cao et al. 
(2010) further explore the lead-lag relation among stock, option, and CDS markets. Their results 
are consistent with the preference of informed traders to first use options and CDS markets to 
exploit their informational advantage. Subsequently, this information is transmitted into the stock 
market. They also examine the reasons why implied volatility is found to be a better explanatory 
variable for CDS spreads compared to historical volatility (HV) and other theoretical determinants. 
The results show that IV explains CDS spreads not only because it forecasts future volatility, but 
also because it captures a time-varying volatility risk premium. For an international sample of 
firms over the period 2000-2002, Norden and Weber (2009) find that first, stock returns lead CDS 
and bond spread changes, while CDS spread changes are found to Granger cause bond spread 
changes for a large number of firms. Second, the CDS market is more sensitive to the stock market 
than the bond market. This effect intensifies with lower credit quality and larger bond issues. 
Finally, they find that the CDS market contributes more to price discovery than the bond market, 
although this effect seems stronger among US firms compared to European ones.  
The aim of this study is to empirically investigate the relative informational efficiency of stock, 
options and credit default swaps for European firms and a long time series, that is covering the 
financial crisis period. Our aim is to empirically explore the price discovery process across the 
three markets. Inspired by Acharya and Johnson (2007), we run a two-step time series regression 
analysis, incorporating the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach in the second step. 
Given that we are confronted with a relatively small cross-section and a long time-series, a SUR 
approach is more appropriate than panel analysis. A lead-lag relation is found between the CDS 
market and the other markets, in which changes in CDS spreads are able to consistently forecast 
changes in stock prices and equity options’ implied volatilities, indicating how the fast growing 
CDS market seems to play a special role in the price discovery process. Moreover, in contrast to 
results of US studies, the stock market is found to forecast changes in the other two markets, 
suggesting that investors also prefer stock market involvement to exploit their information 
advantages before moving to the CDS and equity option markets. Interestingly, these patterns have 
only emerged during the recent financial crisis, while before the crisis the option market was found 
to be of major importance in the price discovery process. Additionally, we find these relationships 
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to be substantially stronger for financial firms relative to non-financial firms, as a result of the 
increased importance of financial firms in market participants’ investment decisions during the 
crisis periods. With respect to informed/insider trading as the common underpinning of price 
discovery in the option and stock markets, we find that only for highly rated, liquid and financial 
firms the option market is leading the stock market. For the liquid firms and during the financial 
crisis, our results suggest that the option market is negatively influencing the CDS market, which 
is counterintuitive, and puzzling, but could possibly highlight the unique characteristics of the 
recent crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the 
literature. In section 2.3 and 2.4 we describe the data and the methodology, section 2.5 explains 
the testing procedures and provides a discussion of the empirical results. Finally, section 2.6 
concludes. 
 Literature review  
Two different market-implied proxies are typically used to measure the creditworthiness of a firm. 
First of all, bond credit spreads, which are defined as “the increase in yield over comparable 
government debt (the benchmark) that corporate borrowers of different ratings have to pay” 
(Servaes and Tufano, 2006, p.12). This difference changes over time, obviously, the higher the 
rating of the issuer the lower the credit spread will be. Bond credit spreads have been the focus of 
many studies trying to identify how much of these credit spreads could be explained by default 
and non-default components. In particular, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) apply a structural credit 
risk model to study the determinants of monthly credit spreads changes. They use a set of variables 
like volatility, leverage, business climate proxies, yield curve slope etc., but they are only able to 
explain a maximum of 25 percent of the spreads changes. Through a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA), they find that the residuals from their regression model are highly cross-correlated 
and mostly driven by a single common factor. They argue that bonds seem to be trading in a highly 
segmented market. Their findings identify local demand/supply shocks, independent of both 
changes in firms’ credit risk and typical measures of liquidity, which are usually seen as main 
determinants of credit spreads. Moreover, Campbell and Taksler (2003) document the strong 
relationship between equity volatility and bond credit spreads, arguing that it can be an explanatory 
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variable as powerful as the company’s own credit ratings. In fact, in their analysis, both of the 
variables explain about one third of the variation in corporate bond yield spreads. They also find a 
longer-term explanatory relationship between bond spreads and idiosyncratic equity volatility. 
Cremers et al. (2008) use equity implied volatility and skewness as explanatory variable with 
respect to credit spread changes. They also perform a PCA analysis and find the existence of 
spillover effects between option-market liquidity and short-maturity corporate bonds indicating 
how individual option prices contain information about the likelihood of rating migrations.  
The second proxy of a company’s creditworthiness is the Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread. CDSs 
represent the most common type of credit derivatives.  They were designed to transfer the “risk of 
default” of a particular reference entity (underlying debt instrument or debtor: a company or a 
sovereign entity) from a party which is seeking insurance protection (protection buyer) to the party 
that is willing to offer such a protection (protection seller) in exchange for a contractually 
determined fair premium (CDS spread or premium). Through a CDS contract not only the “risk of 
default” can be insured. There are several triggering events against which protection can be bought; 
namely default, bankruptcy, restructuring, repudiation or moratorium and obligation acceleration 
or default. Once one of these credit events takes place, the contract has to be settled either via 
physical or cash settlement, which is specified in the contract. The CDS spread is quoted in basis 
points per annum and is paid in quarterly installments. It represents the fair value of the credit risk 
of the institution. The credit risk that the protection buyer bears is subject to the debt instrument 
he is seeking to insure. The intense growth experienced in the credit derivatives market during the 
last decade incited researchers to better understand what drives the pricing of credit risk (CDS 
spread). The relationship between CDS spreads and corporate bond spreads has also been 
extensively examined. A theoretical arbitrage relation between the two which equals CDS spreads 
to the difference between bond yields and a reference risk-free rate is generally assumed. Blanco 
et al. (2005) consider 33 US and European investment grade firms and find support for the 
theoretical relationship (using the swap rate as the risk-free rate). Moreover, they find that the CDS 
spreads seem to lead bond credit spreads in the process of price discovery causing short-lived 
deviations. These results suggest that CDS spreads tend to respond more quickly to changes in 
credit conditions. Similar results are provided by Longstaff et al. (2005) on a set of US firms using 
the Treasury rate as the risk-free rate. They decompose credit spreads into default and non-default 
components. With respect to the non-default components, they identify individual corporate bond 
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and market wide liquidity (illiquidity) characteristics as the main drivers. The non-default 
components can be considered to explain the difference between CDS spreads and bond spreads. 
Therefore, CDS spreads seem to be a more accurate and cleaner indicator of the firm’s real 
creditworthiness or default risk. This is also confirmed in a study by Ericsson et al. (2009) who 
use a set of structural credit risk models to evaluate both the bond and the CDS spreads for a 
sample of US firms. They find evidence that their models tend to underestimate the bond spreads, 
but not the CDS spreads due to the importance of some omitted non-default risk components, bond 
illiquidity, in particular. 
Following the testing framework of Campbell and Taskler (2003), Benkert (2004) investigates the 
capability of both option implied volatility and historical volatility in explaining CDS spreads. 
Option implied volatility is found to be a more important factor in explaining the variation of credit 
default swap premia compared to historical volatility. Moreover, Ericsson et al. (2005) find 
leverage, volatility and the risk free rate to be important determinants of the CDS spread, 
explaining around 60 percent of the CDS premia. Similar results are found in a study by Zhang et 
al. (2009), where they consider equity volatility risk and jump risk as explanatory variables. The 
authors are able to explain around 48 percent of the CDS spread changes considering volatility 
risk alone. They confirm once more the tight relationship between equity volatility and credit 
spreads. Most studies are mainly based on US companies; because of the availability of reliable 
CDS quotes (see Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002)). 
Based on Acharya and Johnson (2007), Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) investigate the impact of 
announcements on companies credit conditions on both credit default swaps and option markets. 
Their empirical findings show that both the CDS and the option market react prior to the 
announcement of negative news. However, option prices reveal information about such 
forthcoming negative events at least as early as credit spreads. They conclude that option market 
participants trade on unsubstantiated rumors more than investors in the CDS market. In addition, 
they find that the equity market does not react to abnormal movement in options, but a strong 
incremental spillover is found from CDS to equity markets around adverse earnings releases.  
Coudert  and Gex (2010a) use a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and VAR model to 
analyze the link between the CDS and the bond market. Consistent with previous studies (Blanco 
et al. (2005) or Zhu (2004)) they find that the CDS market leads the bond market and the stock 
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market leads the CDS market. Coudert  and Gex (2010b) analyse the links between credit default 
swaps and bonds spreads, including the financial crisis period. They find that the CDS market still 
leads the bond market for corporates and the sovereigns in their sample. Moreover, the financial 
crisis seems to amplify the role of CDS market.  Forte and Pena (2009) further explore the dynamic 
between the CDS, stock and bond markets. Thus, they investigate the relationship between changes 
in credit spread measures, where a modified version of Leland and Toft’s (1996) structural credit 
risk model is calibrated based on stock and CDS data (see Forte (2011)). They apply a general 
VECM representation on a sample of North American and European firms. The results indicate 
that stocks lead credit default swaps and bonds more frequently than the other way around. 
However, their findings also confirm the leading role of CDS markets over bond markets. 
Therefore, they conclude that stock market leads the price discovery process, followed by the CDS 
market. This is consistent with Norden and Weber (2009). In contrast, Meng et al. (2009) find that 
there is not a leading market. They examine the volatility transmission among the credit default 
swap, equity and bond markets using a multivariate GARCH model. They find evidence of 
spillovers beween the three markets, in other words, volatility of one market is transmitted to the 
other two markets. Baba and Inada (2009) work on price discovery for four Japanese mega-banks’ 
credit risk between subordinated credit default swaps and subordinated bond spreads. They use the 
price discovery measures proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995). Their 
finding suggests that the two variables are co-integrated and CDS spreads play a more dominant 
role in price discovery than the bond spreads.  According to their results, the CDS spread has a 
significant effect on other financial market variables especially its own volatility and equity return. 
Furthermore, significant volatility spillovers are detected from the CDS to bond spreads.  
Most of the samples used in the studies mentioned above include non-European firms only or a 
mixture of US and European firms. Byström (2005) investigates the behavior of iTraxx CDS 
Europe indexes. More precisely, he focuses on the relationship between CDS index spread changes 
and stock returns. Computing Pearson and Spearman rank correlations, he arrives at two main 
conclusions:  The first indicates that the stock market tends to lead the CDS index market. While 
the second, shows a significant positive serial correlation in daily changes of the iTraxx index. As 
an extension of this study, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) investigate the determinants of changes in 
the iTraxx Europe indices by applying a Markov switching model (Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) 
and Cosslett and Lee (1985)). The result between credit spreads and their determinants depends in 
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particular on the volatility of the CDS market under normal market conditions (low volatility), the 
CDS spreads are more sensitive to stock returns than they are to stock volatility. While, during 
uncertain periods, the CDS spread depends on stock volatility. Furthermore, they find that 
theoretical determinants of structural credit risk models - interest rates, stock returns and implied 
volatilities - have a significant effect on CDS spreads. This result is consistent with the Benkert 
(2004) and Byström (2005) empirical studies. However, their sample does not include the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. Avino et al. (2011) investigates the price discovery process in single-name 
credit spreads obtained from four markets: bonds, credit default swaps, equities and equity options 
on European data from January 2006 to July 2009. Using a VECM of changes in credit spreads, 
they find that the equity market leads the other markets during tranquil periods, while, during the 
crisis, the option market leads the three other markets. This is confirmed by the strong volatility 
spillovers observed from the option market to the other markets. However, even if the crisis period 
is included, the sample contains only 12 European non-financial companies.  
In this study, we investigate the lead-lag relationship among the European Stock, option and Credit 
Default Swap markets. Our sample is composed of 91 financial and non-financial companies of 
investment and non-investment grade over the period 2005–2010, covering the financial crisis 
period.  
 Data  
In our analysis, we use data related to the three markets: stock prices, equity option implied 
volatilities and credit default swap spreads. The data is obtained from Thomson Reuters. The initial 
data set consists of 163 European companies with daily observations from November 2003 to 
November 2010. After matching all the variables, the companies, the periods and dealing with 
missing data, we obtain a final sample of 91 companies from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010, 
and therefore, a total of 123,760 observations for each variable. We consider investment-grade and 
non-investment grade companies from financial and non-financial sectors. 
CDS market  
We extract Senior CDSs with 5 year maturity, as they are the most liquid CDS contracts. We obtain 
data from Thomson Reuters DataStream, coming from Credit Market Analysis (CMA), the 
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available historical data goes back to 01/01/2004. According to Thomson Reuters DataStream, “CMA 
datavision receives credit default swap (CDS) prices (“quote spreads”) from a range of market contributors. 
These contributors consist of both buy and sell side institutions active in the fixed income markets such as 
asset managers, hedge funds and banks. These active market participants provide CMA with both real-time 
and delayed prices of executed trades, firm or indicative bid/offers on a specific entities (e.g. company or 
emerging market), tenors, seniorities (ranking of the debt receiving moneys in case of default) and 
restructuring types. To ensure the highest level of accuracy CMA checks these prices against previous 
quotes and validates those using related securities and news. For less liquid entities where market activity 
is infrequent, CMA calculates the fair CDS spread using a proprietary issuer/sector curve model that derives 
an appropriate curve using known liquid CDS spreads, bond spreads and ratings data”. We use the 
midpoint of bid/ask rates expressed in basis points. Additionally, the bid and ask rates are both 
used in the study to construct an indicator of liquidity in the CDS market. 
Option market 
The relevant equity options data is also obtained from Thomson Reuters. For each firm and for 
both call and put options, an at-the-money implied volatility (IV) measure is retrieved. The implied 
volatility variable is the second most important element of our analysis. In fact, in order for a 
company to be included in the study, options trading volume has to be sufficiently high. In order 
to estimate a unique indicator of a firm’s equity options IV, an average of the call IV and put IV 
is calculated. This is done in order to reduce the possible noise contained in the data, because the 
relevant calls and puts could be traded at different points in time and, therefore, at different implied 
volatilities. The measure of IV provided is the at-the-money (ATM) implied volatility interpolated 
for a continuous series of options. According to Thomson Reuters definitions, the continuous series 
for calls or puts are calculated using the nearest expiry month options. Using MB Risk 
Management (MBRM)  UNIVOPT – Universal Options Add In software together with the Black-
Scholes and the Cox-Rubinstein Binomial Model, interpolated ATM-IV is estimated taking into 
consideration: “The nearest two options series at-the-money available: One above and one below 
the underlying price. For example if the underlying is 655 and the two closest ATM strikes are 650 
and 700, the implied volatility of the 650 strike will be weighted 45/50 against the implied 
volatility 700 strike which is weighted 5/50” (Thomson Reuters Definitions).  
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Stock market  
Daily observations for the Total Return Index (TRI) are also obtained from Thomson Reuters, 
assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of equity at the closing price 
applicable on the ex-dividend. Adjusted closing prices are used to determine price index and return 
index. Since, the sample also contains United Kingdom companies; the prices are converted from 
GBP to EUR using the actual exchange rate. 
Table 2.1.  Summary Statistics 
Notes: For each variable, Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of the time-series averages of the entire sample firms. CDS Spread is the daily 
five-year composite credit default swap spread; Historical Volatility is the 252-day historical volatility; Implied Volatility is the average of call and 
put implied volatilities at the money interpolated as available on Thomson Datastream; Firm Daily Stock Return is the annualized daily average 
of firm continuously compounded stock returns; CDS Spread Changes and Implied Volatility Changes are the daily change in CDS spreads and IVs 
of the average sample firm, respectively. The sample period covers the period from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010. 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the time series averages of variables used in the study 
during the period from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010.  It can be seen that, on average, firms 
in the sample have performed poorly with an annualized average stock return of -2.02 percent, 
although, the cross-sectional standard deviation shows a high value of 9.58 percent, indicating that 
there is some heterogeneity between the various firms’ performances in the sample. Considering 
the fact that CDS spreads are considered to be indicators of a firm’s creditworthiness, a high mean 
CDS spread (106 basis points) indicates that the sample also contains risky firms, while the 
standard deviation of 92.01 basis points suggest that the sample firms display a representative 
range of default risk levels. In fact, they range from a minimum value of 27 basis points to a 
maximum of 606 basis points. Furthermore, the reported implied volatility and the historical 
volatility present similar characteristics. The heterogeneity observed in our sample leads us to split 
Variable Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 
CDS spread (bps)
 
106.01 70.74 92.01     27.12       605.84 54.05 128.73 
Historical volatility 33.41% 32.24% 7.99%  20.58% 59.08% 27.05 39.82% 
Implied volatility 33.09% 31.79% 7.44% 14.99% 53.53% 27.78% 39.07% 
Stock returns (annual) -2.02% -0.76% 9.58% -47.63% 14.87% -7.06% 3.78% 
CDS spread change 6.32% 4.78% 9.01% -33.25% 44.06% 3.04% 6.94% 
Implied volatility change  0.006% 0.006% 0.006% -0.020 0.022% 0.002% 0.009% 
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our initial sample to allow for sub-sample analysis. Hence, we also provide summary statistics for 
the sub samples in our analysis. The sample was divided according to: financial & non-financial 
sector, before & after the crisis, the credit worthiness and finally the CDS’ market liquidity. 
Table 2.2. Before vs. during and after the crisis 
 
Figure 2.1. Daily CDS spread vs. Implied Volatility 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the daily evolution of the CDS spread (bps) and implied volatilities over the period 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010; The 
solid line represents the cross-sectional average of CDS spreads while dash line represents the cross-sectional average of implied volatility. 
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of the times series averages of variables for two sub 
periods: Before (from 15 July 2005 to 31 August 2007), during, and after the crisis (from 03 
September 2007 to 30 September 2010). We consider crisis period start from 3 September 2007, 
Variable Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 
Panel 1. Before the crisis : 15/07/2005 to 31/08/2007 
CDS spread (bps)
 
39.77 28.03 44.91 5.79 290.98 15.88 44.52 
Historical volatility 21.62% 20.62% 4.91%  14.06% 47.48% 18.60% 23.54% 
Implied volatility 23.41% 22.97% 4.73% 10.64% 47.73% 21.07% 25.52% 
Stock returns (annual) 15.37% 15.37% 12.60% -10.08% 61.74% 7.06% 21.42% 
CDS spread change 0.98% 0.95% 10.75% -63.18% 54.60% -0.56% 2.94% 
Implied volatility change  0.017% 0.016% 0.011% -0.027% 0.048% 0.010% 0.025% 
Panel 2. During & after the crisis: 03/09/2007 to 30/09/2010 
CDS spread  (bps)
 
151.82 100.74 135.22     40.24       873.41 72.37 183.28 
Historical volatility 41.61% 38.69% 12.02%  25.12% 88.64% 32.05% 49.53% 
Implied volatility 39.79% 37.79% 10.83% 18.00% 77.29% 31.10% 48.35% 
Stock returns (annual) -13.86% -11.59% 14.11% -80.39% 9.83% -21.17% -4.54% 
CDS spread change 10.02% 7.29% 12.11% -26.86% 62.30% 5.01% 10.77% 
Implied volatility change  -0.001% -0.001% 0.007% -0.022% 0.021% -0.006% 0.003% 
Before the crisis  During/after the crisis 
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because the most important negative events have occurred from that date onwards7. The average 
CDS spread increased by 282% between the period before and after the crisis going from 40 to 
152 basis points as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Given that the CDS spread is one of the risk measures, 
this increase in average spread shows that risk has increased significantly during the period of the 
financial crisis. Implied volatilities have also increased by 74% (from 23% to 40%) during the two 
periods (also illustrated in Figure 2.1). The table also shows an increase of the standard deviation 
between the two periods for both CDS spreads and implied volatilities, an increase of 201% and 
129% respectively suggest that the financial crisis has also amplified the heterogeneity of the 
sample firms. Not surprisingly, the annualized average stock return decreases during the crisis to 
-13.86%, while the mean was 15.37% before the crisis.  
Table 2.3. Financial vs. non-financial firms 
Notes: For each variable, Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics of the time-series averages of the two panels: Non financial sector (panel 1) 
and Financial sector (panel 2). CDS Spread is the daily five-year composite credit default swap spread; Historical Volatility is the 252-day historical 
volatility; Implied Volatility is the average of call and put implied volatilities of at the money options; Firm Daily Stock Return is the annualized 
daily average of firm continuously compounded stock returns; CDS Spread Changes and Implied Volatility Changes are the daily change in CDS 
spreads and IV of the average sub-samples firms respectively. The sample period extends from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010. 
 
 
 
7 We perform a Chow test, which suggest August 31 2007 as the breaking-point date. Alternatively, one could use the NBER 
recession dates to justify the choice of the sub periods. 
Variable Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 
Panel 1. Non-financial sector 
CDS spread (bps)
 
112.30 70.69 100.27   27.12   605.84 52.01 145.35 
Historical volatility 31.56% 30.23% 7.06% 20.58% 50.56% 25.70% 36.53% 
Implied volatility 31.59% 29.72% 6.96% 14.99% 47.88% 26.71% 36.75% 
Stock returns (annual) 0.00% 0.76% 7.81% -25.96% 14.87% -5.54% 4.79% 
CDS spread change 6.12% 4.17% 9.95% -33.25% 44.06% 2.72% 5.87% 
Implied volatility change  0.004% 0.005% 0.005% -0.020% 0.021% 0.002% 0.007% 
Panel 2. Financial sector 
CDS spread (bps)
 
78.62 70.74 27.72     44.20    138.91 57.57 88.03 
Historical volatility 41.46% 40.72% 6.86% 30.54% 59.08% 37.59% 45.28% 
Implied volatility 39.65% 39.52% 5.85% 29.22% 53.53% 37.57% 41.04% 
Stock returns (annual) -10.33% -8.82% 12.10% -47.63% 6.55% -15.88% -1.76% 
CDS spread change 7.22% 6.96% 2.12% 3.61% 12.45% 6.20% 8.27% 
Implied volatility change  0.012% 0.012% 0.006% 0.002% 0.022% 0.008% 0.015% 
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Figure 2.2. Financial vs. non-financial CDS spread 
 
Notes: Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the CDS spread (bps) of the financial and non-financial sector over the period 15 July 2005 to 30 
September 2010; The solid line represents the cross-sectional average of non-financial firms (74 firms), while the dashed line represents the 
cross-sectional average of financial firms (17 firms). 
 
Table 2.3 reports summary statistics of the times series averages of variables for the financial and 
non-financial sectors. The CDS spread average is much higher for non-financial sector than 
financial sector, respectively 112 and 79 basis points. On the other hand, the average implied 
volatility of the financial sector exceeds the one in the non-financial sector, 40% against 32%. So, 
the non-financial sector appears to be more risky than the financial sector when looking at the CDS 
market, while, the financial sector appears to be the more risky when we evaluate option prices. 
The CDS spread evolution over the entire period is shown in Figure 2.2 This shows that before the 
financial crisis, the financial sector is less risky than the other sector, while during the financial 
crisis, the difference between the average spreads of the two sectors is quite volatile and at some 
point the financial sector becomes more risky. The standard deviation of both CDS spread and 
implied volatility shows that the financial sample is more homogeneous compared to the non-
financial sample.   
 
 
 
Before the crisis  During and after  the crisis 
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Table 2.4.  Relative CDS bid-ask spread as proxy of liquidity 
Notes: For each variable, Table 2.4 reports the summary statistics of the time-series averages for the three sub sample according to CDS market 
liquidity subdivision. CDS Spread is the daily five-year composite credit default swap spread; Historical Volatility is the 252-day historical volatility; 
Implied Volatility is the average of call and put implied volatilities of at the money options; Firm Daily Stock Return is the annualized daily average 
of firm continuously compounded stock returns; CDS Spread Changes and Implied Volatility Changes are the daily change in CDS spreads and IV 
of the average sub-samples firms respectively. The sample period extends from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010. 
 
Table 2.4 reports the summary statistics of the times series averages of variables for the three sub 
samples according to CDS market liquidity. The liquidity of the CDS market is proxied by the 
relative bid-ask spread, the ratio of the bid-ask spread and the CDS mid-point. This measure is 
inspired by Chen, et. al. (2010), the authors refer to it as the “normalized bid-ask spread”. We can 
see from the table that the most liquid firms have the highest CDS spreads (149 basis points on 
average) and implied volatilities (35%) compared to the less liquid firms.  
 
 
Variable Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 
Panel 1. High liquidity 
CDS spread (bps)
 
148.64 119.81 121.61     47.71     605.84 70.03 164.44 
Historical volatility 34.53% 34.96% 6.65%   23.67% 45.46% 28.63% 40.36% 
Implied volatility 35.31% 36.71% 6.46% 24.20% 46.56% 29.37% 40.11% 
Stock returns (annual) -2.02% -0.25% 9.58% -25.96% 14.62% -8.06% 4.54% 
CDS spread change 9.02% 5.53% 12.02% -9.42% 44.06% 2.60% 10.09% 
Implied volatility change  0.006% 0.006% 0.005% -0.009% 0.021% 0.004% 0.009% 
Panel 2. Medium liquidity  
CDS spread (bps)
 
60.33 53.51 30.84 29.23       194.76 44.06 65.27 
Historical volatility 31.87% 31.68% 6.52% 22.48% 46.10% 25.60% 37.08% 
Implied volatility 31.39% 29.70% 6.04% 18.76% 44.68% 27.23% 36.23% 
Stock returns (annual) -0.76% -1.01% 8.06% -20.41% 14.87% -6.05% 5.80% 
CDS spread change 5.06% 4.22% 3.29% 2.04% 19.50% 3.39% 6.35% 
Implied volatility change  0.008% 0.007% 0.006% -0.001% 0.022% 0.003% 0.012% 
Panel 3. Low liquidity  
CDS spread (bps)
 
108.97 81.64 79.20    27.12       357.88 56.89 135.37 
Historical volatility 33.81% 31.55% 10.20% 20.58% 59.08% 25.79% 42.35% 
Implied volatility 32.59% 31.84% 9.09% 14.99% 53.53% 25.46% 38.39% 
Stock returns (annual) -2.77% -1.26% 11.34% -47.63% 13.61% -6.55% 2.77% 
CDS spread change 4.94% 4.82% 9.10% -33.25% 26.24% 3.49% 7.05% 
Implied volatility change  0.004% 0.004% 0.006% -0.020% 0.020% 0.002% 0.007% 
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Table 2.5. Credit worthiness proxied by CDS spread 
Notes: For each variable, Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics of the time-series averages according firms credit worthiness subdivision 
proxied by CDS spread (BPS). CDS Spread is the daily five-year composite credit default swap spread; Historical Volatility is the 252-day 
historical volatility; Implied Volatility is the average of call and put implied volatilities of at the money options; Firm Daily Stock Return the 
annualized daily average of firm continuously compounded stock returns; CDS Spread Changes and Implied Volatility Changes are the daily 
change  in CDS spreads and IV of the average sub-samples firms respectively. The sample period extends from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 
2010. 
Figure 2.3.  Credit worthiness proxied by CDS spread 
 
Notes: Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the CDS spread according to the credit worthiness subdivision proxied by CDS spread (bps) over the 
period 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010;  The dashed line (G1) represents the cross-sectional average of the high-grade companies; The solid 
line (G2) represents the cross-sectional average of mid-grade companies , while the dotted line (G3) represents the cross-sectional average of 
low-grade companies. 
Variable Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 
Panel 1. High-grade 
CDS spread (bps)
 
46.12 45.15 8.24     27.12    57.05 43.29 53.36 
Historical volatility 28.38% 27.17% 5.52%  20.58% 46.10% 25.07% 29.75% 
Implied volatility 28.67% 28.01% 5.46% 18.76% 44.68% 25.77% 30.39% 
Stock returns (annual) 0.76% 1.26% 7.81% -20.41% 14.87% -3.02% 5.04% 
CDS spread change 3.96% 3.59% 2.07% 1.62% 11.69% 2.66% 4.21% 
Implied volatility change  0.005% 0.004% 0.005% -0.002% 0.004% 0.002% 0.006% 
Panel 2. Mid-grade 
CDS spread (bps)
 
73.87 69.79 12.80     57.52     97.18 63.83 86.43 
Historical volatility 33.38% 31.94% 8.40%   21.94% 59.08% 28.43% 39.41% 
Implied volatility 32.63% 31.63% 7.72% 14.99% 53.53% 27.49% 37.64% 
Stock returns (annual) -4.28% -2.02% 11.09% -47.63% 11.59% -8.06% 1.76% 
CDS spread change 5.02% 5.16% 2.88% -3.99% 12.45% 3.33% 6.47% 
Implied volatility change  0.007% 0.005% 0.006% -0.002% 0.021% 0.003% 0.012% 
Panel 3.  Low-grade 
CDS spread (bps)
 
195.08 156.91 111.17   113.02      605.84 128.73 200.46 
Historical volatility 38.30% 37.67% 6.64% 24.11% 50.56% 33.98% 42.87% 
Implied volatility 37.82% 38.99% 6.08% 24.69% 47.88% 33.42% 41.64% 
Stock returns (annual) -2.27% -0.76% 9.58% -25.96% 14.62% -8.06% 4.03% 
CDS spread change 9.87% 6.29% 14.53% -33.25% 44.06% 4.33% 17.89% 
Implied volatility change  0.006% 0.007% 0.007% -0.020% 0.021% 0.005% 0.009% 
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Table 2.5 reports summary statistics of the times series averages of variables according to credit 
worthiness sub-samples. The average CDS spread for the creditworthy companies is less than one-
third of that for the lowest credit grade companies (46 basis points and 195 basis points, 
respectively). Implied volatility is also higher for the low-grade companies 38%, while it is 29% 
for the high-grade companies. Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the CDS spread for each of the 
three sub-samples over all the study period. It highlights that the increase in spreads during the 
crisis is much more severe for the low-grade companies compared to the other two groups. This 
shows that the financial crisis had a greater impact on companies of speculative grade, which is 
also found in other studies (see e.g. Avino et al. (2011)). 
 Methodology 
We apply a methodology similar to Acharya and Johnson (2007). Though we do not implement 
panel data regressions, but Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) (see e.g. Zellner, 1962) and 
then perform a cross-sectional t-test in order to verify the statistical significance of our average 
cross-sectional coefficient estimates. Using panel data regression in our analysis will lead to 
inefficient results. Indeed, both fixed and random effect panel regressions are based on the 
assumption of a large cross section N and a small time-series T, while our sample is characterized 
by large T and small N. In this case it is more appropriate to use SUR regressions. The 
methodology involves two steps; the first one allows us to extract the residuals, which we use in 
the second step as explanatory variables, thus, the model, can be estimated using SUR 
methodology. 
In the first step, we regress the daily changes8 in CDS spreads, IVs and stock returns on the lagged 
values of CDS spread, IV changes and stock returns. To derive the CDS, option and stock market 
residual (respectively tCDSr , , tIVr , and tRr , ), we estimate the following equations separately and for 
each company 9: 
8 We perform Augmented Dickey Fuller test for unit root on the three variables: CDS spreads, IV and R. The test and the 
autocorrelogram show that the returns are stationary, while the CDS spreads and IV are not.  To obtain stationary time series, we 
calculate first difference on CDS spreads and IV time series. We run the test again, which shows the absence of a unit root. 
9 Using Akaike’s (1974) Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), the equation 
specification with three lags was found to be sufficient.  
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From these three regressions, we obtain three vectors of residual. The lagged values of these 
residuals are then used as independent variables in the second step regression in equations 4, 5 and 
6. We do this for up to three lags to absorb any lagged information transmission. The resulting 
residuals from each of the regressions can be interpreted as independent news from one market 
either not relevant or simply not appreciated by the other markets. These residuals should represent 
the amount of unique information contained in each market (option, stock and CDS market).  
In the second step, changes in CDS spreads, IV and stock returns are regressed over the three 
lagged residuals. This allows us to investigate the predictive explanatory power of the unique 
information contained in each market with respect to future stock, CDS and option market 
movements. 
  tStSSStIVIVStCDSCDSSStS rrrR ,1,,1,,1,,, εβββα ++++= −−−                                 (4) 
    tCDStSSCDStIVIVCDStCDSCDSCDSCDSt rrrCDS ,1,,1,,1,, εβββα ++++=∆ −−−               (5)     
   tIVtSSIVtIVIVIVtCDSCDSIVIVt rrrIV ,1,,1,,1,, εβββα ++++=∆ −−−                             (6) 
We use the SUR method to estimate the three equations independently. So, for each equation 
presented above, using the SUR approach, we estimate jointly the company-specific equations, 
taking into account the contemporaneous correlation of errors terms across firms. Formally: 
 
             For t=s and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
[ ] jisjtiE ,,, , ρεε =
 
 Page37 
The method involves two steps, the first one consists of running OLS regression. The residuals 
produced by OLS estimation will be used to construct the variance matrix ∑, where the elements 
are given by the expression: 
jiij T
εεσ ˆ1ˆ ′=
.
 
The matrix obtained in the first step is used in the second step to run the GLS estimation to obtain 
the coefficients: 
( ) ( )yIXXIX TT )ˆ()ˆ(ˆ 111 ⊗Σ′⊗Σ′= −−−β . 
X is the matrix of explanatory variables: rCDS,t-1, rIV,t-1 and rS,t-1. This matrix is the same for the three 
equations. Y represents the vector of dependent variables: tSR , , tCDS∆  and tIV∆  in equations 
4, 5 and 6, respectively.  
The cross-sectional average coefficient estimates (betas) and t-statistics (obtained through the 
cross-sectional t-test) are reported in Tables 6 through 9. Note that if errors turn out to be 
uncorrelated or when the set of independent variables is the same, using SUR results in a standard 
OLS estimation in terms of efficiency. 
 Empirical Results 
As already outlined in the introduction section, we aim to investigate the price discovery process 
exploring the lead-lag relation among stock, options, and CDS markets. As mentioned before, the 
US results of Cao et al. (2010) are consistent with the preference of informed traders to first using 
both options and CDS markets to exploit their informational advantages. Inspired by those results, 
we examine how the price discovery process unfolds across European stock, option and CDS 
markets. In order to do this we apply a methodology similar to the one used in Acharya and 
Johnson (2007). US results suggest that CDS spread and IV changes can forecast future stock 
returns and they report this as evidence for informed investors’ preference for the option and CDS 
markets to exploit their insider information compared to the stock market.  
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Table 2.6. Lead-Lag Analysis: Entire Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cross-sectional average coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) of lead-lag time series SUR regressions of changes of the CDS spread, 
implied volatility and the stock return for the entire sample. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are used to compute t-statistics. (***) 
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The regression equations and the 
coefficients are defined in equations (8)-(10). The sample period extends from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010. 
Table 2.6 presents the overall results for our European sample. We report the cross-sectional 
average coefficient estimates (average betas from the SUR regressions) and t-statistics (obtained 
through the cross-sectional t-test). For example, βIV,CDS refers to the coefficient obtained with 
respect to the ability of the CDS market to consistently forecast changes in implied volatilities. In 
contrast to the US results, it is apparent that the preference of investors for the equity option 
markets does not entirely hold in European markets; in fact, innovations in the option markets do 
not predict future movements in the stock or CDS markets. Both coefficients (βS,IV and βCDS,IV) are 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
However, the CDS market seems to play a leading role in the price discovery process. The 
coefficient related to the impact of the CDS market on stock returns is negative (-7.9 E-05) and 
significant at 1 percent level, suggesting that an increase in the credit spread of 10 bps today will 
lead to a negative return in the stock price of -0.00079 (or -0.2 annualized) on the following day. 
In other words, negative news about the creditworthiness of a firm (in line with an increase in the 
spread) translates into a moderate drop in stock prices. Moreover considering the relationship 
between CDS and option markets, it was found in US studies that innovations in the option markets 
can consistently forecast changes in the CDS spreads, but not the other way around. We report 
Entire sample 
CDSS ,β  
-7.9 E-05 
(-4.03)*** 
IVS ,β  
-0.00 
(-1.53) 
SCDS ,β  
-11.00 
(-5.64)*** 
IVCDS ,β  
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
SIV ,β  
-2.37 
(-2.96)** 
CDSIV ,β  
0.01 
(5.29)*** 
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contrasting results, suggested by the previously mentioned insignificant βCDS,IV  and the positive 
and significant (at the 1 percent level) coefficient obtained with respect to the predictive power of 
the CDS market on changes in implied volatilities (βIV,CDS). According to the estimated coefficient, 
an increase of 10 bps in the CDS spread today will cause a 0.1% increase in implied volatility 
tomorrow, on average. This confirms the strong relationship between the two markets already 
documented in previous studies and takes this one step further, as we show that beyond displaying 
a contemporaneous link, the CDS market is also leading the price discovery process in the option 
markets. Informed investors tend to prefer the CDS market to the option markets to exploit their 
informational advantages. 
Furthermore, considering the predictive power of innovations in the stock market, we find that 
with respect to both the CDS and the option market the average coefficients (βCDS, S and βIV, S) -
11.00 and -2.37, respectively, are found to be negative and statistically significant (at the 1 and 5 
percent level), documenting how the stock market seems to also lead the price discovery process 
in the other two markets. With respect to the coefficient being negative, it can be seen that a 
negative change of 1% in the stock return triggers a widening of the CDS spread of 11 bps and a 
positive change in IV of  2.37% over the next day. Regarding the option market, this phenomenon 
was first discovered by Black (1976, p.177), who observed that the amplitude of relative price 
fluctuations (“volatility”) of a stock tends to increase when its price drops, which refer to the well 
documented “leverage effect”. This effect is particularly important for option markets: option 
prices indeed reflect the fact that a negative volatility-return correlation induces a negative 
skewness in the risk-neutral distribution. Considering the positive contemporaneous relationship 
already documented in previous studies between IV and CDS spreads and the fact that they are 
both measures of a firm’s riskiness, it is not surprising to find the same negative lead-lag relation 
between stock returns and CDS spreads. These results are also in line with Norden and Weber 
(2009) who find that European stock returns lead CDS and bond spread changes.  
As a robustness check we subdivide our regression results into sub-samples according to sectors 
(financial vs. non-financial), creditworthiness (proxied by level of CDS spread) and liquidity 
(proxied by the bid-ask spread relative to the CDS mid-point).  
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Table 2.7. Lead-Lag Analysis: Financial vs. non- Financial sector subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cross-sectional average coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) of lead-lag time series SUR regressions of changes of the CDS spread, 
implied volatility and the stock return for each of the sub-groups. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are used to compute t-statistics. (***) 
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The regression equations and the 
coefficients are defined in equations (8)-(10). The sample period extends from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010. 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 report the results for the cross-sectional average coefficient estimates (betas) 
and their relative t-statistics (obtained through the implementation of the afore-mentioned cross-
sectional t-test). The results in Table 2.7 suggest that the overall results are partly driven by the 
financial companies in the sample. The results for financial firms are typically similar in terms of 
statistical significance, but always stronger in terms of economic significance as a result of the 
increased importance of financial firms in investment decisions of market participants’ during the 
crisis periods. Interestingly, for financial firms, we find a volatility feedback effect from the option 
market to the stock market (see e.g. Fan et al. (2013) or Bollerslev et al. (2014)). The estimated 
coefficient of the impact of IV on stock return is equal to -2.7E-04, meaning that a 10% increase 
in IV results in a slight decrease, on average -0.0027% of the stock prices (or -0.7% annualized) 
on the following day. 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variable 
Financial / non-financial Sector  
Financial Non-financial 
CDSS ,β                  -1.2 E-04 (-5.70)*** 
-7.0 E-05 
(-3.64)*** 
IVS ,β  
- 2.7 E-04 
(-3.60)*** 
- 1.1 E-04 
 (-1.15) 
SCDS ,β  
-8.88 
(-8.05)*** 
-11.49 
(-5.49)*** 
IVCDS ,β  
-0.01 
(-1.28) 
-0.01 
(-0.49) 
SIV ,β  
-7.47 
(-5.96)*** 
-1.20 
(-2.04)* 
CDSIV ,β  
0.01 
(6.41)*** 
0.01 
(5.05)*** 
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Table 2.8  Lead-Lag Analysis: Credit worthiness and Liquidity subsample 
Notes: Cross-sectional average coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) of lead-lag time series SUR regressions of changes of the CDS spread, 
implied volatility and the stock return for each of the sub-groups. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are used to compute t-statistics. (***) 
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The regression equations and the 
coefficients are defined in equations (8)-(10). The sample period extends from 15 July 2005 to 30 September 2010. 
Table 2.8 exhibits the lead-lag results from a company’s credit quality point of view using CDS 
spread levels to form the sub-samples. Again, both the CDS market and the stock market seem to 
lead the price discovery process in the option markets across all groups. Therefore, the findings 
are in line with Cao et al. (2010) and Acharya and Johnson (2007), suggesting the existence of two 
different groups of investors: a sophisticated one, which considers to enter the CDS market and a 
less sophisticated one, which instead prefers the more traditional stock market involvement. The 
reported results are also in line with what Norden and Weber (2009) in a way that the CDS market 
seems to be more sensitive to the stock market as the credit quality of the reference entity 
decreases; in fact, looking at the average coefficients going from high to low the relationship 
becomes stronger.  
An interesting result emerges concerning the option and stock market dynamics as βS,IV becomes 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level moving from low to high. An increase of 10% in IV 
leads to a -0.0014% (or -0.4% annualized) decrease in stock returns for mid-grade firms and -
0.0036% (or -0.9% annualized) for high-grade firms the next day. This could be interpreted as a  
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Creditworthiness Liquidity 
High-grade Mid-grade Low-grade High Medium Low 
CDSS ,β  -8.5 E-05 (-3.54)*** 
-9.9 E-05 
(-4.52)*** 
-5.3 E-05 
(-5.66)*** 
-1.1 E-04 
(-5.84)*** 
-2.3 E-05 
(-1.00) 
-1.0 E-04 
(-6.81)*** 
IVS ,β  
-3.6 E-04 
(-2.91)*** 
-1.4 E-04 
(-1.79)* 
7.4 E-04 
(1.38) 
-7.9 E-05 
(-1.90)* 
-3.7 E-04 
(-3.10)*** 
2.5 E-05 
(0.27) 
SCDS ,β  
-4.45 
(-3.69)*** 
-4.41 
(-4.17)*** 
-23.71 
(-9.70)*** 
-15.72 
(-6.88)*** 
-2.26 
(-2.74)*** 
-14.89 
(-7.23)*** 
IVCDS ,β  
-0.01 
(-1.16) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.73) 
-0.04 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.00 
(-0.28) 
0.02 
(0.87) 
SIV ,β  
-1.25 
(-1.99)* 
-4.15 
(-3.92)*** 
-1.74 
(-2.87)*** 
-1.08 
(-2.07)** 
-1.58 
(-2.14)** 
-4.40 
(-4.35)*** 
CDSIV ,β  
0.01 
(5.36)*** 
0.01 
 (6.06)*** 
0.01 
 (4.65)*** 
0.01 
 (6.35)*** 
0.01 
 (5.45)*** 
0.01 
(4.21)*** 
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sign that for more solid firms, investors tend to exploit their knowledge through opening positions 
in the option markets. For those firms, despite the existence of a fairly new competitive CDS 
market, the option markets still plays an important role in the price discovery process. Finally, 
Table 2.8 also summarizes the results looking at CDS market liquidity indicators, using the bid-
ask spread relative to the CDS mid-point as a proxy for liquidity. Since the results are similar we 
only comment on the ones involving the option market. As can be seen from Table 2.8, the stock 
market seems to be leading the price discovery process in both the option and CDS markets for 
the most liquid firms. The estimated coefficient βCDS, S of firms with high liquidity is large (-15.72) 
meaning that 1% decrease in stock returns today results in a 15.72 bps widening of CDS spreads 
tomorrow. This increase is less important for companies with medium liquidity; their CDS spreads 
increase by only 2.26 bps on average. As to βIV, S, the coefficients are quite similar for firms with 
high and medium liquidity (-1.08 and -1.58, respectively), which means that a 1% negative change 
of stock returns causes an increase in IV of 1.08% and 1.58% on the following day.  
On the other hand, there is also evidence of some spillover effect of the CDS and option markets 
into the stock market. In line with the results regarding creditworthiness, the more liquid the 
derivatives markets, the more investors tend to exploit their knowledge through opening positions 
in the option markets, leading to significant coefficients βS,IV  and βCDS,IV.. Finally, looking at the 
CDS and option market relationship, it can be seen that as the liquidity in the CDS market 
increases, the linkages between the two markets becomes stronger. 
Finally, we would like to separately analyze the price discovery process of the three markets before 
and during/after the financial crisis. Detailed results are presented in Table 2.9. 
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Table 2.9. Lead-Lag Analysis: Before and during/after crisis subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cross-sectional average coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) of lead-lag time series SUR regressions of changes of the CDS spread, 
implied volatility and the stock return for each of the sub-groups. Newey and West (1987) standard errors are used to compute t-statistics. (***) 
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The regression equations and the 
coefficients are defined in equations (8)-(10). The first sample period extends from 15/07/2005 to 30/08/2007  and the second sample period 
extends from 03/09/2007 to 30/09/2010. 
 
A striking result is that our overall findings are very much driven by the dynamics that we observe 
during the financial crisis. Before the crisis, and in line with most of the US studies, we observe 
that the option market is leading the CDS market and therefore, the option market plays a crucial 
role in the price discovery process. In this period, we do not observe different spillover effects. 
Most of the other dynamics that we observe and previously discussed emerge during the recent 
financial crisis. One exception is the negative coefficient βCDS,IV , suggesting that the option market 
is negatively influencing the CDS market, which is only marginally statistically and economically 
significant, but counterintuitive and puzzling, highlighting the unique characteristics of the recent 
crisis.  
 
 
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Sub periods 
Before the crisis  During/after the crisis 
CDSS ,β  7.3 E-05 ( 1.37) 
-1.1 E-04 
( -4.90)*** 
IVS ,β  
-6.4 E-05 
( -0.63) 
-1.3 E-04 
( -1.30) 
SCDS ,β  
-2.13 
( -1.49) 
-15.00 
( -6.09)*** 
IVCDS ,β  
0.04 
( 2.58)** 
-0.03 
( -1.68)* 
SIV ,β  
0.00 
( 0.34) 
-3.14 
(-3.71)*** 
CDSIV ,β  
9.5 E-04 
( 0.09) 
0.13 
 (5.66 )*** 
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 Conclusion 
The aim of this European study covering the financial crisis period is to empirically investigate 
the relative informational efficiency of stock, options and credit default swaps. We try to answer 
this question by testing for a lead-lag relationship and exploring the price discovery dynamics 
across all three markets. Tracking the relatively recent field of research, which investigates the 
information content of equity options and CDS to predict returns on the underlying stock (see Cao 
et al. (2005 and 2010), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Acharya and Johnson (2007)), we perform 
another two step time-series regression analysis together with a cross-sectional t-test which, first, 
tries to identify the information advantage of each market with respect to the others and then uses 
this as explanatory variable for future changes in the other markets. Overall, it can be concluded 
that investors seem to first prefer stock and CDS market involvement to exploit their informational 
advantages and then move to option markets. Therefore, the findings suggest the existence of two 
different groups of investors: more sophisticated one, which considers entering the CDS market 
and a less sophisticated one, which instead sticks with more traditional capital markets dynamics 
to exploit its knowledge.  
In particular, a lead-lag relation is found between the CDS market and the other markets, in which 
changes in CDS spreads are able to consistently forecast changes in stock prices and equity 
options’ implied volatilities, indicating how the fast growing CDS market seems to play a special 
role in the price discovery process. Moreover, in contrast to US results, the stock market is found 
to forecast changes in the other two markets suggesting that investors also prefer stock market 
involvement to exploit their informational advantages and then move to CDS and option markets. 
Interestingly, these patterns have only emerged during the recent financial crisis, while before the 
crisis the option market was found to be of major importance in the price discovery process. 
Additionally, we find those relationships being substantially stronger for financial firms relative 
to non-financial firms as a result of the increased importance of financial firms in market 
participants’ investment decisions during the crisis periods. With respect to informed/insider 
trading as the common underpinning of price discovery in the option and stock markets, we find 
that only for highly rated, most liquid and financial firms the option market is leading the stock 
market.  
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Chapter Three 
 
3 CDS Contracts versus Put Options :    
A robust relationship? 
 
 
 Introduction  
The Chicago Board Options Exchange argues in a report published in March 2009 that deep out 
the money options (DOOM options henceforth) can be used by investors as a “viable” and “liquid” 
alternative to CDS contracts10. Various reasons are put forward to defend this idea. Firstly, both 
derivatives tend to behave in the same way, particularly in times of credit crisis. Secondly, DOOM 
options occasionally prove to be a better indicator of credit deterioration than the CDS market. 
The last set of reasons is tied to the transparent feature and relatively low transaction costs of 
DOOM options as opposed the opaque nature and high transaction costs of CDS contracts. The 
whole CBOE argument is based on the work of Carr and Wu (2011). A paper where the authors 
propose a robust theoretical linkage between these two derivatives. In view of growing concerns 
about credit protection solutions, this study relies on the same model so as to verify the story put 
forward by the CBOE. It seems relevant to investigate the extent to which combined information 
contained in DOOM put options and CDS contracts can be used in the pricing of credit risk. More 
precisely, we exploit an existing theoretical link which proves an equivalence between a DOOM 
put option and a CDS contract to back out default arrival rates which are typically extracted from 
CDS contracts only. In this sense, we take a different empirical approach than Carr and Wu’s 
(2011): We do not place the focus on computing unit recovery claims values extracted from a CDS 
10 http://www.cboe.com/micro/doom/doomquickreference.aspx 
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contract and comparing them to values of unit recovery claims extracted from a DOOM option. 
Rather, we are interested in using the theoretical linkage between these two types of derivatives, 
and hence the combined information from CDS and DOOM options to provide estimates of default 
arrival rates.  
The model underlying the study is a ‘simple’ theoretical link between DOOM American put 
options on a company’s stock  and a credit insurance contract on the company’s bond. The key 
underpinning of the model is the presence of   ‘default corridor’ [A,B]  the stock price cannot 
penetrate. Before default the stock price remains above a barrier B before  sliding  below a barrier 
A<B  after default. Under this condition   a spread between two American put options struck within 
the corridor replicates a credit contract whose pay-off is only possible before the option expires. 
The most desirable attribute of the model is that the replication is materialized regardless of the 
details of the stock price dynamics before and after default, the interest rate dynamics, and 
specifications about default arrival rate, provided that the stock price is located outside the default 
corridor. A legitimate question arises regarding the likelihood of such a default corridor. The 
question is partly answered by a body of literature which  models default as a strategic decision. 
In other words, debt holders  have an incentive to spur or cause default while the value of the stock 
is still greater than zero, B>0 . Papers addressing the topic of strategic default include Leland and 
Toft (1996); Anderson, Sundaresan (1996); Mella-Baral and Perraudin (1997) and Broadie, 
Chernov, Sundaresan (2007). On the other hand, Car and Wu (2011) justify the assumption of the 
escalation of the stock price from above B to below a lower barrier by costs which are inherent to 
the bankruptcy process. 
Futhermore, the authors clearly spell out that when the company is viewed as too big to fail 
(TBTF), default does not occur even when the stock price falls below the strike price of the DOOM 
option due to the existence of government guarantees. However, we take a particular interest in 
examining systemically important European banks. Our Argument is that Lehman Brothers 
collapsed despite being deemed TBTF. Thus, we would like to treat a sample of systemically 
important banks as though they would not be bailed out in the event of a default and analyse how 
their default arrival rates behave across time. In fact, the awareness of the systemic importance of 
certain institutions grew after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Our interest in this type of banks 
is also justified by an empirical observation by the CBOE based on our reference model. As the 
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plot below shows, during the crisis period of September 2008 to January 2009, The put spread and 
CDS spread of Lehman Brothers behaved in quite an identical fashion:  
 
 Source: http://www.cboe.com/micro/doom/doomquickreference.aspx 
Thus, we apply the theoretical link of Carr and Wu ( 2011) and confront information about put 
spreads with that of CDS spreads for a sample mainly composed of  systemically important 
institutions. More importantly we gauge the credit riskiness of such institutions, before and during 
the financial crisis, through the estimation of their default arrival rates.  
In a second stage of our analysis we will attempt to take into account the government guarantee 
component provided to systemically important banks to judge whether it is necessary incorporate 
it to our estimation of their default arrival rates. We estimate government guarantees using the 
same approach as Gray and Jobst ( 2011)11 and gauge their effect on the credit risk of the banks’ 
composing our sample, and more specifically on the differences between the estimated and 
historical  default arrival rates.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we summarize the literature. 
Section 3.3 exposes the underpinning theoretical framework along with the estimation procedure. 
Section 3.4 describes the data and the related statistics.  Section 3.5 outlines the main results and 
discusses their implications on the risk profile of the banks in our sample. Section 3.6 concludes 
the paper. 
11  See also the April 2014 Global Financial Stability Report, Gray et al.(2008), Gray and Malone 2008 (book) 2012 
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 Literature review 
From an academic perspective, several studies12 demonstrate an empirical Link between  CDS 
contracts and  stock options. To cite a few, Acharya and Johnson (2007), Berndt and Ostrovnaya 
(2008) investigate the impact of announcement of negative credit news on both credit default 
swap (CDS) and options market. The empirical findings show that both the CDS and the option 
market react prior to the announcement of negative credit news. But, options prices reveal 
information about forthcoming adverse events at least as early as do credit spreads. Cao et al. 
(2010) show that the implied volatility (IV) explains CDS spreads not only because it forecasts 
future volatility, but also because it captures a time-varying volatility risk premium. Avino et al. 
(2011) investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from four 
markets: bonds, credit default swaps, equities and equity options on European data from January 
2006 to July 2009. Using a VECM of changes in credit spreads, they find that during the crisis, 
the option market lead the three other markets (so the option market lead the CDS market). This 
is confirmed by the strong volatility spillovers observed from the option market to the other 
markets. Bekkour and Lehnert(2011) work on a large European sample and demonstrate that the 
CDS market leads the option market. This pattern have only emerged during the recent financial 
crisis. Before the crisis the option market is found to lead the CDS market.  
While is ample empirical literature looking at the relationship between stock options and CDS 
contracts, the main feature of these studies is that they exploit the informational aspect of the 
markets where these derivatives are traded and attempt to determine the direction in which 
information flows. Yet, the flaw with this approach is that it ignores that information extracted 
from the tails of the distribution is likely to reveal more about the behaviour of the markets it 
describes. The more interesting movements happen at the level of the tail where troublesome 
options can be found. That is why our data selection process is designed to extract information 
from the tail distribution of put options. 
On the other hand, research tackling this relationship from a pricing perspective is scarce. Merton’s 
model (1974)13 establishes a link between corporate bond spread and stock return volatility. 
12 See also Campbell and Taskler (2002), Benkert (2004) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008). 
13 See also Merton (1973, 1976) 
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Despite providing a good foundation, the link is mainly based on the strong assumption whereby 
asset value follows a Geometric Brownian Motion and volatility is held constant. Hull, Nelken and 
White (2004), propose a link between CDS spreads and stock option prices through a modification 
in the estimation of Merton’s framework .The calibration  proposed by the author is nonetheless 
static. Carr and Wu (2010) Design a dynamic framework capable of joint estimation and valuation 
of put options and CDS contracts inherent to the same firm. The model decomposes the total risk 
of an individual stock into two components: risk in the return variance rate under normal market 
conditions and risk in the default arrival rate. Using data on stock options and CDS spreads they 
disentangle the two sources of risks and identify their respective market prices. Unlike in Carr & 
Wu (2011) the default arrival rate is stochastic. Nonetheless, its estimation procedure based on the 
Kalman Filter is costly and complex. Therefore, we opt for the framework of Carr and Wu (2011) 
–explained earlier- to infer default arrival rate estimates. 
The objective of our study differs from that of Carr and Wu’s (2011). Indeed, we do not seek to 
calibrate the CDS data in the model to prove that the CDS recovery claim is equivalent to the 
DOOM put option .Instead, we use the theoretical link to estimate a variable of interest, i.e, the 
default arrival rate. We do so with a specific focus on European the banking sector to gauge its 
credit riskiness. Altogether, our results indicate that the estimated default arrival rates do not only 
reflect the angst of the financial markets with respect to the deteriorating credit risk profile of 
European banks but can serve, at times, as early warning signals.  Furthermore, our findings 
suggest that higher financial guarantees from their sovereign display a lower default risk and hence 
have a lower CDS spread along with a lower estimated default arrival rate. Ultimately, the 
government guarantee explains the differences in the level of estimated default arrival rates across 
banks as well as the observed differences  between estimated  ( i.e derived from Carr&Wu ‘s 
model) and historical ( CDS spreads scaled by (1-recovery rate)) default arrival rates.  
 Methodology 
Our estimation of the default arrival rates (Lambda) relies upon the framework of  Carr and Wu 
(2011).We start off by outlining its major points of the framework . The authors develop a ‘simple’ 
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theoretical link between DOOM American put options on a company’s stock and a credit insurance 
contract on the company’s bond. Under certain conditions the following relationship holds:  
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)       (1) 
⟹     𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝐾𝐾2,𝑇𝑇) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝐾𝐾1,𝑇𝑇)
𝐾𝐾2 − 𝐾𝐾1 = �𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝜆𝜆)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑         𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡
(2) 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝐾𝐾2,𝑇𝑇) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝐾𝐾1,𝑇𝑇)
𝐾𝐾2 − 𝐾𝐾1 = 𝜆𝜆 1 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝜆𝜆)(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝑟𝑟 + 𝜆𝜆             (3) 
Where :  
Up(t,T) is the unit recovery claim inferred from a  DOOM put option; 
Uc(t,T) is the unit recovery claim inferred from a  credit contract; 
Pt(K2,T)-Pt(K1,T) is the spread between two observable put option prices at time t 𝐾𝐾2 − 𝐾𝐾1; 
K2-K1 is the strike difference; 
R  is the interest rate;  
𝜆𝜆 is the risk neutral default arrival rate; 
T is the expiry date. 
The key assumption underpinning the model is the presence of   ‘default corridor’ [A, B] the stock 
price cannot penetrate. Before default the stock price remains above a barrier B before sliding 
below a barrier A≤K1<K2≤B after default. Under this condition   a spread between two American 
put options struck within the corridor replicates a credit contract whose pay-off is only possible 
before the option expires. The most desirable attribute of the model is that the replication is 
materialized regardless of the dynamics of the stock price before and after default, the interest rate 
dynamics, and specifications about default arrival rate. This implies that not only pricing of the 
option becomes less complex but also the inference of risk measures such as default probabilities 
and default arrival rates proves more parsimonious.  
While Car and Wu (2009) use the theoretical linkage to show empirically that the values of credit 
contracts generated by CDS contracts and American put options co-move strongly, we exploit the 
linkage from a different angle. We use the relationship in equation (3) to infer the parameter 𝜆𝜆 , 
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which represents the default arrival rate, based on the scaled spread in the pricing of two DOOM 
put options (left hand side of equation (3)). The spread corresponds to the cost of replicating a 
standardized default insurance contract paying 1 if the company defaults prior to T and 0 otherwise. 
In order to determine a default corridor [A, B] in a discrete setting  we  work with  the  two lowest 
strike prices with non-zero bids for the  highest  possible time to maturity on the same trading day. 
We first estimate the prices of the American put options 14 according the Bjerksund-Stensland  
(1993 )(a) and (2002) option pricing model. Basically, the computer efficient method presented in 
the latter paper provides a simple approximation of the value of an American call and put options 
by dividing maturity into two periods, each with a flat early exercise boundary. This way, a lower 
bound to the option value is obtained. 
In the context of complete continuous-time Black-Scholes economy, the price of the underlying 
asset St at a future date t will be: 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 {(𝑏𝑏 − 0.5𝜎𝜎2)𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡}     
Where :  
S is the spot price 
b<r is the drift rate w/r to the equivalent martingale measure. (b) is regarded as a cost of carry 
𝜎𝜎 is the volatility  
Wt is Wiener process  
 The value of an American call with maturity T and strike K and a given feasible strategy within 
the stopping date τ € [0.T] can be written as:                                      𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇, 𝑟𝑟, 𝑏𝑏,𝜎𝜎) = 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠[𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈{−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟}(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝐾𝐾)+]    
The relationship in equation (4) can be transformed to obtain the value of the put option such 
that: 
                                𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇, 𝑟𝑟, 𝑏𝑏,𝜎𝜎) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑆𝑆,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇, 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑏𝑏,−𝑏𝑏,𝜎𝜎) 
14 Working with historical prices leads to noisy results 
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Once put options are estimated, and assuming constant recovery rates  𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 the inference of the 
default rate arrival (𝜆𝜆) becomes possible. We take two routes with this regard: One implying the 
use of historical volatilities and the second involving the estimation of an implied volatility surface 
with a view to curing the issue of noise in the data. However, the cost of estimating an implied 
volatility surface does not lead to any improvements in the results. 
3.3.1 Lambda (𝜆𝜆) using estimated option prices and historical volatilities 
All variables  in equation (3)  are  known  apart from the parameter of interest. However, it is not 
possible to find a close form solution without having recourse to optimization technique. We set a 
starting value15 of 𝜆𝜆= 1  and we obtain a numerical value for  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) ( The unit recovery contract 
inferred from puts options) and 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) (The unit recovery contract inferred from a credit 
contract). Hence, on each trading day, we obtain a pair of  (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈). 
The optimization problem consists simply of minimizing   the following objective function:  
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) ≤ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)                                (4)    
⟹ min�𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)�                  (5) 
This allows us to obtain a time series of optimal solutions for (𝜆𝜆), the default arrival rate 
corresponding to each trading day from  01/01/2006 to 31/12/200916.      
3.3.2 Lambda (𝜆𝜆) using estimated option prices and estimated volatilities 
In a second stage, the same methodology is applied for the Lambda inference except that we 
estimate implied volatilities for the American option according to the model of Bjerksund-
Stensland  (2002) 
 Important are the assumptions about: rate structure, stock specification and the continuous 
dividend yield (we chose a negligible level) 
With a view to eliminating part of the noise inherent to option data, we further estimate a volatility 
surface. We use a modification of the prominent ad-hoc Black-Scholes model of Dumas, Fleming 
15  We perform the optimization with various starting values and the results remain unchanged.  
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and Whaley (1998). Expect that our IVs are not Black -Scholes-related but are generated from a 
model for American option pricing 
TTTIVi deltadeltadelta 5
2
43
2
210 αααααα +++++=  
The regression we had for each date t and put option i , we  have one observation of delta ( based 
the theoretical model), and T . We obtain the coefficients of the equation through OLS which 
allows us to have a new IV for each put option. The resulting implied volatilities are then used to 
infer option prices, which are in turn used for the optimization in equation (5). The use of an 
estimated volatility surface does not necessarily lead to an improvement in our results. Therefore, 
we only present the results using historical volatilities and estimated option prices. 
Once the default arrival rates 𝜆𝜆  are inferred based on the linkage between DOOM put options and 
the credit protection contract,  we can  compare them to default arrival rates  which are computed 
solely based on the credit protection contract  such that :  
𝑘𝑘 = 𝜆𝜆(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏) 
              𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏)�           (7) 
k are the  historical CDS spreads 
𝑅𝑅𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 40% 
The obtained new time series represents historical default rates which are confronted to the 
estimated default arrival rates with a view to comparing the ‘prediction power’ of each type of 
indicator. 
In a second stage of our analysis we will attempt to take into account the government guarantee 
component provided to systemically important banks and relate it to our estimation of their default 
arrival rates.  We conjecture that government guarantees might well explain the differences in 
levels of default arrival rates. Essentially, banks enjoying higher financial guarantees from their 
sovereign should display a lower default risk and hence have a lower CDS spread along with a 
lower estimated default arrival rate. Furthermore, we are interested in determining whether 
(6) 
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government guarantees explain the observed differences between the estimated default arrival rates 
and those rates emanating from the market, i.e. historical default arrival rates (results in table 3.3). 
The underpinning argument is that the implicit put option derived from the equity price reflects 
the total expected loss of the bank while the put derived from the CDS captures the expected loss 
retained by the bank after accounting for financial guarantees. The difference between these two 
puts defines the scope of government guarantees. 
 Following Gray and Jobst (2011), the estimation of the implicit guarantee is possible by 
combining the market-implied expected losses induced through the contingent claim framework 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡) ( i.e. Merton’s implicit put option) and information from the credit default swap markets, 
specifically the put option value using a CDS, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝑡𝑡)  which is a measure of expected default net 
of any financial guarantee. Hence, the combination of the two types of implicit puts allows us to 
disentangle between the fraction of expected losses covered by the government ∝ (𝑡𝑡)𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡) , 
which represents the government implicit guarantee ( i.e. contingent government liability) and the 
expected loss borne by the bank and translated in its CDS spread(1 − 𝛼𝛼(𝑡𝑡))𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡)  according to 
the equation below:  
𝛼𝛼(𝑡𝑡) = 1 −  𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸⁄ (𝑡𝑡)            (8) 
Where  𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡) , the market-implied expected loss is given by the Black-Scholes- Merton equation 
for the value of an implicit put option :  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡) = Be−r(T−t)Ф(-𝑑𝑑2) − 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) Ф(-𝑑𝑑1) 
A(t) is the asset value of the bank with strike price B which represents a distress barrier. 
On the other hand , 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡), is the expected loss net of financial guarantees. 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) = �1 − exp (−�𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)10,000� � 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) − 1� (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡))�  𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)    
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Once the implied government guarantees are retrieved we relate the difference between the 
estimated and historical default arrival rates of bank i at time t  to the corresponding   government 
guarantee i at time t  through the following panel regression with fixed effect17 |𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆|𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡     (9) 
Where |𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆| is the difference between the estimated and historical default arrival rates in absolute 
value (Lambda E – Lambda H). 
 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the government guarantee in first differences  computed as (alpha*equity put option) 
X_it  is a set of two controls  : Size as measured by market capitalization and VSTOXX which as 
measure of the risk appetite of the financial markets.   
In addition we run two more panel regressions18 to verify the relationship between the implied 
government guarantee and the estimated default arrival rates on the one hand, and the implied 
government guarantee and the CDS spread on the other. We expect the relationship to be negative 
and significant in both instances implying that banks with higher financial government guarantees 
display less default risk.    
                                             𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡     (10) 
                                                       𝛿𝛿𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡      (11) 
 Where19 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the estimated default arrival rate of bank i in first differences at time t ,  𝛿𝛿𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   its  CDS spread in first differences and 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the government guarantee in first 
differences  computed as (alpha*equity put option) 
X_it  is a set of two controls  : Size as measured by market capitalization and VSTOXX which as measure 
of the risk appetite of the financial markets.   
17 We run a Haussmann test and reject the null hypothesis that the efficient  random effects estimators are the same as the consistent 
fixed effect  estimators ( significant p-value = 0.000, p<Chi2=18.2) 
18 We run a Haussmann test and reject  the null hypothesis that the efficient  random effects estimators are the same as the consistent 
fixed effect  estimators ( significant p-value = 0.000, p<Chi2=43.98 , p-value = 0.000, p<Chi2=42.23   for Lambda E and s 
respectively  ) 
19 The Augmented Dickey Fuller test shows the presence of  a unit root and so we work with first differences 
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 Data   
Data Collection 
Our study spans from January 2006 to December 2009 and thus covers a pre-crisis and a crisis 
period. We work on a sample of large European banks. The American  put options data as well as 
the  stock data is from  Thomson Reuters tick database while the CDS spreads are from 
Bloomberg20. The options data on Thomson Reuters is displayed in the form of RIC symbols which 
stands for ‘Reuters Instrument Code’ , This code encompasses information about the month-letter 
for  the option type ( Call / Put) and its strike price and the exchange identifier.  The expiry date 
needs to be computed from complementary information. We also extract mid quotes  of  14:30 p.m 
along with the corresponding stock prices. We extract data at this point of the day because the 
highest value of  options trading occurs around this time. 
To start with, we set a reference time series of trading days from 02/06/2006 to 30/12/2009. In 
constructing the sample of DOOM options, we apply a number of selection criteria.  We sort the 
data so that for a given put option, on a given trading day, we end up with the two lowest strike 
prices for the highest possible time to maturity. Maturities which are lower than 200 days are 
discarded. The combination of low strikes and high maturities is supposed to ensure that the put 
options are ‘deep’ enough and are struck within Carr and Wu ‘s ( 2011) default corridor. Indeed, 
As pointed out by the authors, we are not apt of identifying  this corridor ex-ante  because we do 
not have put quotes for a continuum of strikes. Therefore, we deal with the discrete nature of strikes 
by selecting  the lowest (K1, K2) with non-zero bid quotes and non-zero open interest rate  such 
that K2 > K1. The non-zero(mid) bid quote and  non-zero open interest rate conditions  are meant  
to ensure  the option is actually traded. Another crucial condition for the model to be implemented 
is that the stock represents an upper barrier B for (K1, K2) and escalades to a lower barrier  A= 0 
upon default  such that : A<K1<K2<B. In addition, the estimated delta of the American options of 
our sample is lower than 15%  and is another condition to help identify options struck within the 
corridor. We apply this filtering procedure to a sample of 50 banks and obtain 15 banks which 
match the requirements for the model implementation. However, the assumption related to the 
non-penetration of ‘default corridor’ is intermittently violated by some banks of our sample. When 
20 We use  the German government interest rate  the spot interest rate found on Bloomberg 
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plotting the Strike prices (K1, K2) along with the underlying asset  prices (B)  of each bank, we 
observe banks that  have asset prices which never penetrate the ‘default corridor’ throughout the 
whole period of our study namely : BARC, CNKG, CRDI,DBKG, KBC, , STAN,. And, banks for 
which the asset price penetration of the corridor is barely ostensible, this the case of : ERTS and 
CSGN. The plots which can be found in appendix A.2, describe the evolution of those three 
variables throughout our study period for each bank and so periods over which this particular 
assumption is violated can be visualized.  
In addition, we retrieve over-the counter- CDS quotes at 5 years maturities due to their reliability.  
An additional set of data is required for the estimation of the implicit government guarantee which 
is obtained by recovering the difference of an implicit put option from equity and implicit put 
option using a CDS derivative. For 12 banks of our sample we retrieve information from 
Bloomberg about equity prices, the number of shares outstanding and government bond yields, the 
S&P 500 index, quarterly book values of short and long-term debt. The implied equity risk 
premiums are downloaded from Damodaran website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/). 
Statistics  
The number of banks which match our filtering criteria amounts to 15 over a period of 3 years 
(2006 through 2009). At maturities which are no lower than 200 days, we have 1044 observation 
for each bank.  
Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
Table reports statistics calculated based on the banks time series mean values for default arrival rates (%), CDS spreads and 
strike prices K1 and k2 
 Estimated Lambda CDS Stock K1 K2 
Mean 49,31 44,73 655,37 12,80 13,95 
STD 63,70 61,06 1144,57 14,80 16,26 
Q1 52,85 59,73 29,18 7,11 7,41 
Median 79,21 73,38 64,12 11,61 13,55 
Q3 128,58 116,26 230,64 29,80 33,91 
Skew 1,13 1,77 3,36 0,57 0,57 
Kurto 0,70 2,93 11,85 -1,20 -1,21 
Min  23,34 49,84 12,18 1,13 1,24 
Max 248,03 264,88 4430,91 42,20 47,52 
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Table 3.1 reports summary statistics calculated based on the banks’ time series mean values for 
default arrival rates, CDS spreads and strike prices K1 and K2. The mean value for the CDS is  44 
bp with a standard deviation of 61%. The strikes prices K1 and K2 have mean values of 12,80 and 
13,93 and standard deviations of 14,80 and 16,26. The mean on the mean values of the stocks 
prices is around 66 with a high standard deviation of around 1144. This gives us an indication of 
the large differences among the banks of our sample.  
Table A.2 in appendix reports statistics related to the strike prices of the DOOM put options  used 
in the calibration of the model along with the underlying stock prices.  Despite the fact that the 
banks composing our sample share the common feature of being large and/or  systemically 
important banks, the descriptive statistics show considerable difference among these banks. A 
major difference has to do with the volatility of the stocks. The UK banks (Barclays, RBS and 
Standard Chartered) have on average the most volatile stocks. Dexia and KBC have the least 
volatile stocks. The same applies to the mean value of stock prices of these banks.  RBS has the 
maximum stock value (4430.91) and BBVA has the lowest (12.18). Interestingly,   In terms of 
mean, the British banks also have very low strike prices together with German banks : STAN ( 
0.77,094) ; BARC(1.3, 1.40); RBS ( 4.86, 4.93) , DB (1.97,1.96); CBKG(0.59, 0.67). Another 
estimate worth of comparison is the skew statistics. This estimate is negative for the put option of 
some banks suggesting that investors perceive a downward risk and seek protection by buying put 
options. 
 Empirical Results 
Table 3.2 describes the summary statistics of estimated and historical default arrival rates. There 
are visible differences in the estimates of each bank.   
The mean for the estimated default arrival rates ranges from 248% to 23%. According to the 
descriptive statistics the banks with the most volatile stocks and the deepest out of the money strike 
prices are not necessarily the banks for which the default arrival rate is highest. The first set of 
results reported in table 3.2 is characterized by dramatic differences across banks. The highest 
mean values of estimated default rates are registered by CSGN (248%), Barclays (197%), STAN 
(153%), whereas the lowest mean values are registered by CBKG (23%), ERSTE (30%).The mean 
value computed based on the cross section of the default arrival rates mean value of the banks of 
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our sample is around 49%. When computing summary statistics based on the mean estimates of 
all bank, we obtain a standard deviation from the mean of 63,70 % which indicates that there are 
considerable differences in the level of default arrival rates across banks. 
The standard deviation values also give us an indication for the volatility of our estimates and 
hence the degree of variation in the credit risk of the banks composing our sample. The sharpest 
variations are observed for  CAGRA, CSGN, KBC with standard deviations of 150.79, 149, 104.84 
respectively and corresponding minimum and maximum values of (33;609),(44;656),(14;539). 
(table3) 
Table 3.2. Summary statistics of estimated, historical default arrival rates 
Bank Variable Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 Skew Kurto 
Barclay Lambda E 167,34 197,08 89,80 28,31 322,31 76,96 253,60 0,08 -1,49 
Lambda H 116,01 101,12 107,90 9,08 435,20 14,38 198,84 0,74 -0,49 
BBVA Lambda E 52,42 28,29 52,45 13,56 301,85 23,14 63,72 2,80 8,93 
Lambda H 156,51 155,00 42,79 70,64 295,60 130,00 171,67 0,72 0,66 
CAGRA Lambda E 187,86 121,59 150,79 33,59 609,25 50,73 311,32 0,78 -0,55 
Lambda H 83,07 71,26 69,69 9,72 276,12 12,22 142,03 0,33 -1,32 
CBKG
 Lambda E 23,34 16,48 24,38 4,28 320,68 11,65 28,76 6,23 62,02 
Lambda H 89,78 98,66 66,87 13,09 274,16 20,32 138,14 0,41 -0,90 
CRDI
 Lambda E 74,55 72,27 32,52 25,69 170,67 41,35 91,73 0,61 -0,25 
Lambda H 100,67 84,16 86,11 12,46 460,39 20,50 158,85 1,03 1,05 
DBKG
 
Lambda E 50,64 43,85 35,93 12,63 265,08 23,72 60,04 2,01 6,19 
Lambda H 98,42 91,95 75,66 15,92 286,66 21,74 159,21 0,44 -1,08 
DEXIA
 
Lambda E 71,07 59,85 52,92 12,24 208,53 27,09 96,01 0,96 -0,15 
Lambda H 444,36 401,38 138,44 160,00 983,33 320,47 522,83 0,78 -0,20 
ING
 Lambda E 88,32 65,88 64,48 21,80 281,80 36,17 108,55 1,29 0,81 
Lambda H 119,09 115,35 77,47 9,54 305,03 50,80 172,27 0,20 -0,82 
KBC
 Lambda E 103,67 50,48 104,84 14,26 539,87 28,55 162,90 1,65 3,06 
Lambda H 328,98 366,67 120,54 96,25 570,83 247,81 429,17 -0,47 -0,84 
RBS
 Lambda E 79,21 68,83 45,76 33,36 240,99 53,92 87,72 2,01 4,13 
Lambda H 122,31 107,80 112,80 6,61 508,16 12,40 214,18 0,57 -0,70 
UBS
 
Lambda E 88,32 65,88 64,48 21,80 281,80 36,17 108,55 1,29 0,81 
Lambda H 174,92 160,04 135,66 9,33 607,80 54,81 230,22 0,85 0,38 
BNP
 Lambda E 53,29 38,26 36,64 12,13 223,04 22,35 72,85 0,99 0,70 
Lambda H 86,58 94,43 49,95 10,95 239,21 48,09 119,66 0,07 -0,54 
CSGN
 Lambda E 248,03 237,67 149,79 43,89 656,58 117,34 360,86 0,51 -0,75 
Lambda H 143,26 131,35 94,17 18,33 443,81 76,11 194,79 0,68 -0,04 
ERSTE
 Lambda E 30,23 23,72 22,17 4,05 133,18 16,43 33,71 1,53 2,53 
Lambda H 212,62 205,91 170,51 18,06 803,36 59,17 307,47 0,99 0,95 
STAN Lambda E 153,48 135,30 47,21 99,91 265,42 118,58 166,00 1,04 -0,10 
Lambda H 238,59 222,50 124,84 93,50 583,33 129,79 292,71 1,01 0,28 
Table  3.2 reports summary statistics of the   Estimated , historical default arrival rates  and CDS spreads for each bank. Respectively  Lambda E, 
Lambda H over the period of January 2006 to December 2009. Lambda E whereas Lambda H is expressed in %  
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The plots displayed in Figure 3.1 clearly show that the estimated default arrival rates constitute a 
less noisy measure than the historical default rates. The historical measure being largely based on 
information stemming from the CDS market is bound to have liquidity issues leading to noisy 
information. Therefore, combining information from the CDS market together with information 
from the put option market appears to improve the quality of information about the default risk of 
the financial institution composing our sample. 
In the following section we discuss the patterns observed in our estimated default arrival rates and 
confront them to major events of the financial turmoil that marked the period of our study 2006 -
2009. We do so with a view to finding evidence of the ability of our estimates co move with the 
patterns of the financial markets or provide warning signals as to the deterioration of the credit 
profile of the financial institutions.    
Figure 3.1 shows that the default arrival rates increased around beginning of 2007 which precedes 
the start of the credit crunch with BNP Paribas being the first bank to declare exposure to subprime 
mortgage risk through the collateralised debt obligations. In the following month, the British bank 
Northern Rock (albeit not part of our sample) faces liquidity strain and causes the first bank run in 
Britain in 150 years. Banks displaying heightened default arrival rates include Deutsche Bank, 
Dexia, Unicredit, Barclays, , Erste Group Bank, Credit Suisse.  For RBS and Standard Chartered, 
the increase in the estimate before the credit crunch is slightly less stable but still intelligible.  
In the case of BNP Paribas, we do not observe an increase in our credit risk estimates prior to the 
burst of the credit crunch crisis. Admittedly, this may be due to the fact has BNP Paribas already 
announced its troublesome situation with regard to the valuation of CDOs to the financial markets 
thus becoming one of the institutions which played a major role in triggering the subprime crisis.  
More pronounced spikes occurred in early 2008, Before Lehman Brothers spread off panic in the 
financial markets worldwide by filing for bankruptcy. We observe the spikes notably for Credit 
Agricole, BNP, Credit Suisse and BBVA. Over this period, the subprime crisis in the US was 
intensified by a series of events, the most consequential being the purchase of Bearn Stern by JP 
Morgan in March 2008 ,followed by the US government bail-out of Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac 
in September prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers the same month. In the particular case of 
RBS where we only possess data for 2006 and 2007, we observe a sharp and abrupt rise of default 
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arrival rates towards the end of 2007. RBS happens to be one of the banks which were bailed out 
in October 2008 by the British government to prevent a collapse of the banking sector in the UK. 
The observation of spikes prior to the intensification of the crisis suggests that our estimated 
default arrival rates could potentially send early warning signals. In the case of some banks no 
spikes are observed but the increase in our estimates is very clear and the trend appears more 
upward than downward for the following months (Barclays, UniCredit, ING Group) .Hence, when 
not providing early warning signals, our estimates reflect the angst of the financial markets with 
respect to the deteriorating credit risk profile of  European banks. 
Sharp spikes are also observed towards the beginning of 2009. However for most banks the default 
arrival rates appear to decrease gradually after the increase or stabilize towards the end of the year. 
One should note that this period was marked by the start of recovery of European banks thanks to 
the various interventions carried out by governments and central banks. An example of such 
interventions is the 5tn dollars global stimulus package issued on the G20 meeting in April2009. 
However, an interesting observation emerges for 2009. Indeed BBVA displays a trend upward 
throughout year. This coincides with the Spanish sovereign being hit during the sovereign debt 
crisis starting in October in Greece. One could argue that the rising default arrival rates of BBVA 
suggests the worry of the markets about a struggling sovereign potentially unable to bail out their 
banks. 
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Figure 3.1.  Plots of Estimated versus Historical Default 
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The second part of our analysis involves the estimation of financial government guarantee21. The 
purpose of that is to look at the extent to which this component help explain the differences in 
levels between the estimated   and historical default arrival rates. Government guarantee also help 
explain the dramatic differences across the banks of our sample. The level of financial guarantee 
provided by the governments -reflecting primarily the ability of a sovereign to bail out a troubled 
21 The estimation of the government guarantee involves the estimation of a faction alpha (𝛼𝛼) 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈ℎ 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼(𝑡𝑡)𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (𝑡𝑡). While the 
alphas should never be negative from a conceptual viewpoint .This factor takes a negative value for a very limited number of 
observations in our sample but it worth pointing out reasons which may be at the origin of this deviation from theory, these include: 
Differences between the put option values of the Merton model may differ from the put option values from CDS spreads due to, 
e.g., illiquidity in CDS markets, distortions in pricing due to irrational behaviour, recovery value perceived as different from the 
40% used in pricing CDS, the effects of government interventions such as capital injections that dilute banks' equity. 
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blank- plays a role in reducing the default risk of the bank. Figure 3.2 represents the times series 
plot of the Government guarantees.  
Around the beginning of 2008 we observe a rise in levels which supposedly reflects the 
intervention of European governments to prevent banks from suffering the effect of the US credit 
crunch. The rise in level is however more pronounced towards the beginning of 2009, a period 
where the financial crisis repercussions spread to Europe and were amplified by the start of the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
Figure 3.2. Plots of Government guarantees 
 
The Government guarantees  which represents the  government implied liability  and is calculated as alpha*equity put option where alpha is 
factor defines as  (1- Put on CDS/ Put on equity) 
Table 3.3 reports regression analysis (Equation 9 through 11) relating to the government guarantee 
component. The First equation (9) relates differences between estimated and historical default 
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and (11) verify the relationship between the government guarantee variable and default risk 
indicators, namely our estimates of default arrival rates and CDS spreads. In both instances we 
find strong evidence of the expected relationship (negative and significant coefficients), that is, 
banks with higher guarantees have less default risk.We introduce size and an indicator of the risk 
appetite of the European financial markets and our results remain unchanged. 
Table 3.3. Regression results of equations 9 through 11 
Table 3.3 reports fixed effect panel22 regression results over the period 2006-2009. The depend variables are:|𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆|,𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and  𝛿𝛿𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡Where |𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆| is the difference between the estimated and historical default arrival rates in absolute value (Lambda E – Lambda H); 
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the estimated default arrival rate of bank i in first differences at time t and  𝛿𝛿𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   its  CDS spread in first differences. The 
independent variables are: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , size and VSTOXX  𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the government guarantee in first differences  computed as (alpha*equity put option); 
Size as measured by market capitalization and VSTOXX which as measure of the risk appetite of the financial markets.   
 
22 We run the fixed effect model after performing Haussman test  
Variable                                  Coefficients 
Model 1 (| λ∆ |) 
GG -2.426*** 
(0.000) 
-1.696*** 
(0.000) 
VSTOXX - -0.002 ** 
(0.014) 
Size - 0.883 *** 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.164 0.175 
Model 2 (Lambda) 
GG -3.340*** 
(0.000) 
-0.995  *** 
(0.000) 
VSTOXX - -0.002 *** 
(0.000) 
Size - 0.598 *** 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.316 0.381 
Model 3 (CDS) 
GG -3.216 *** 
(0.000) 
-0.412 *** 
(0.000) 
VSTOXX 
- -0.002 *** 
(0.000) 
Size 
- 1.473*** 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.473 0.655 
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 Conclusion 
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, we contribute to the literature linking CDS spreads 
to put options. Second, and more importantly we exploit the theoretical link between these two 
derivatives to estimate the default arrival rate in a novice way. We do so with a specific focus on 
European the banking sector to gauge its credit riskiness. Altogether, our results indicate that the 
estimated default arrival rates do not only reflect the angst of the financial markets with respect to 
the deteriorating credit risk profile of European banks but can serve, at times, as early warning 
signals.  Furthermore, our findings suggest that higher financial guarantees from their sovereign 
display a lower default risk and hence have a lower CDS spread along with a lower estimated 
default arrival rate. Ultimately, the government guarantee explains the differences in the level of 
estimated default arrival rates across banks as well as the observed differences  between estimated  
( i.e derived from Carr&Wu ‘s model) and historical ( CDS spreads scaled by (1-recovery rate)) 
default arrival rates. 
A practical goal of the paper is to verify whether combined with information from the CDS market, 
DOOM put options could prove to be an alternative indicator of credit deterioration instead of 
solely relying on CDS derivatives deemed to have an opaque nature
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Chapter four  
4 Euro at Risk: The Impact of Member Countries’ 
Credit Risk on the Stability of the Common 
Currency* 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction  
In view of the current sovereign debt crisis, understanding the dynamics of the credit risk of the 
euro-area countries proves urgent so as to prevent dire scenarios. At worst, the default of a major 
country would unleash the currency break-up, ravage the European banking system and ultimately 
engender a global economic slump. In this study, we view the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
through the twin lenses of sovereign credit swaps and currency option markets. In the absence of 
Eurobonds, we empirically examine the impact of the credit risk of member countries on the 
stability of the Euro.  
The credit risk of a country can be measured through its sovereign credit default swap (CDS)23. 
Market prices of CDS spreads reflect the perception of financial markets about the economic-
political stability of a country, and thus about the creditworthiness of a given sovereign. As shown 
by Pan and Singleton (2008), the changes in credit risk premiums of sovereign markets which 
translate into changes in sovereign CDS spreads, do not emanate from changes in fundamentals of 
23 A sovereign CDS contract provides protection against the non-payment of sovereign debt. Typically, it involves one counterparty 
agreeing to sell protection to another. The "protected" party pays a yearly premium known as the CDS spread in exchange for a 
guarantee that in the event of a default, the seller of protection will provide compensation. 
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the underlying economies. Rather, these variations mirror a change in the risk appetite of market 
participants in terms of credit exposure. A negative change in the creditworthiness of a sovereign 
inevitably translates into a depreciation of its currency along with soaring currency volatility. 
Furthermore, currency option prices are instruments which are capable of predicting the changes 
in the realized volatility of currency returns. Based on data from the Mexican and Brazilian 
Markets, Car and Wu (2007) establish a relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and currency 
return volatilities induced through implied-volatilities of currency options and risk reversals24. 
Their results indicate that the sovereign CDS spreads covary substantially with the risk reversals. 
In the same spirit, Hui and Fong (2011) report similar results while focusing on the 
interconnectivity between the US and Japan sovereign CDS markets and the currency option 
market characterized by risk reversals of options on the dollar-yen exchange rate. Compared to 
Japan, The US sovereign credit risk is shown to have a significant impact on the risk reversal. 
Therefore it is deemed to play a more significant role in the way markets form expectations on the 
dollar-yen exchange rate. 
Turning to the European context, Hui and Chung (2011) document information transmission from 
the sovereign CDS market to the currency option market. Using implied volatilities of options on 
the dollar-euro exchange rate as a measure of crash risk, they conclude that the credit risk of the 
Eurozone is a distinct factor which determines the prices of the out-of-the-money euro put options 
prices. The recent Eurozone crisis is viewed from various angles by the literature. Azerti et al. 
(2011) and Alfonso et al. (2011) use the perspective of credit rating agencies and show that 
sovereign rating announcements have spillovers effect on the European financial markets. They 
firstly study the response of sovereign CDS spread, banking stock index, insurance stock index 
and country stock while they secondly focus on the response of government yield spreads. Either 
way news about downgrades is found to have significant spillover effects. However, the linkages 
with currency option markets are not considered. Another perspective is that of Calice et al. (2011) 
who analyse the Eurozone crisis by modelling liquidity in the sovereign CDS markets. They find 
evidence that the liquidity of CDS markets of struggling countries such as Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland has a substantial impact on sovereign debt spreads. An earlier strand of literature tackles 
24 Risk reversal is the difference in volatility (delta) between similar out-of-the-money call and put options. A positive risk reversal 
implies that market participants are expecting an appreciation rather than a depreciation of the local currency. The risk reversal 
conveys information about the skewness of the exchange rate distribution. 
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the question of currency crash risk from a macro-economic angle and explains currency crash risk 
by economic fundamentals. It provides empirical evidence from developing countries of a 
relationship between macro-economic indicators and weak currencies. Countries with weak 
fundamentals are less likely to be able to defend their currencies against speculative attacks (Wolff 
(1987), Eichengreen et al. (1996); Frankel and Rose (1996); Kaminsky et al. (2003) are a few 
examples). 
Our study also relates to a recent strand of literature which attempts to link currency crash risk to 
the distribution of exchange rate. Notwithstanding the sound models and explanations established 
by this strand, it does not take into account sovereign credit risk. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) detect 
negative skewness in the movements of exchange rates involving a low-level interest rate currency 
and a high-level one. This boils down to saying that carry trade strategies are exposed to crash risk. 
The authors argue that the skewness is triggered when such strategies take place in an abrupt 
manner reflecting lower risk appetite and higher liquidity constraints. Currency risk with respect 
to Carry trade strategies are also examined in work by Fahri et al. (2009).The main risk of these 
strategies emerges from the value of the exchange rate at the end. The authors propose an exchange 
model to distinguish between “disaster” and “Gaussian” premia in the currency option markets. 
The model entails a strong relationship between interest rates, changes in exchange rates and levels 
of risk reversals. The main empirical implication indicates that disaster premium explains 25% of 
carry trades returns. In others words, crash risk drives currency returns considerably. Other papers, 
which find a similar result by analyzing crash risk from the perspective of currency options include 
the work of Jurek (2009) and Burnside et al. (2011). 
Moreover, our study is related to the literature examining the linkage between corporate CDS and 
stock option markets and the information transmission inherent to these markets. Examples include 
work by Acharya and Johnson (2007), which presents empirical evidence on the existence of 
information transmission from the corporate CDS to the stock market. This phenomenon is 
detected for firms which were subject or are likely to be subject to negative credit news and which 
maintain strong ties with banks. The analysis of the relation between CDS spreads and implied-
volatilities in the work of Cao et al. (2010) shows that the information embedded in the implied 
volatilities of deep out of the money put options is able to explain the variations in CDS spreads. 
The skew of the implied volatilities is also computed so as to examine its effect on CDS spreads. 
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Important to note is the fact that this implied volatility is related to the negative tail of the risk 
neutral probability. Besides, the information embedded in it reflects both future volatility and risk 
premium. 
In an effort to shed more light on the current sovereign debt crisis, our study proposes the use of a 
sound and state-to-the art measure to assess the stability of the Euro. Based on the framework of 
Bakshi et al. (2003), the stability of the euro is examined by decomposing dollar-euro25 exchange 
rate options into the moments of the risk-neutral distribution. The method is partly used in the 
recent empirical option pricing literature (see e.g. Bams et al. (2009) and Neumann and 
Skiadopoulos (2012)). In particular, we compute model-free risk-neutral volatility, skewness and 
kurtosis measures from the cross-section of currency option prices, which allow us to evaluate the 
stability of the euro. Skewness is typically interpreted as the euro crash risk, while risk-neutral 
kurtosis as the tail risk of the exchange rate distribution. The first measure gives an indication in 
which direction market participants are expecting the dollar-euro exchange rate to move. A 
negative skewness reflects concerns about a depreciation of the euro, which translates into the 
willingness of investors to pay a higher risk premium for put options relative to call options in 
order to obtain protection for the potential drop in value. Tail risk refers to the extreme events 
whose probability is low but whose impact on prices is large should they materialize. In particular, 
during the European sovereign debt crisis, we expect that possible concerns about the stability of 
the euro should be reflected in a negative skewness of the dollar-euro exchange rate options. The 
focus of this study is to examine the impact of the credit risk of Eurozone member countries on 
the stability of the Euro. 
We document that changes in the creditworthiness of a member country on one day have a 
significant impact on the stability of the euro on the following day. On the one hand, an increase 
in member countries’ credit risk results in an increase of the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange 
rate along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. On the other, we find 
that member countries’ credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk as measured by the 
risk-neutral skewness. Based on those results, we propose a new indicator for currency stability by 
combining the risk-neutral moments into an aggregated risk measure and show that our results are 
robust to this change in measure. Noticeable is the fact the creditworthiness of countries with 
25 The quotation ‘dollar-euro’ refers to the amount of dollars needed to obtain one unit of euro. 
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vulnerable fiscal positions is the main, but not the only risk-endangering factor of the euro-
stability. While the creditworthiness of the latter countries has a significant impact on the skewness 
measure (i.e. crash risk) and the stability indicators, healthier countries equally drive the 
relationship between the creditworthiness and the volatility as well as the kurtosis (i.e. tail risk) of 
the risk-neutral distribution. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines the conceptual 
framework. Section 4.3 describes the data and presents some summary statistics. Then, the 
methodologies with respect to the option pricing aspects and the regression analyses are explained. 
Subsequently, the empirical results are outlined and discussed. The last section contains 
concluding remarks. 
 A Conceptual Framework 
In this section, we attempt to provide a conceptual explanation for the channels through which the 
sovereign CDS market might impinge on the currency option market. We build on the contingent 
claim balance sheet framework of (Gray et al. (2007)), which is an adaptation of Merton’s 
contingent claim analysis to the sovereign context. Under this structure, the sovereign balance 
sheet in Figure 4.1, representing a combined balance sheet of the government and the monetary 
authority, can be expressed in terms of foreign currency units (here US Dollar) to analyze the 
values of assets and liabilities in an international context. 
Figure 4.1. The sovereign balance sheet 
Assets  Liabilities  
 
Foreign Reserves 
 
Net Fiscal Asset 
 
Other Public Assets 
 
- Guarantees 
 
 
 
Foreign-currency Debt 
 
 
Local-Currency Debt 
Base Money 
 
Default-free value of 
debt minus put option 
Call option 
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Sovereign assets consist of foreign reserves, net fiscal assets and other public assets. The item “-
guarantees” results from subtracting the guarantees to too-big-to-fail entities from both sides of the 
balance sheet. The value of local currency liabilities in foreign currency terms, 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿€ , which 
comprises local-currency debt and base money, can be viewed as a call option on sovereign assets 
(in foreign currency terms),  𝑉𝑉€𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. The strike price for this option, 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓, is the distress barrier  for 
foreign currency-denominated debt, which is derived from the interest payments and promised 
payments on foreign currency debt up to time T in the future. Similar to the Black-Scholes-Merton 
pricing framework for equity, this call option can be expressed as:  
𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿$ = 𝑉𝑉$𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1)−𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑2)                                                   
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Where rf and rd are the foreign and local interest rates, respectively, and  2$Sovσ  is the volatility of 
sovereign assets in foreign currency terms. The local currency debt and money are claims on 
sovereign assets. In principle, governments can always inflate or dilute local currency debt in case 
of distress, instead of defaulting on foreign currency debt. Therefore, local currency debt can be 
assumed to be junior while foreign currency debt is assumed to be senior26. In this line of thinking, 
local currency liabilities can be considered to be similar to equity issued by firms and multiplied 
by the exchange rate being the “market cap” of the sovereign27. 
The two unknowns that cannot be observed, but need to be computed are implied sovereign assets, 
𝑉𝑉$𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 and asset volatility 2$Sovσ . Asset volatility 2$Sovσ  can be derived by applying Ito’s lemma to 
the pricing formula of the call option, suggesting a relationship with the volatility of sovereign 
“equity”, 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿$: 
26 See Gapen et al. (2005) for a discussion on how it could be inconsistent to consider money and  local currency debt as senior 
and sovereign currency debt as Junior. 
27 One can easily make the analogy between the value of local currency debt and the value of equity for a firm. If the market value 
of assets at time t is the sum of the market value of equity and market value on debt, then equity is modeled as a call option on the 
assets 𝐴𝐴 with strike price 𝐵𝐵, which represents the promised debt payments.  
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𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿$ σ$𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿 = 𝑉𝑉$𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟σ$𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1)                                                        
The local currency liabilities 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿$, can be directly computed from the sovereign balance sheet data 
using actual exchange rates. The volatility of local currency liabilities, 𝜎𝜎$𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿, is a function of the 
volatility of the money base and local currency debt, as well as exchange rate volatility. In case 
the exchange rate is floating, exchange rate volatility is the major part of uncertainty. The model 
can be implemented similarly to the Merton model, solving the two equations with two unknown 
variables. The probability of default of the sovereign is given by N(-d2). In order to find the model-
implied credit spread, we first need to find the current value of the risky debt with promised 
payments Bf. From the balance sheet of the sovereign, the value of risky debt Df can be expressed 
as the difference between the asset value, 𝑉𝑉$𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , and the value of the local currency liabilities 
𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿$ .  Then the yield-to-maturity of the risky debt is 𝑟𝑟 = ln�𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇  and the model-implied “fair value” 
of the credit spread is equal to s = y – rf. 
The sovereign CCA model provides a framework for valuing sovereign foreign-currency debt, 
local-currency debt, foreign currency value of base money and local-currency debt. However, the 
CCA model is not only useful for the valuation of the different constituents of a sovereign’s capital 
structure, but also for the valuation of other claims such as CDS on foreign currency debt. The 
book-based ‘fair’ estimates can be compared with market-based spreads of sovereign CDS’s and 
relative value strategies can be employed. This makes it possible to benefit from capital structure 
arbitrage strategies using various instruments, FX options and sovereign CDS, in particular. 
Similarly to the relationship between the volatility skew implied by equity options and CDS 
spreads, a trade strategy on the sovereign capital structure is to trade currency against the CDS. A 
“fair value” CDS spread can be obtained from the contingent claims model using currency market 
information. If currency volatility is expensive relative to observed CDS spreads, resulting in a 
‘fair value’ CDS spread being too high compared to the observed spread, a strategy is to sell 
currency volatility (e.g. a straddle) and to buy protection. If volatility declines or spreads widen 
the strategy earns money. Another strategy, if currency volatility is cheap relative to the observed 
CDS spreads, the strategy is to buy currency volatility and to sell protection. If volatility increases 
or spreads decline the strategy earns money. Many different sovereign capital structure arbitrage 
trading strategies are possible using a variety of instruments, including FX spot and forwards, FX 
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options, local-currency debt, foreign-currency debt, CDS on foreign-currency debt, and inflation 
or indexed debt. These strategies are reasonable because exchange rates (which affect the value of 
local currency liabilities) tend to co-move with the credit spreads of foreign currency debt. As a 
result, sovereign capital structure arbitrage also ensures that relevant information from the 
sovereign CDS market is transmitted into the currency options market. For example, if the 
sovereign CDS spread increases, the “fair value” model-implied spreads appears to be cheap or 
the foreign currency appears to be undervalued, the strategy is to buy a put on the local currency 
and to sell protection. If the local currency subsequently depreciates the strategy earns money. In 
the European context, it suggests, that relevant information regarding sovereign distress risk might 
affect the stability of the Euro. 
However, one might argue that there are several reasons why the sovereign CCA model is not 
applicable to European countries. First, countries have direct access to large and liquid markets to 
issue debt in their domestic currency and that is why European countries have only a relatively 
small amount of foreign currency debt. Moreover, countries from the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) have only limited control over the money supply of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and, therefore, the analogy between local currency liabilities and equity is not complete. 
However, countries like Greece are indebted in terms of a currency (the euro) that they cannot 
print on demand. This makes their local currency debt similar to foreign currency 
debt. Furthermore, the recent interventions of the European Central Bank give rise to the 
perception that the member countries jointly took over some control over the money supply. As a 
result, debt of the member countries can be partly considered to be senior debt, equivalent to 
foreign currency debt, and partly to be junior debt, equivalent to local currency debt. This suggests 
that the CCA framework can be used as an ad-hoc model for relative value strategies like sovereign 
capital structure arbitrage. 
 Data  
We collect data on daily 5-year sovereign CDS spreads for 11 countries: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal. The source used 
to obtain the sovereign CDS quotes is Bloomberg’s CMAT portal. In addition, we obtain a 
complete cross-section of daily over-the-counter dollar/euro option prices together with the 
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underlying spot exchange rates, as well as interest rates for Europe and the US through Thomson 
Reuters’ Tick History system. Our data sample covers the period from September 10th 2007 to 
January 31st 201228.  Our data underwent a rigorous cleaning process in order to obtain the final 
dataset. 
Currency option prices 
We obtain OTC European type dollar/euro option prices quoted in implied volatilities at fixed 
maturities. We used the 1, 3, 6 and 9 months maturity options, because they are the most frequently 
traded ones. The option quotes are in terms of implied volatilities for particular put and call deltas 
categories, which is a common industry practice. The different delta categories cover the complete 
moneyness range of the currency options, e.g out-of-the-money calls and puts at 10-15-20-25-30-
35-40-45-delta and at-the-money-options at 50-delta. Using the available delta- and maturity 
categories of all option contracts, on each day, we fit a functional form to the observed implied 
volatilities of the options, which allows us to obtain implied volatilities for every possible delta-
maturity combination. That allows us to calculate call and put option prices through the Black-
Scholes model. Thereafter, on a daily frequency, we are able to derive the moments of the risk-
neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate options. 
Sovereign CDS spread 
The sovereign credit default swaps, expressed in basis points, are traded at various maturities of 
up to 30 years. We retrieve the 5-years maturity quotes for the 11 euro-area countries in the analysis 
since they are the most liquid.  
Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 portrays the summary statistics of individual countries’ CDS spreads. We report 
summary statistics for the subprime crisis period and the sovereign debt crisis period separately. 
In line with previous research (Hui and Chung (2011)), we assume that October 14th 2009 was the 
onset of the European sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, the subprime crisis covers the period from 
28 However, we had to reduce the sample period for the regression analysis due to lack of reliable sovereign CDS data for certain 
countries before September 5th 2008. Nonetheless, our sample period still covers the subprime and the sovereign debt crises. 
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September 5th 2008 until October 13th 2009. The period starting on October 14th 2009 and ending 
at January 31st 2012 represents the sovereign debt crisis period. 
Table 4.1. Summary Statistics: CDS spreads per country 
 
 BE FR DE NL FI AT IR ES PT GR IT 
Overall sample period  from 05/09/2008  to 31/01/2012 
Mean 127 79 47 56 40 99 366 198 384 970 191 
Median 115 69 41 46 33 85 255 188 266 688 162 
Maximum 406 250 119 140 91 269 1192 491 1527 5047 592 
Minimum 21 12 8 11 11 11 11 39 39 52 41 
Std.Dev 84 54 24 29 19 48 270 115 366 1086 128 
Skewness 0.99 1.35 1.10 1.04 1.03 1.27 0.46 0.55 1.03 1.54 1.54 
Kurtosis 0.15 1.18 0.49 0.02 -0.07 1.40 -1.03 -0.83 -0.19 1.27 1.46 
Q1 56 40 32 35 28 69 150 94 82 172 106 
Q3 161 91 56 68 50 119 615 266 548 1040 199 
Subprime crisis from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Mean 67 42 38 59 41 107 140 89 81 160 113 
Median 61 39 35 48 37 100 151 87 75 147 104 
Maximum 157 98 91 129 90 269 386 169 161 298 199 
Minimum 21 12 8 11 11 11 11 39 39 52 41 
Std.Dev 33 20 19 31 20 56 111 29 29 62 45 
Skewness 0.97 0.85 1.09 0.58 0.63 0.80 0.23 0.69 0.70 0.38 0.36 
Kurtosis 0.21 0.34 1.12 -0.75 -0.32 0.92 -0.95 0.09 -0.34 -0.77 -1.11 
Q1 39 26 24 34 25 72 11 68 57 118 75 
Q3 80 55 46 86 58 138 219 100 97 212 158 
Sovereign debt crisis from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Mean 156 96 52 55 39 95 474 250 529 1359 229 
Median 139 79 44 46 31 82 555 242 445 925 180 
Maximum 406 250 119 140 91 241 1192 491 1527 5047 592 
Minimum 33 20 19 24 17 48 111 66 51 123 68 
Std.Dev 86 56 24 28 18 43 256 105 364 1131 137 
Skewness 0.61 1.03 1.03 1.33 1.25 1.58 0.01 0.12 0.57 1.12 1.16 
Kurtosis -0.51 0.13 -0.02 0.63 0.14 1.50 -1.24 -0.80 -0.90 -0.02 0.07 
Q1 93 64 37 35 28 68 199 180 245 677 138 
Q3 213 108 59 60 39 98 688 342 837 1751 248 
Note: Entries correspond to Q1 (first quantile), Q3 (third quantile), BE (Belgium), FR (France), DE (Germany), NL (Netherlands), FI (Finland), AT 
(Austria), IR (Ireland), ES (Spain), PT (Portugal), GR (Greece), IT(Italy). Statistics are computed based on daily data and are expressed in basis points 
except for Skewness and Kurtosis. The total number of observations is 882 for the whole sample period , 288 for the first sub-period and 594 for 
the second.   
Panel A shows the overall statistics for the full sample and reveals the obvious difference in the 
creditworthiness of the Euro member countries. Based on the CDS data29, one might want to 
characterize certain countries as healthy countries with stable economic conditions and vulnerable 
29 We look at the average CDS for the entire sample period.  
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countries with fragile economic conditions. Following this logic, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Finland and Austria would belong to the group of healthy countries. In contrast, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Italy would belong to the group vulnerable country. We leave Belgium due 
to its political instability unclassified, while its CDS spread would suggest that it could be included 
in one of the groups. Panel B and Panel C allow us to compare the CDS spreads during the 
subprime crisis period and during the sovereign debt crisis. The summary statistics reveal 
substantial differences in the CDS spreads across countries. These differences are in particular 
pronounced during the sovereign debt crisis. While the average CDS spreads for the healthy 
countries shows only a slight increase during the subprime crisis, the increase in spreads was 
substantial for the vulnerable countries. As shown by panel C, the average value is 39bps for 
Finland and 1359 bps for Greece. 
We also report in appendix (Table A.3 and A.4) summary statistics of the dollar-euro option prices 
quoted in terms of 10-delta and 25-delta implied-volatilities of calls and puts. The at-the-money 
options statistics are only reported once together with the put statistics. Summary statistics are 
presented for four different maturities. The statistics are computed over a sample period covering 
the subprime- and sovereign debt crisis period, ranging from September 5th 2008 until January 31st 
2012. Overall, the implied volatilities for calls and puts increase with maturity and they are on 
average higher during the sub-prime crisis. 
Figure 4.2 shows the dollar-euro option smile on February 14th 2012 for maturities of up to 9 
months. The graph nicely characterizes the extreme shape of the smile, which characterizes the 
European sovereign debt crisis period. The smirk-type shape, typically observed for equity options, 
refers to the negative skewness in the risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, 
therefore, proxies the crash risk of the euro. 
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Figure 4.2. Dollar-euro option smile on February 14th 2012 for various maturities 
 
Source: www.fxoptions.com website 
 Methodology 
It is industry practice to quote currency options in terms of implied volatilities at particular deltas. 
The Black-Scholes deltas of European-style call and put options are given by 
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where S is the dollar-euro exchange rate, K is the exercise, σ is the implied volatility of the option, 
r and q are the US and European risk-free interest rates corresponding to the time to maturity (T) 
of the option and N(.) is the cumulative normal distribution. 
4.4.1 Estimating the implied volatility surface 
For the empirical analysis, we first use a modification of the prominent ad-hoc Black-Scholes 
model of Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) to estimate the implied volatility surface of our 
currency options. We use all available information content in currency option prices for different 
moneyness (deltas) and different maturities. The aim is to construct a time series of standardized 
measures (e.g. risk neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis) that characterize the cross-section of 
prices and can be compared over time. Rather than averaging the two contracts that are closest to 
at-the-money or closest to one month maturity, we fit the modified ad-hoc Black-Scholes model 
to all option contracts on a given day and subsequently obtain the desired functional form of the 
implied volatility surface. This strategy successfully eliminates some of the noise from the data 
(see Christoffersen et al. (2010)). We allow each option to have its own Black-Scholes implied 
volatility depending on the options delta and time to maturity T. We use the following functional 
form for the options implied volatility: 
jjiCjjjiCjiCji TTTIV ,5
2
43
2
,2,10, deltadeltadelta αααααα +++++= ,  (3) 
Where IVij denotes the observed implied volatility and deltaC,i,j, the delta of a call option for the i-
th moneyness and j-th maturity, defined in Equation (1)30. Tj denotes the time to maturity of an 
option for the j-th maturity. It is common practice to estimate the parameters using standard OLS. 
For every call option delta (or put option delta) and maturity, we can compute the implied volatility 
and derive option prices using the Black-Scholes model. For example, the implied volatility for an 
at-the-money short term call option with three month maturity can be derived by setting delta equal 
to 0.5 and time to maturity T equal to 3/12. 
30 For put options, we use the corresponding put delta in the implied volatility regression. 
 
                                                          
 Page81 
4.4.2 Calculating the moments of the risk-neutral distribution 
Having characterized the implied volatility surface of the dollar-euro exchange rate options, we 
calibrate the moments of the resulting risk-neutral distribution. Bakshi et al. (2003) derive a model-
free measure of risk-neutral variance, skewness and kurtosis based on all options over the complete 
moneyness range for a particular time to maturity T.  
Variance, skewness and kurtosis of the T-month risk-neutral distribution can be computed by 
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The parameters correspond to the ones used in Equation (1) and (2). c and p refer to call and put 
prices. Again, rather than averaging the observed implied volatilities of all contracts that are closest 
to one particular maturity (e.g. 3 month), we derive the Bakshi et al. (2003) risk-neutral moments 
using the estimated implied volatility surface and the corresponding call and put prices. In the 
empirical analysis, we focus on the 3 months horizon and calculate the moments of the 3-months 
risk-neutral distribution. 
4.4.3 Regression analysis 
The first step in our analysis is to regress daily changes in credit default spreads of country i on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in the various moments that we use to characterize the risk-
neutral distribution as well as on lagged changes in credit default spreads in order to extract the 
residual component, hence, we estimate the following equations31 
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31 We use log-changes for CDSs and simple changes for the other variables, which allow us to compare the results across countries. 
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We do this for up to five lags to absorb any contemporaneous information transmission and any 
lagged information transmission. In this way, we are able to identify the information arriving in 
the CDS market, which is not based on information that has been revealed in the dollar-euro 
options market. The resulting residuals ε t can be interpreted as innovations in the CDS market 
relative to the risk-neutral moments that characterize the market conditions in the currency options 
market. 
Subsequently, for each country i, we run a regression of changes in the moments of the risk-neutral 
distributions on lagged innovations in the CDS market and lagged changes in the variable itself, 
hence, we estimate 
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For each of the risk-neutral moments, we examine ∑
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Kurt λβ  as measures of impact of countries’ i credit risk on the risk-neutral moments 
of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, therefore, on the stability of the euro. A motivation and 
detailed discussion of the usefulness of this approach for testing transmission effects can be found 
in Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008). 
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 Empirical results 
Figure 4.3 shows the annualized volatility of the daily 3-month risk–neutral distribution together 
with the dollar-euro exchange rate over the period from September 10th 2007 to January 31st 2012. 
Figure 4.4 shows the daily risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis of 3 month options calculated 
according to Bakshi et al. (2003). Interestingly, during the subprime crisis, the skewness is mainly 
positive and turns negative during the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, with a turning 
point in October 2009, typically found to be the start of the sovereign debt crisis. Kurtosis was 
much higher and more volatile during the subprime crisis and reaches its peak in December 2008. 
 
Figure 4.3. Dollar-euro exchange rate and annualized volatility of the 3-months risk-neutral 
distribution of options on the dollar-euro exchange rate 
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Figure 4.4. Skewness and kurtosis of the 3-months risk-neutral distribution of options on the 
dollar-euro exchange rate 
 
Clearly, our risk neutral skewness measure is able to distinguish between turbulent times. During 
the subprime crisis, our measure is positive reflecting a possible depreciation (crash risk) of the 
Dollar. Towards mid-October 2009, the skewness measure turns negative, suggesting a change in 
the market expectations of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. That is, markets expect the euro to 
depreciate, which translates into buying put options of the dollar-euro exchange rate. The lower 
kurtosis exhibited during the sovereign debt crisis is synonymous to “thinner” tails of the risk-
neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate. Therefore, the tail risk of the two currencies 
seems to be priced in the US. The subprime crisis starting with the burst of the housing bubble in 
the US had a major impact on the US economy. Figure 4.4 shows that during the subprime crisis, 
not only the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate substantially increased, but the kurtosis of 
the risk-neutral distribution, our proxy for tail risk, increased as well. However, during the 
sovereign debt crisis period the volatility increased, but the tail risk of the two currencies is 
relatively stable at a low level.  
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics of risk-neutral moments and the dollar-euro exchange rate 
Notes: Statistics are computed based on daily data. The overall sample period spans from 05/09/2008 to 31/01/2012. The first sub-period 
(subprime crisis) is from 05/09/2008 to 13/10/2009 and the second sub-period (sovereign debt crisis) is from 14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012.Skew, 
Kurt and IV, respectively: Skewness, kurtosis and implied volatility are the independent variables. 
Summary statistics of the dollar-euro exchange rate and the risk-neutral moments are displayed in 
Table 4.232. The skewness measure is positive over the sub-prime crisis (0.47) but becomes 
negative during the sovereign debt crisis (-0.37) reflecting concerns of market participants about 
the stability of the euro. With respect to the kurtosis measure, the lower kurtosis exhibited during 
the sovereign debt crisis (5 versus 8 in the prior period) is synonymous to “thinner” tails of the 
risk-neutral distribution of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, therefore, lower tail risk 
Table 4.3 summaries our regression analysis results. The reported betas refer to the sum of 
regression coefficients based on equations (7a) – (7c) and can be interpreted as a measures of 
impact of countries’ i credit risk on the risk-neutral moments of the dollar-euro exchange rate and, 
32 More detailed table in Appendix A.5 
 Exchange rate risk-neutral Skewness risk-neutral Kurtosis risk-neutral Volatility 
Subprime crisis from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Mean 1.36 0.47 7.64 0.17 
Median 1.36 0.45 7.06 0.16 
Maximum 1.49 1.58 15.12 0.27 
Minimum 1.25 -0.17 5.04 0.06 
Std.Dev 0.07 0.25 1.75 0.04 
Skewness -0.07 1.06 1.34 0.41 
Kurtosis -1.22 2.57 2.05 -0.90 
Q1 1.30 0.30 6.28 0.13 
Q3 1.42 0.56 8.61 0.20 
Sovereign debt crisis from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Mean 1.37 -0.37 4.99 0.14 
Median 1.37 -0.36 4.96 0.13 
Maximum 1.51 0.29 5.94 0.19 
Minimum 1.19 -0.91 3.90 0.10 
Std.Dev 0.07 0.23 0.25 0.02 
Skewness -0.16 -0.01 0.75 0.66 
Kurtosis -0.59 -0.22 1.62 -0.18 
Q1 1.32 -0.54 4.78 0.12 
Q3 1.42 -0.23 5.12 0.15 
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therefore, on the stability of the euro. For the complete sample period, the results suggest that 
member countries creditworthiness affects the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate. An 
increase in the CDS spreads, indicating worsening credit conditions, has a positive impact on the 
volatility of the exchange rate. However, the results for skewness and kurtosis are typically 
insignificant. Once we separate the period into a subprime crisis period and a sovereign debt crisis 
period, we observe significant differences over time. Looking at the subprime crisis period, our 
estimates have no statistical significance. The interpretation is that the credit risk of the euro-area 
member countries as measured by their CDS spreads does not affect the stability of the euro 
induced through the skewness (Skew) and kurtosis (Kurt) of the risk-neutral distribution of the 
dollar-euro exchange rate together with the risk-neutral volatility. In contrast, the results during 
the sovereign debt crisis period are quite pronounced. An increase in member countries’ credit risk 
results in an increased risk-neutral volatility of the dollar-euro exchange rate along with soaring 
tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. Furthermore, the impact for healthy countries is 
significantly not different to the impact for vulnerable countries. As result, both vulnerable and 
healthy countries have an impact on the stability of the euro in the way that higher levels of 
volatility are accompanied by lower levels of the exchange rate, and in turn, a weaker euro. 
However, we find that member countries’ credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk 
as measured by the risk-neutral skewness. Overall, the relationship is negative, suggesting that an 
increase in countries’ credit risk has a negative impact on the stability of the euro. 
With respect to the skewness measure, we find statistical significance only among countries 
belonging to the “vulnerable” group, namely: Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy. These coefficients 
are substantially negative, which entails that the struggling countries drive the euro crash risk. It 
can be shown that the betas for the healthy countries and the ones of the vulnerable countries are 
significantly different form each other at the 1% level. Additionally, we performed a principal 
component analysis on the CDS spreads changes of the healthy countries vis à vis the vulnerable 
countries. PCAH refers to the first principal component of the first group and PCAV refers to the 
first principal component of the second group. Results presented in Table 4.3 confirm previous 
findings and suggest that during the sovereign debt crisis period only the struggling countries drive 
the euro crash risk. Contrary to what one would expect, the creditworthiness of Greece does not 
seem to play a looming role in the stability of the common currency. This reflects the fact that 
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currency option markets do not perceive the credit risk of Greece as a major determinant or risk 
factor for the stability of the euro. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Regression Results: Risk-Neutral Moments 
 Skewness Kurtosis Volatility 
Betas T-stat Betas T-stat Betas T-stat 
Overall sample period   from  05/09/2008  to 31/12/2012 
Belgium 0.008 0.09 0.529 1.48 0.022*** 2.37 
France -0.010 -0.11 0.634 1.69 0.029*** 2.94 
Germany 0.047 0.05 0.858** 2.20 0.024*** 2.34 
Netherlands -0.020 -0.19 0.567 1.40 0.027*** 2.64 
Finland -0.044 -0.39 0.423 0.94 0.024** 2.09 
Austria -0.001 -0.01 0.311 1.02 0.017** 2.14 
Ireland -0.082* -1.84 -0.331* -1.87 -0.003 -0.69 
Spain -0.074 -0.77 0.339 0.89 0.028*** 2.82 
Portugal -0.049 -0.51 0.596 1.56 0.026*** 2.66 
Greece -0.137 -1.45 0.135 0.36 0.013 1.37 
Italy -0.075 -0.75 0.608 1.53 0.033*** 3.13 
Subprime crisis   from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Belgium 0.089 0.54 0.569 0.76 0.016 0.93 
France 0.082 0.43 0.774 0.89 0.034* 1.73 
Germany 0.138 0.75 0.917 1.10 0.023 1.20 
Netherlands -0.005 -0.03 0.439 0.51 0.030 1.50 
Finland 0.007 0.03 0.398 0.38 0.025 1.09 
Austria 0.017 0.13 0.260 0.43 0.020 1.47 
Ireland -0.058 -0.86 -0.382 -1.26 -0.004 -0.63 
Spain -0.005 -0.02 0.272 0.26 0.028 1.16 
Portugal 0.130 0.59 0.968 0.98 0.036 1.61 
Greece -0.100 -0.48 -0.120 -0.13 0.024 1.10 
Italy 0.010 0.04 0.595 0.56 0.035 1.41 
Sovereign debt crisis  from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Belgium -0.128 -1.26 0.538** 2.16 0.031*** 2.81 
France -0.090 -0.99 0.420* 1.86 0.019* 1.94 
Germany -0.097 -0.92 0.698*** 2.66 0.021* 1.80 
Netherlands -0.092 -0.85 0.657*** 2.45 0.022* 1.84 
Finland -0.150 -1.37 0.481* 1.78 0.022* 1.89 
Austria -0.004 -0.04 0.421* 1.76 0.010 0.97 
Ireland -0.223** -2.14 0.627*** 2.43 0.016 1.40 
Spain -0.145* -1.77 0.383* 1.89 0.024*** 2.71 
Portugal -0.203** -2.25 0.467** 2.10 0.018* 1.78 
Greece -0.134 -1.54 0.383* 1.80 0.008 0.87 
Italy -0.174** -2.00 0.540*** 2.51 0.030*** 3.05 
PCAH -0.045 -0.87 0.292** 2.25 0.011* 1.87 
PCAV -0.099** -2.14 0.275*** 2.42 0.012*** 2.34 
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It is interesting to confront these findings with figures published by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). On a regular basis BIS publishes cross-border claims of BIS reporting European 
banks. The Eurozone member countries are interlinked throughout the foreign claims their national 
banks hold. Given this exposure, a default of one country would cause a spread of the crisis to the 
rest of the member countries. The speed and magnitude of those contagious effects depend on the 
amount of debt the defaulting country owes to the rest of Eurozone countries as well the way it is 
connected to their respective banks. Put another way, the higher the foreign exposure of a given 
country to the banks of other Eurozone countries, the stronger the potential contagion effects. 
Looking at the BIS figures for the third quarter of 2009, the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, the 
data suggest that other vulnerable countries like Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy account for 
nearly 16% of foreign claims in European banks33, while Greece only accounts for a bit more than 
1%. Interestingly, we find that the creditworthiness of countries like Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy have an impact on the stability of the euro, while the results for Greece are insignificant. 
Additionally, Figure 4.5 illustrates the Eurozone debt structure as of the end of June 2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 European banks refer to domestically owned banks of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK. 
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Figure 4.5. BBC Eurozone debt web: Who owes what to whom? 
Greece 
 
Spain     Portugal 
 
Italy     Ireland 
 
The circles above summarize data from the Bank for International Settlements and show the gross external, or 
foreign, debt of some of the main players in the eurozone as well as other big world economies. The arrows point 
from the debtor to the creditor and are proportional to the money owed as of the end of June 2011. The exposures, 
represented by the proportional arrows, shows what banks in one country are owed by debtors - both government 
and private - in another country. (Source: BBC website, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15748696) 
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Each cycle represents the foreign exposure of a given Eurozone country to other member countries 
as well as its exposure to major economies. The figure shows how a country would influence the 
rest in the event of a default. The countries of interest are: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Ireland. With 2tn euro of gross foreign debt, Italy has the highest exposure towards national banks 
of the Eurozone countries, and those of the U.S, Japan, and the UK. Spain comes second with 
1.9tn, followed by Ireland 1.7tn and finally Portugal and Greece at the same indebtedness level of 
0.4 tn. Given these amounts and the interlinkages of each country with national banks of the other 
countries, the creditworthiness of Italy, Ireland and Spain seem to be the main sources of worry 
regarding the common currency, which is in line with our empirical results. French and German 
banks together hold 429bn, 243.7bn, 105,8 bn of  Italian, of Spanish and Irish debt respectively, 
whereas they only hold 57.3 of Greek claims. This lends further credence to our results which do 
not display significance for Greece. In the case of default, France and Germany would be in 
position to absorb the shock more easily than if Italy, Spain or Ireland were to default. Furthermore, 
while Portugal and Greece have similar levels of debt, Portugal proves more unsettling because it 
is more intimately linked to another struggling country like Spain. 
A new indicator for currency stability 
In the following, we combine the three risk neutral moments into one aggregated risk indicator 
that characterizes the complete risk-neutral distribution. This allows us to derive one single 
market-based indicator that measures currency stability from the cross-section of exchange rate 
options. During the sovereign debt crisis period, this indicator would measure the euro instability. 
However, the comovements of these three moments are supposed to have a nonlinear impact on 
the risk-neutral distribution as a whole. Some popular risk measures in risk management, such as 
Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) constructed from this risk-neutral distribution 
are expected to be a good indicator of the euro stability. The Gram-Charlier and Cornish-Fisher 
expansions are tools often used to compute VaR and ES in the context of skewed and leptokurtic 
return distributions. These approximations use the higher moments of the unknown target 
distribution to compute an approximate distribution and quantile functions. Simonato (2011) 
compare these methods with the Johnson System of distributions which also uses the moments as 
main inputs but is capable of accommodating all possible skewness and kurtosis. In this study, we 
consider an alternative approach based on the Pearson System (Pearson (1895)), which can be used 
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to model a wide scale of distributions with various skewness and kurtosis. The Pearson System is 
a family of probability density distributions which includes a unique distribution corresponding to 
every valid combination of the moments of a distribution. It is possible to find the distribution in 
the Pearson system that precisely matches the moments of the risk-neutral distribution and to 
generate a random sample. We calculate the VaR and ES for both lower tail and upper tail at the 
1%-quantile from the generated random samples. We construct two euro stability indicators by 
relating the upper tail of the risk-neutral distribution to the lower tail, e.g. the absolute VaR of the 
upper 1%-quantile divided by the absolute VaR of the lower 1%-quantile. Clearly, these indicators 
nicely summarize the imbalances of extreme values of the risk-neutral distribution overall and can 
be considered to reflect currency stability. For example, a ratio below one indicates a fatter left tail 
of the distribution compared to the right tail and, therefore, suggests euro instability. Figure 4.6 
shows the stability indicators for the complete period. 
Figure 4.6. Euro stability indicators 
 
Notes: Euro stability indicators based on the 3-months risk-neutral distribution of options on the dollar-euro 
exchange rate. VaR ratio refers to the indicator based on the Value-at-Risks measure and ES ratio refers to the 
indicator based on the expected shortfall measure. 
We replicate the 2-step regression analysis outlined in Equations (6) and (7) by replacing e.g. the 
skewness measure by the different stability indicators. The resulting betas are shown in Table 
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4.434. VaR ratio refers to the indicator based on the Value-at-Risks measure and ES ratio refers to 
the indicator based on the expected shortfall measure. 
Table 4.4. Regression Results: Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall ratios 
 
VaR ratio ES ratio 
Betas T-stat Betas T-stat 
Subprime crisis   from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Belgium 0.03 0.365 0.00 -0.014 
France -0.02 -0.192 -0.02 -0.159 
Germany 0.02 0.199 0.02 0.156 
Netherlands -0.03 -0.374 -0.05 -0.442 
Finland -0.05 -0.478 -0.08 -0.517 
Austria -0.02 -0.251 -0.04 -0.500 
Ireland -0.03 -0.864 -0.02 -0.462 
Spain -0.05 -0.416 -0.04 -0.272 
Portugal 0.02 0.220 0.03 0.191 
Greece -0.01 -1.151 -0.03 -0.951 
Italy -0.08 -0.740 -0.07 -0.445 
Sovereign debt crisis  from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Belgium -0.08 -1.518 -0.09 -1.359 
France -0.08 -1.573 -0.09 -1.423 
Germany -0.07 -1.298 -0.10 -1.404 
Netherlands -0.06 -1.078 -0.08 -1.119 
Finland -0.09 -1.554 -0.12 -1.674 
Austria -0.01 -0.274 -0.02 -0.269 
Ireland -0.12** -2.195 -0.14** -2.007 
Spain -0.08* -1.925 -0.11** -1.991 
Portugal -0.10** -2.024 -0.12** -2.006 
Greece -0.07 -1.571 -0.10 -1.464 
Italy -0.12*** -2.495 -0.15*** -2.530 
Note: For each country, the dependent variables are the Value-at-Risk ratios and Expected Shortfall ratios of the 
daily moments of the 3-months risk-neutral distribution of dollar-euro exchange rate options (the variance is 
expressed in terms of annualized volatility). T-stats are computed based on the Wald test. . (***) indicates 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level.  
The results suggest that our previous findings are robust to a change of measure for euro stability. 
Most of the coefficients are insignificant except the ones for the sovereign debt crisis sub sample. 
During that period, all coefficients are substantially negative, which entails that member countries 
credit risk have a negative impact on the stability of the euro. But again, during the sovereign debt 
crisis period the struggling countries drive the instability of the common currency. It can be shown 
that the betas for the healthy countries and the ones of the vulnerable countries are significantly 
34 More detailed table in appendix A.6 
 
                                                          
 Page94 
different form each other at the 5% level for both indicators. The principal component analysis 
again supports those conjectures. In line with previous findings and contrary to what one would 
expect, the creditworthiness of Greece does not seem to affect the stability of the common currency 
significantly. 
 Conclusions 
In this paper, the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is viewed through the twin lenses of 
sovereign credit swaps and currency option markets. We empirically investigate the impact of the 
credit risk of Eurozone member countries on the stability of the Euro. The credit risk of a country 
can be measured through its sovereign credit default swap (CDS). Market prices of CDS spreads 
reflect the perception of financial markets about the economic-political stability of a country, and 
thus about the creditworthiness of a given sovereign. The stability of the euro is examined by 
decomposing dollar-euro exchange rate options into the moments of the risk-neutral distribution. 
We document that changes in the creditworthiness of a member country on one day have a 
significant impact on the stability of the euro on the following day. On the one hand, an increase 
in member countries’ credit risk results in an increase of the volatility of the dollar-euro exchange 
rate along with soaring tail risk induced through the risk-neutral kurtosis. On the other hand, we 
find that member countries’ credit risk is a major determinant of the euro crash risk as measured 
by the risk-neutral skewness. We propose a new indicator for currency stability by combining the 
risk-neutral moments into an aggregated risk measure and show that our results are robust to this 
change in measure. In line with previous research, these findings apply to the period of the 
sovereign debt crisis but not necessarily to the subprime crisis period. Noticeable is the fact the 
creditworthiness of countries with vulnerable fiscal positions is the main, but not the only risk-
endangering factor of the euro-stability. While the creditworthiness of the latter countries has a 
significant impact on the skewness measure (i.e crash risk) and the stability indicators, healthier 
countries equally drive the relationship between the creditworthiness and the kurtosis (i.e tail risk). 
As one would expect, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy play a prominent role. However, this does 
not seem to be the case for Greece, which can be partly explained by the only marginal foreign 
exposure of European banks to Greece.  
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Chapter Five 
 
5 Does systemic risk affect credit ratings 
of sovereigns and banks? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
The financial crisis highlighted the implications of the ratings assigned to banks and sovereigns by 
the agencies that dominate the global credit rating industry: Moody’s Investors Service, Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch Ratings. Even though these agencies were blamed for helping to 
precipitate the crisis, they still play a major role in the financial markets. Ratings represent an 
estimation of the rating agency regarding the ability of an institution or a country to meet its 
obligations. In other words, ratings reflect the creditworthiness of the bond issuer, and signal 
improving and deteriorating fundamental credit quality. In this sense a rating issued by a credit 
rating agency is considered as a credit risk indicator and helps determines the funding costs for 
institutions and countries. The three agencies have different scales of ratings and different methods 
to assess credit quality. Given the role and implications of the ratings assigned by rating agencies, 
it is essential that they reflect properly the risk inherent in the entities they assess. 
Recent events have demonstrated that any bank, even the mightiest, can suffer a rapid loss in 
market confidence which might even result in failure. Because of interconnection in the market, 
 
 Page96 
one bank failure could lead to a banking crisis with domestic and international consequences for 
financial markets and whole economies. The collapse of Lehman Brothers is a good example. In 
order to enhance financial stability, there has been an increased focus on systemic risk as a key 
aspect of macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS). Government and financial regulators 
established government entities like the Financial Stability Oversight35 Council in the U.S., the 
European Systemic Risk Board in the European Union (2013), and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) for the G20.  The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) views systemic risk as “the risk 
that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other 
participants to default, with the chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties”. Systemic 
risk represents a critical part of global banking risk and has a big influence on an individual bank's 
and sovereign’s financial profile, something that should be considered in their credit risk analysis. 
To the best of our knowledge there is no study that analyses the role of systemic risk in forecasting 
changes in credit rating which is the main contribution of the paper. 
Previous research has documented that Distance to Default is informative for forecasting credit 
rating changes, Aggarwal et al. (2012); their study is based on Indian sample, Distinguin et al. 
(2012) focus on emerging markets while Gropp et al. (2002) uses European banks from 1991 to 
2001. However, previous literature fails to address the link between banks’ credit risk indicator 
and their sovereign rating. We try to mitigate this gap in the literature by making an original 
contribution with this paper. The aim of this study covering the financial crisis period from a 
European perspective is to investigate empirically the predictive power of banks’ Distance to 
Default and systemic risk on banks’ and sovereigns’ credit ratings. For this purpose we consider a 
set of 39 banks from 14 European countries from 01/01/2007 to 01/08/2013. In this study we 
employ Panel Probit model, also, we estimate Distance to Default using a standard option pricing 
framework and the systemic risk indicator by an aggregation procedure (weight the individual 
Distance to Default by the implied value of asset) following the methodology used in the European 
Central Bank (ECB) report (2005). Regardless of our econometric specification, our results 
indicate that Distance to Default is a useful leading indicator, but systemic risk is more effective 
in predicting downgrades. The results show also that the three private agencies react differently to 
35 In July 2010, the U.S. Congress enacted the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank Act), the most 
comprehensive financial reform bill since the 1930s. Among other things, the Dodd Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR) 
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the deterioration in banks’ credit risk proxies by Distance to Default and systemic risk. Regarding 
banks’ ratings, among the three agencies, Moody’s is the one that reacts least to an increase in 
banks’ systemic risk and Distance to Default in comparison with its competitors S&P and Fitch. 
As to sovereign ratings, S&P is the agency that takes the banks’ systemic risk factor most into 
account in its assessment of the sovereigns’ risk profiles, with Fitch coming next.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 5.2 presents the literature review. Section 5.3 describes 
our sample. Section 5.4 defines the methodology. Section 5.5 presents our results. Finally, section 
5.6 concludes. 
 Literature review 
A relatively large stream of literature focuses on the impact of sovereign credit rating on the 
financial market. Caporale et al. (2012) use a sample of S&P credit ratings for 86 countries over 
2002–2008, and they show that bank ratings reflect banks’ financial position and country of origin. 
A bank in a less developed economy appears to have a lower rating. Brooks et al. (2004) show that 
sovereign rating downgrades have a strong negative impact on stock markets but there is limited 
evidence of abnormal returns linked to upgrades. This result is supported by Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym (2012) who examine how abnormal returns by banks are affected by countries’ rating 
changes during 2007-2011 (based on the European data set). Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) 
analyze whether emerging markets’ CDS spreads respond to countries’ rating changes. They find 
that positive signals add new information to the markets, while negative news is anticipated and 
hence reflected in the CDS spreads. Kim and Wu (2008) examine whether S&P sovereign ratings 
help attract international capital in 51 emerging markets. Their results reveal significant domestic 
bond market developments after improvements in sovereign ratings. Alfonso et al. (2011) use the 
outlook of credit rating agencies and show that sovereign rating announcements have spillover 
effects on the European financial markets. First, they study the response of sovereign CDS spreads, 
banking stock indices, insurance stock indices and country stock indices. Then they focus on the 
response of government yield spreads. Either way, news about downgrades is found to have 
significant spillover effects. 
Other literature studies the determinants of banks’ and sovereigns’ credit ratings. Shen et al. (2012) 
show that banks with higher ratios of profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy, and better ratios 
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of efficiency (cost-to-income) and asset quality (loan loss provisions to net interest revenues) tend 
to be assigned higher ratings. One of the first empirical studies on the determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings was carried out by Cantor and Packer (1996), who focus on an examination of both 
the criteria underlying ratings and their impact on countries’ borrowing costs. They found that 
ratings can be explained by per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, level of 
economic development, and default history. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2009) examine the dynamics 
of ratings in emerging economies, including the watch status. They find that countries placed on 
the watch list have a higher probability of a rating change in the direction specified by the watch 
status within the subsequent year.  
But below-mentioned papers are the most closely related to our study. They examine the impact 
of the Distance to Default or of the default probability as a measure of credit quality in institutions’ 
ratings. Using the scoring and mapping method on emerging market data, Christophe J. Godlewski 
(2007) studies the consistency of banks’ ratings with their default probabilities. Aggarwal et al. 
(2012) suggest that the change in the Distance to Default is informative in predicting a change in 
the credit rating using the Probit model. Their sample includes the top 500 listed firms in India 
from 2000 to 2011. Distinguin et al. (2012) test whether annual changes in the Distance to Default 
and in the Z-score are good indicators to estimate changes in credit ratings of Asian banks. In their 
paper, Gropp et al. (2002) show that the distance-to default and the subordinate bond spread are 
complete indicators of a bank’s fragility in the sense that they reflect the three major determinants 
of default risk (earnings expectations, leverage and asset risk) and are unbiased in the sense that 
they reflect these risks correctly. Gropp et al. (2004, 2006) study the predictive performance of the 
Distance to Default indicator applying logit estimations. They show that the DD is a direct 
indicator of a bank’s fragility that outperforms other indicators of risk in predicting bank defaults 
in Europe 6, 12 and 18 months prior to the event. Their data set consists of monthly observations 
of 83 European banks from 1991 to 2001. But the above mentioned studies do not link banks’ 
credit risk indicator to sovereigns’ credit ratings. In our study we investigate empirically the 
predictive power of the banks’ Distance to Default and the systemic risk on banks’ and sovereigns’ 
credit rating covering the recent financial crisis, which started in 2007. 
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 Data  
Our study spans from January 2007 to August 2013, and thus covers the subprime and the 
sovereign debt crises. We work on a large sample of European banks. The initial sample covers 
92 banks from the European Banking Authority stress test. After matching the rating data to all 
variables needed to estimate the Distance to Default (DD) we obtain a sample from 14 European 
countries, which consists of 39 banks for Fitch, and 34 banks for both S&P and Moody’s36.  
The bank ratings data are from the Interactive Data Credit Ratings International database and they 
are at a monthly frequency from January 2007 to December 2013. The sovereign ratings, watch 
and Outlook status are obtained from the CRA’s publications, and they have daily frequency from 
03/07/2006 to 27/09/2013. We collect the data for the three credit rating agencies: S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch. 
Rating changes are calculated according to the mapped 20-point numerical ratings (AAA/Aaa = 
20, AA+/Aa1 = 19, AA/Aa2 = 18 …CCC- /Caa3 = 2, CC/Ca, SD-S/C = 1).  As for the countries, 
we use the previous 20-point numerical ratings, but also a 58-point numerical ratings scale, which 
incorporates ratings, credit outlook and watch lists as follows: AAA/Aaa = 58, AA+/Aa1 = 55, 
AA/Aa2 = 52 …CCC-/Caa3 = 4, CC/Ca, SD-D/C = 1, and we add ‘+2’ for positive watch, ‘+1’ 
for positive outlook, ‘-1’ for negative outlook, ‘- 2’ for negative watch, and ‘0’ for stable outlook 
and no watch/outlook assignments. 
The default risk indicator DDs is estimated monthly based on the Merton model. For this purpose, 
we extract daily local currency stock prices and market capitalization data from Thomson Reuters’ 
Datastream from January 2006 to December 2013. The stock prices of Swiss, Norwegian, Danish, 
Polish and Swedish banks are converted to euros using the exchange rates from Bloomberg. The 
stock returns and the historical volatility can therefore be calculated37. Quarterly long- & short-
term debt38, as well as daily 3-month German government bond yields (proxy for the risk-free 
rate), and S&P 500 returns (proxy for the market return), are also retrieved from Bloomberg. 
Finally, we obtain the monthly market risk premium from the Damodaran website. 
36 The banks are listed in appendix A.7 
37  Stock return data started from 28/09/2005 one year before the other data in order the compute the first historical volatility used to estimate 
the implied volatility.  
38   We double checked the borrowing levels  by comparing them to the one on bank scope. The definition of short & long term debt is in Appendix. 
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Summary statistics 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for banks’ and sovereigns’ downgrades and upgrades 
registered at the end of each month by the three credit rating agencies for 39 banks (34 for S&P 
and Moody’s) from January 2007 to September 2013. It can be seen that there are 117 (11) bank 
downgrades (upgrades) by S&P, 124 (30) by Fitch, and 110 (8) by Moody’s. There are also 31 (3) 
sovereign downgrades (upgrades) by S&P, 27 (0) by Fitch, and 27 (3) by Moody’s. These statistics 
reflect the strong trend for downgrades in the European banking system during the financial and 
the sovereign debt crises. Table 2 also summarizes the sovereign downgrades (upgrades) based on 
the 58-point numerical rating scale taking into account the watch and outlook status, and identifies 
54 (13) downgrades (upgrades) by S&P, 47(2) downgrades (upgrades) by Fitch, and 43 (9) 
downgrades (upgrades) by Moody’s. These figures highlight differences in the policies of the three 
credit rating agencies. 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of credit rating data sample 
  S&P Moody’s Fitch Total 
 Number of countries 14 14 14 - 
 Number of banks  34 39 34 - 
Banks Upgrade by 1-notch 11 17 4 32 
Upgrade by >1-notch 0 13 4 17 
Total upgrades  11 30 8 49 
Downgrade by 1-notch 93 67 76 236 
Downgrade  by > 1-notch 24 53 32 111 
Total  Downgrades 117 124 110 351 
Number of Observations 2 720 3 120 2 720 - 
Sovereigns 
(20) 
Upgrade by 1-notch 1 0 1 2 
Upgrade by >1-notch 2 0 1 4 
Total upgrades 3 0 3 6 
 Downgrade by 1-notch 17 12 14 43 
 Downgrade  by > 1-notch 14 15 13 42 
Total  Downgrades 31 27 27 85 
Sovereigns 
(58) 
Upgrade by 1-notch 9 2 6 17 
Upgrade by >1-notch 4 0 3 7 
Total upgrades 13 2 9 24 
Downgrade by 1-notch 19 12 15 46 
Downgrade  by > 1-notch 35 35 28 98 
Total  Downgrades 54 47 43 144 
Number of Observations 1 120 1 120 1 120 - 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for banks’ and countries’ downgrades and upgrades registered at the end of each month by the three credit 
rating agencies for 39 banks (34 for S&P and Moody’s) from January 2007 to September 2013.  
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics of the time series averages of all other variables used in the 
study during the period from 02 January 2006 to 27 September 2013. It can be seen that, on 
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average, firms in the sample have performed poorly, with an average daily stock return of -0.08% 
and a minimum time series average return of -0.30% for the British bank TSB. Only three banks 
among 41 in our sample have positive time series average returns: 0.01% for SHBA, 0.17%  for 
PKO and 0.18% for Barkley. The standard deviation of average stock returns is 0.09% showing 
more or less homogeneity between various banks’ performances. 
Table 5.2. Summary Statistics of variables related to the Distance to Default 
For each variable, Table 5.2 reports the summary statistics of the time-series averages of the entire sample of banks. The sample period extends 
from 02/01/2006 to 27/09/2013. Firm Daily Stock Return is the daily average of firm continuously compounded stock returns. Long and short 
term debts are quarterly data extracted from Bloomberg and expressed in billion euros. Default probability, Distance to Default and implied 
volatility are monthly data, we estimate them based on Merton model. 
The equity value varies from 994 billion euros for the Danish bank NORDJYSKE, to the largest 
in our sample, the Swedish banks Nordea (258 344), SHBA (123 740), Skan Enskilada (108 830) 
followed by British HSBC (107 250), Danish Danske (106 157) and Norwegian DNB (105 794). 
The median shows that half of our sample has an equity value above 16 996 billion euros. The 
standard deviation is quite high and reveals substantial differences in the size across banks in the 
database.  
 Mean STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 Median Skew Kurto 
Equity value
 
38 576.14     50 054.86    994.08    258 344.44    6 171.77    43 611.22    16 996.29    2.52 8.36 
Stock returns -0.08% 0.09% -0.30% 0.02% -0.13% -0.01% -0.04% -1.23 0.40 
S T Debt 88 446.55    145 592.13    11.17    691 983.23    13 594.84    111 699.47    28 918.24    2.87 8.70 
L T  Debt 87 835.95    108 367.57    39.71    443 975.16    8 127.26    149 338.10    41 296.54    1.86 3.91 
Equity Hvol annual 0.47 0.17    0.21    1.09    0.37    0.53    0.43    1.54 3.31 
Market cap’ 2.44% 3.23% 0.06% 16.76% 0.39% 2.75% 1.00% 2.59 8.79 
leverage 23.90 69.66 0.01 434.42 1.38 16.79 8.62 5.49 32.05 
vstoxx
 
27.53 9.52 13.41 87.51 22.84 29.33 23.84 2.04 5.45 
Default probability
 
0.08 0.10 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.10 0.03 1.77 2.78 
Distance to Default  5.15 2.87 1.73 16.27 3.55 5.62 4.30 2.15 5.69 
Distance to Default 
Index
 
6.94 0.16 6.05 7.16 6.94 6.99 6.95 -4.54 25.72 
Distance to Default  
at country level 
 
6.67 4.01 2.67 16.27 4.03 7.76 5.50 1.42 1.43 
Distance to Default 
Index country 
 
6.90 0.45 5.45 7.52 6.88 7.04 6.96 -2.72 9.66 
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The average of short-term and long-term debt is quite similar over the period of study, 88 447 
billion euros and 87 836 billion euros, respectively, although, according to the standard deviation, 
there is more heterogeneity in the short-term debt compared to the long-term debt. Credit Agricole 
has the highest level of long-term debt, with a value of 443 975 billion euros. As for the short-term 
debt, Erste Group has the lowest level of debt (11 billion euros). The French banks have the largest 
amount of debt: BNP Paribas (691 983), Société Generale (527 473) and Credit Agricole (431 
463). However, their leverage is 21.39, 23.22 and 38.53, respectively, which is not too far from 
the average leverage of banks of 23.90. The standard deviation of leverage (69.66) indicates a big 
variation between banks’ leverage with a maximum of 434 for Dexia and a minimum of 0.01 for 
Erste Group.  
The European volatility index (VSTOXX index) does not vary a lot during the study period with 
a standard deviation of 9.52 and mean of 27.53. The implied volatility index was at its lowest 
(13.41) in February 2007 before the start of the credit crunch, while in October 2008, after the 
Lehman Brother collapse, it reaches its maximum of 87.5. 
According to the default probability, TSB represents the riskiest bank with the highest default 
probability (0.43) followed by Bank of Ireland (0.31) and Dexia (0.29). The less risky banks 
according to the same indicator are Erste Group (1.31 E-11) Nordea (2.48 E-12) and PKO (1.30E-
15). The second risk indicator, the Distance to Default, represents the number of standard 
deviations between the market value of the bank’s assets and the default barrier. In accordance 
with the DP, the DD is highest for Erste Group (16.27) and Nordea (14.4), while the lowest value 
is for TSB. The Distance to Default Index is calculated by weighting individual DDs by their 
respective implied asset values, and it represents a systemic risk indicator. Less risky banks (i.e. 
banks with lower DP and higher DD) are those with the smallest DDI. Nordea has the lowest index 
(6.05) followed by SHBA (6.74), PKO (6.83), DNB (6.87) and Erste Group (6.90). These banks 
are the most systematically important banks in our sample. As for the three French banks, BNP 
Paribas, Societé Generale and Credit Agricole (ACA), they represent the lowest systemic risk in 
the sample with respectively 7.16; 7.11 and 7.10.   
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 Methodology 
5.4.1  Distance to Default estimation 
Many studies have shown that market-based risk measures are good risk indicators for the financial 
stability of an institution (Tudela and Young (2003), Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Agarwal and 
Taffler (2008)). Based on a sample of European banks, Gropp et al. (2004, 2006) show that 
Distance-to-Default is a direct and powerful indicator of bank distress that outperforms other 
indicators of risk in predicting bank defaults. Also, Vassalou and Yuhang (2004) found that DD is 
a powerful measure to predict bankruptcy.  
We estimate DDs based on Contingent Claim Analysis (CCA) of Merton (1974). CCA combines 
accounting and market information to obtain indicators of default risk through the application of 
option pricing theory. Other measures can be estimated based on CCA as probabilities of default, 
risk-neutral credit risk premia etc. In the CCA approach, liabilities are viewed as contingent claims 
against assets, and the firm equity becomes an implicit call option on the market value of assets 
with a strike price equal to the total book value of the debts that  is also referred to as the ‘distress 
barrier’. Assets distribution follows the following stochastic process with ‘ w ’ a standard 
Brownian  
dwVdtVdV AAAA σµ +=       (1) 
The normalized distance between the market value of an asset and the default barrier is called 
Distance-to-Default and constitutes a financial risk indicator. The Distance to Default expresses 
the number of standard deviations between the market value of bank assets and the default barrier. 
A default occurs when the value of the firm’s assets hits the default barrier.                                                                                                   
According to the Black-Scholes model, the value of a call is given by this equation: 
                    𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1) − 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑2))        (2) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸     Represent the value of the firm equity  
𝑑𝑑1 = ln (𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵 ) +(𝑟𝑟+𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴22 )(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴√𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡  
𝑑𝑑2 = 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴√𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡 (3) and (4) 
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where 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴  is the value of the firm’s assets, B  is the distress barrier, which is defined following the 
Moody’s KMV (Crosbie 1999) as Short Term Debt + 0.5 Long Term Debt, r is the risk-free interest 
rate and T -t the time to maturity of the debt. 
The volatility of equity𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸 is given by this expression: 
            𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸  = 𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1) 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸  𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴              (5) 
N represents the cumulative normal distribution. 
The probability of the firm’s default is then 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 = 𝑁𝑁(−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) 
Where DD is defined as: 
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In this formula, the leverage ratio is standardized by the expected return and scaled by the 
volatility.  
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the time-series averages of individual Distance to Default of 41 
banks over the period 01 January 2007 to 01 August 2013. As mentioned before, the Distance to 
Default indices are monthly and are estimated based on the Merton model. It can be seen that 
around September 2007 the DDs reached their maximum. Due to the spread of the crisis to the 
European financial system (for instance, Northern Rock, one of the UK's largest mortgage lenders 
was bailed out by the Bank of England on September 13th 2007, the Swiss bank UBS announced 
a $3.4 billion loss from a subprime-related investment on October 1st of the same year) the DDs 
dropped drastically until they reached their lowest point between the end of 2008 and the beginning 
of 2009. During that period the graph exhibits a negative value, indicating a default of a number 
of banks in our sample: Dexia (bailout by the Belgian, French and Luxembourgish governments 
pumping 6.4 billion euros into the group on 30 September 2008); the Bank of Ireland (bailout of 
3.5 billion euros on 11 February 2009); on October 2008, the UK government pumped £37 billion 
into three UK banks RBS, TBS and HBOS; and finally, Commerzbank (on November 2008 the 
German government injected 8.2 billion euros). Towards mid-October 2009, after all government 
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interventions, the value of the DDs was rising until early 2011, before dropping again. Also, the 
figure clearly shows that some banks have a negative value. These values correspond to the Greek 
banks: Agricultural Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, AE Piraeus Bank and Ergasias. 
Figure 5.1. Individual Distance to Default 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of individual Distance to Default time-series averages of the entire sample of banks (41 banks) over the 
period 01 January 2007  to 01 August 2013; Individual Distance to Default indices are monthly, they are calculated using Merton model.  
 
5.4.2 Systemic risk proxy 
There is no consensus about the definition of systemic risk. Several definitions are proposed in the 
literature. However, there are qualitative and quantitative definitions.  
The BIS views systemic risk as “the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual 
obligations may in turn cause other participants to default, with the chain reaction leading to 
broader financial difficulties”. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) define systemic risk as the 
risk of default of the banking system considered as a whole. According to DeBandt and Hartmann 
(2000) systemic risk can be rather an external effect hitting one institution, market or system which 
spreads to others, or wide systematic shocks, which badly affect many institutions or markets at 
the same time. Another strand of literature proposes a larger definition. Borio et al. (2001), Perotti 
and Suarez (2009) view the systemic risk as a propagation risk, where shock effects go beyond 
their direct impact causing disorder in the real economy. According to Borio et al. (2001) financial 
system turmoil can rarely raise from failure of a unique financial institution due to an idiosyncratic 
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shock. But problems in the financial system are due to financial institutions underestimating their 
exposure to a common factor, most notably to the financial business cycle in the economy as a 
whole. 
These definition above show that the concept of a systemic risk is not yet clearly defined, which 
makes its measurement challenging. Furthermore, the estimation should include the complex 
nature of the financial system (cross-section dimension as well as the time dimension). Many 
possible ways to classify different measures of a systemic risk are proposed in the literature. Hattori 
et al. (2014) propose a classification according to the channels through which systemic risk 
materializes. 
In the first group of measures, the risk materializes from interconnectedness between financial 
institutions. In this case, the financial system is considered as a whole. Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) estimate the risk that a shock of an individual financial institution spills over to the entire 
financial sector using “CoVaR39”. Acharya et al. (2010), Huang et al.(2009, 2010, 2011) and 
Brownlees and Engle (2012) suggest quantifying the contribution of an individual financial 
institution to the risk of a financial sector-wide shock. They do this by estimating the “marginal 
expected shortfall” (MES40). Huang Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) suggest the “joint probability 
of distress” (JPoD)41.  
Other studies have proposed systemic risk measures based on interdependence between the 
financial sector and the real economy. In this context, Giesecke and Kim (2011) propose the 
“default intensity model” using the number of defaults or downgrades. Alternatively, De Nicolò 
and Lucchetta (2010) propose “GDP at risk” which models the interdependence between real GDP 
growth and the rate of return of a banking sector stock index. The literature also proposes measures 
of risk materializing from interdependence between the financial and public sectors. Jobst and 
Gray (2013) develop a measure of risk caused by an increase in the bailout cost incurred by the 
government, which they term “systemic contingent claims analysis”. Finally, the “systemic 
39 The CoVaR is a measure indicating how the banking sector stock index falls when an individual bank stock price declines. 
40 This measure indicates which banks contribute to financial sector-wide risks when risk materializes, and the magnitude of these contributions. 
41 In Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), who suggest JPoD, three risk measures are introduced. The first is the JPoD, the probability that all sampled 
financial institutions default at the same time. The second is the “Banking Stability Index,” the expected number of defaulting financial institutions 
conditional on the default of at least one financial institution in the sample. The third is the probability of a “cascade” of defaults, the probability 
that a specific financial institution defaults conditional on the default of another particular financial institution in the sample. 
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liquidity risk index” suggested by Severo (2012) measures risk materializing from malfunctions 
in the financial market in this context.Then the “volatility spillover index” is proposed by Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2009, 2014). 
We estimate the systemic risk exposure of a banking system following the methodology used in 
the European Central Bank (ECB) report (2005), we aggregate individual banks’ risk indicators 
(DD) by their respective estimated implied asset value (from the Merton model). More specifically, 
to obtain the Distance to Default index (DDI) for each bank, we calculate the weighted average of 
remaining banks in the sample42. A number of studies and reports used this aggregated series of 
Distance to Default as an indicator of stability of the system. For instance, the International 
Monetary Fund (2011) reports that aggregated Distance-to-Default series computed for the US 
banking system did well in forecasting systemic extreme events and in detecting early turning 
points near systemic events. In the study based on the US banking system Carlson et al. (2008) 
find that the DD index properly captures the evolution of systemic risk over a period of three 
decades. However, a simple aggregation of DD presents shortcomings. Duggar and Mitra (2007) 
argue that it implicitly ignores the joint distributions.  
Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of time-series averages of individual Distance to Default indices. 
Like the papers by Jin and Nadal De Simone (2011a) and Black et al. (2013), which uses different 
measures based on the PDs43 and the distance to distress for European banking groups, this chart 
shows the same movement of systemic risk indicators. By the end of 2007, our systemic risk 
indicator started to decline till it tumbles to its minimum in 2008-2009 due to the spillover effects 
of the US financial crisis, which was caused by the failure of Lehman Brothers. During this period, 
the stress was mostly due to amplified risk aversion and liquidity issues in the global financial 
market.  
 
 
42 Index for each bank represents the weighted average assigning a weight of zero to one specific bank and considering only the 
remaining ones.  
43  For example, Delianedis and Geske (2003) compound option-based structural credit risk model to estimate implied neutral 
PDs. 
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Figure 5.2. Individual Distance to Default Indices 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of individual Distance to Default indices time-series averages of the entire sample of banks (41 banks) 
over the period 01 January 2007  to 01 August 2013; Individual Distance to Default indices are monthly, they are calculated by weighting 
Distance to Default by implicit asset value, both are estimated based on Merton model.  
In order to analyze the impact of Distance to Default and systemic shocks on the probability of a 
downgrade at a sovereign level, we cluster the two indicators. In other words, we consider all 
banks in one sovereign as a subsystem. Therefore, the DDS of this subsystem is the weighted 
average of individual banks’ DD’s of that given sovereign. Similarly, we estimate the DDIS for 
each sovereign as a weighted average of all banks’ Distance to Default in the sample excluding 
the banks of that sovereign. 
5.4.3 Regression analysis 
In order to analyze the impact of changes in the banks’ credit risk  ∆DDi (∆DDS) and systemic risk 
∆DDIi(∆ DDIS) on the banks' and sovereigns’ ratings, we employ the Panel probit model. It is 
most appropriate to use the probit model is to represent the nature of the credit ratings data (discrete 
and ordinal). After running a Husman test on different specifications, we select the random effect 
over the fixed effect44. This stipulates that bank and country specific errors are not correlated with 
the explanatory variables E(ai|Xit,Zi)=0. Besides, in his paper, Alfonso (2011) explains why it’s 
44 We run a Haussmann test on logit estimation and do not reject the null hypothesis that the efficient random effects estimators are the same as 
the consistent fixed effect estimators (significant p-value > 0.05).Greene (2002) addresses the shortcomings of non-linear fixed effect estimation. 
The first obstacle relates to the difficulty of estimating non-linear models with possibly a very large number of dummy variable coefficients. The 
other issue is methodological and concerns incidental parameters, which raises questions about inconsistency of estimators.  
0
5
10
15
20
25
1/1/2007 9/1/2007 5/1/2008 1/1/2009 9/1/2009 5/1/2010 1/1/2011 9/1/2011 5/1/2012 1/1/2013
RBS
DB
CBK LT
Allied Irish
TSB
Bank of Ireland
Banca Monte Dei Paschi
Banco POPOLARE DI MILAN
Intesa LT
Unicredit
PKO
DEXIA
KBC
Banco Comercial
BPI
Erste Group
Danske
JYSKE
NORDJYSKE
SYDBANK
Agricultural Bank of Greece
Alpha
Piraeus
Ergasias
National Bank of Greece
 
                                                          
 Page109 
not appropriate to employ fixed effects. According to him, the dummies included in the regression 
capture the average rating because of the small variation of ratings over time; however, the other 
variables in the regression only capture movements in the ratings across time. So, even if it was 
statistically correct, a fixed effect regression does not make too much sense.  
We estimate a model including only downgrades, because both downgrades and upgrades are 
driven by different factors (e.g. Williams et al., 2013). We do not estimate a model for upgrades 
because of the small number of observations in our sample potentially leading to biased results.    
The rating changes are identified by notches (0 and 1 or more) using the 20-point rating scale for 
banks. As for sovereigns we use 20-point and 58-point rating scale. First, we focus only on the 
S&P credit rating agency. We introduce separately each ∆DDi (∆DDS) and ∆DDIi (∆ DDIS) and 
we estimate a random Probit on 3 months45 horizon through the following panel regression 
(equation 7).  
Models: 
iiiiai CIDDDDY εββα ++∆+∆+=∆ −− 3,23,1
*
,  (7) 
where: 
 3,−∆ iDD  Monthly change in bank “i” Distance to Default 3 months prior to the rating change 
announcement;  
 3,−∆ iIDD  Monthly change in bank “i” systemic risk 3 months prior to the rating change 
announcement; 
i = 1,…., 34   
iε  follows a normal distribution with the parameters zero and one (mean and variance) 
*
,aiY  is an unobserved latent variable linked to the observed ordinal response categories  :  
                           0      if   Yi,a ≤ µ1   (no rating change) 
                           1      if  Yi,a> µ1 (rating downgrade of 1 or more notches) 
45  We controlled for the results above using a maturity of 6 months and the results remain robust. 
Yi,a=               
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µ1 represents threshold.  µ1 and the parameters α and β are estimated using the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE).      
Also, we select a set of four market-based measures as control variables that we include in our 
specifications. The three first variables are the main inputs of the Merton model used to estimate 
both DD and DDI. In addition to this, we consider the risk appetite of the European financial 
market. 
1. Bank size relative to the size of all banks in the sample measured by dividing the market 
cap of a bank i by the total of the market cap of all the banks; 
2. Leverage measured as the ratio of total debt of bank “i” on its equity value; 
3. Historical volatility of the equity prices over the past year; 
4. Vstoxx index, which represents the European volatility index as a measure of the risk 
appetite of the financial markets. 
After estimating the previous specification for banks ratings, we then make another estimation for 
the change in the downgrade for countries with 20-point and 58-point rating scale. In this case, the 
independent variables will be ∆DDS,-3 and ∆ DDIS,-3 which represent monthly changes in Distance 
to Default and systemic shock of banks that are part of country “S” 3 months prior to the rating 
change announcement (S = 1,…., 14). 
The expected relationship between changes in systemic risk indicator and changes in credit ratings  
We expect a negative relationship between changes in Distance to Default and changes in credit 
ratings. DD, our risk default indicator, illustrates how far is the stock value from the default barrier. 
Thus, the smaller DD is, the closer we are to that barrier. Therefore, a negative change in DD 
should translate into an increase in the probability of a downgrade. The same logic applies to DDIi, 
given that systemic risk of one bank represents the weighted average of remaining banks’ default 
risk (Distance to Default) in the sample. It means that one bank is more systemically important 
than another when its DDI is lower (closer to default barrier). Thus, a negative change in DDIi 
implies a higher systemic risk for that bank and should translate into an increase in the probability 
of downgrade. 
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Comparison across credit rating agencies 
In order to confirm the predictive power of Distance to Default and systemic risk on the downgrade 
of banks and sovereign, and also to compare the impact of DD and systemic risk across agencies, 
we perform extra regressions using data from the three rating agencies. First, we incorporate lag 
value of DDi (DDIi) for different horizons: 1, 3, 6 and 12 months simultaneously (model 8). 
Afterwards, inspired by Aggarwal et al. (2012), we run the model (9) with one year non-
overlapping changes in DDi-T (DDIi-T).  Besides, we incorporate the control variables defined 
above.  
                                             iiTiai CRiskY εβα ++∆+=∆ −,
*
,                                                (8) 
iiMMMMMMMtai CRiskRiskRiskRiskY εββββα ++∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆ −−−−−−− )69(3)36(2)13(11
*
,         (9) 
Equations (8) and (9) are estimated separately for the risk measure “Risk”  
∆Riski,-T Represent monthly changes in our risk measures (DD and DDI) ‘T’ months prior to the 
rating change announcement. 
∆Risk-(3M-1M) Represent the change in the risk measures (DD and DDI) between the three month 
period prior to the rating change and one month prior to the rating change.  
i = 1,…., 34  banks for S&P and  Moody’s; i = 1,…., 39 for Fitch  
‘a’ represent the three CRAs: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 
Once we have estimated the two specifications above, we repeat the exercise using changes in the 
downgrade of sovereigns as dependent variable (20-point and 58-point rating scale) and DDS 
(DDIS) as an independent variable.  
Furthermore, we run the regression using the logit model. We reported the results only for credit 
downgrades of the banks in appendix (A.20 and A.21). Also, we test for fixed versus random effect 
by performing a Husman test. In almost all cases the random effect is the selected model. The 
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results are unchanged overall; they are reported in the appendix. Finally, we control the results by 
estimating pooled Probit with dummies for banks and years46. 
 Empirical results 
As already outlined in the introduction, we aim to investigate whether banks’ Distance to Default 
and systemic shocks are able to predict changes in a credit rating. As mentioned before, previous 
studies by Distinguin et al. (2012), Aggarwal et al.(2012) and Gropp et al. (2002, 2006) focus on 
predictive performance of the Distance-to-Default indicator on changes in financial and non-
financial institutions. The studies mentioned above find that the Distance to Default is a significant 
indicator of a credit rating change. However, Distinguin et al. (2012), who consider an annual 
change in the Distance to Default, find that the signs of the coefficient are not as would be 
expected.  
Table 5.3 reports the results from estimating probit model of equation (7) for S&P at bank level. 
We report the coefficient estimates, Z-statistics and log-likelihood. Since the coefficient levels 
cannot be interpreted directly, we report marginal effects in percentage. Models are compared 
based on their log likelihood and R-squared. We estimate McFadden (1974)47 pseudo R-squared, 
which captures the performance of the estimated model over the model with only the intercept. 
The coefficients associated with the change in both indicators are negative, which is consistent 
with the expected relationship, meaning that a positive (negative) change in the Distance to Default 
and Distance to Default index of a bank 3 months prior to the event will decrease (increase) the 
likelihood of a downgrade.  
 
 
 
46 The pooled estimator ignoring the correlation across periods generally leads to underestimating standard errors. 
47 Here are the details. Logistic regression is, of course, estimated by maximizing the likelihood function. Let L0 be the value of the likelihood 
function for a model with only the intercept, and let LF be the likelihood for the model with predictors. McFadden’s R2 is defined as R2= 1 – 
(ln(LF) / ln(L0)) 
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Table 5.3. Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in 3 months lagged DD and 
DDI on S&P bank ratings over the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table 5.3 reports coefficients and z statistics (in parentheses) of random probit estimations. The independent variables are 
monthly changes in 3 months lag of DD and DDI and the dependent variable is change in banks’ downgrade for S&P. The model 
1 includes only changes in DD and model 2 changes in IDD. Model 3 has both variables DD and IDD. Model 4 additionally 
contains the other four market-based measures capturing relative bank size, Leverage, Historical volatility of the equity prices and 
Vstoxx index.  (***) indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent 
level. The sample period extends from 01/01/2007 to 01/08/2013 
 
In the first two models, we introduce separately DD and DDI as explanatory variables. The 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. However, the marginal effect of DDI is higher 
than that of DD (0.26% vs. 0.15%) meaning that a change in one unit of DDI (DD) of a given bank 
will have as a consequence a change in the probability of a downgrade by 0.26% (0.15%). In other 
words, a change in the systemic risk of a bank has a bigger impact on its credit rating compared to 
a change in its credit risk indicator. Besides, if we compare the pseudo R-squared of the model 
including DD and the one with DDI, we find that the explanatory power of the model increases 
substantially together with the maximum log likelihood. 
In the third column of the table, we estimate simultaneously DD and DDI. Both coefficients are 
still significant, but the coefficient related to DD is significant at 10% the level and its marginal 
 
Bank 
M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDD-3M 
-0.26*** 
(-3.87)  
 -0.14*   
(-1.90)    
-0.13***    
(-1.78)    
Marginal effect -0.15%  -0.10% -0.10% 
ΔDDI-3M
 
 -0.44*** (-7.72) 
 -0.54***    
(-7.26)    
 -0.49***    
(-6.45)    
Marginal effect  -0.26% -0.32% -0.30% 
Volatility    0.04   (0.38)    
Relative size    -8.26***    (-4.54)    
leverage    0.00   (1.64)    
vstoxx    0.01***    (4.12)    
Constant  -2.90*** (-69.27) 
-2.92*** 
(-68.63) 
-2.90***    
(-69.47)    
-3.08***      
(-29.99)    
Log L -833.60 -819.10 -817.58                    -793.16                  
Pseudo-R2 1,13% 2,85% 3,03% 5,93% 
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effect decreases from 0.15% to 0.10%, while the coefficient of DDI remains highly significant and 
its marginal effect increases to 0.32%. Once we introduce market-based measures of banks, our 
results stay significant. The pseudo R-squared and the log likelihood indicate that this last model 
is the “best” one. Among the four control variables, only relative size and VSTOXX variables are 
significant at 1% level. The negative sign of the relative size coefficient indicates that the smaller 
the bank, the higher the probability that this bank will be downgraded. As to VSTOXX, the 
coefficient is positive, which suggests that high implied volatility for the European equity markets 
leads to a higher likelihood of a downgrade. One explanation for the fact that volatility and 
leverage are not significant is that these variables are main inputs in the Merton Model (used to 
estimate DD and DDI) and their effect was already captured by these two risk indicators. 
Table 5.4 shows the estimate coefficients of change in the downgrade of countries. The first four 
models are based on the 20-point rating scale, while we use the 58-point rating scale in the four 
others. It can be seen that the coefficients are also all negative, as expected. Note that in this case, 
interpretation is quite different: a positive (negative) change in the Distance to Default and 
systemic shock of banks of a given country 3 months prior to the event will decrease (increase) 
the likelihood of a downgrade of that country. The pseudo R-squared and log likelihood indicate 
that model 2 including DDI is better than the one with DD. Moreover, the marginal effect of DDI 
(0.09%) is higher than the marginal effect of DD (0.02%). The results remain unchanged in model 
3 and 4 with the two indicators and controls. With regards to the 58-point rating scale, looking at 
the first three models, the marginal effect of DD is higher or equal to the marginal effect of DDI. 
However, in model 4 the best specification according to R-squared and log likelihood is when DD 
and DDI are estimated jointly; the coefficient relative to DD becomes insignificant, meaning that 
systemic risk goes beyond DD in explaining changes in the downgrade of a sovereign. In addition, 
the coefficient of historical volatility is positive and significant, meaning that, higher is the 
volatility, bigger will be the probability of the bank downgrades.  
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Table 5.4. Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in 3 months lagged DD and 
DDI on S&P sovereign ratings over the entire sample 
 
Notes: Table 5.4 reports coefficients and z statistics (in parentheses) of random probit estimations. The independent variables are 
monthly changes in 3 months lag of DD and DDI, and the dependent variable changes countries’ downgrade for S&P using the 20-
point and 58-point rating scales. Model 1 includes only changes in DD and model 2 changes in IDD. Model 3 has both variables 
DD and IDD. Model 4, additionally, contains the other four market-based measures capturing relative bank size, leverage, historical 
volatility of the equity prices and Vstoxx index.  (***) indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent 
level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The sample period extends from 01/01/2007 to 01/08/2013 
Comparing the marginal effect of DD and DDI on the bank sample with that of the country sample, 
we notice that the effect of DDI is much higher for banks. In other words, changes in Distance to 
Default and systemic shock for banks will have a bigger impact on banks’ rating than on countries’ 
ratings, a finding which is quite intuitive.   
Besides, Gropp et al. (2002) find that the Distance to Default is not a significant variable three 
months before a downgrade. They suggest that “many eventually downgraded banks exhibit a 
lowering in the equity volatility just before the downgrading, which causes the derived asset 
volatility measure to decrease as well, reducing the (-DD) value.” But the time period they consider 
is from 1991 to 2001, during which the financial market was much more stable compared to the 
period we are studying. Overall, our results indicate that systemic risk goes beyond Distance to 
Default in explaining a downgrade of banks and countries. 
 
Sovereign (20) Sovereign (58) 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDDS-3M 
-0.07*** 
(-2.88)  
-0.04* 
 (-1.88)    
-0.11**  
 (-2.42)    
-0.05*** 
(-3.51)  
-0.04* 
(-1.69)    
-0.04  
(-1.50)   
Marginal effect -0.02%  -0.02% -0.03% -0.03%  -0.02% -0.02% 
ΔDDIS-3M
 
 -0.14*** (-2.36) 
-0.12**    
(-1.93)    
-0.17**    
(-2.21)     
-0.05*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.02*   
 (-1.93 ) 
-0.06**   
 (-2.45 ) 
Marginal effect  -0.09% -0.08% -0.05%  -0.03% -0.01% -0.04% 
Volatility    0.89 (1.03)       
 1.63**   
(2.01)   
Relative size    -12.72*    (-1.79)       
-13.87***    
(-3.04)   
leverage    -0.68    (-0.77)       
-0.39   
(-0.53)   
vstoxx    0.01   (0.17)    
   0.01***  (2.33) 
Constant  -2.87*** (-17.30) 
-2.99*** 
(-16.00) 
-3.06***    
(-17.60)    
-1.57***    
(-3.24)    
-2.68*** 
(-23.14) 
-2.68*** 
(-19.76) 
-2.85***    
(-23.78)    
-1.81***    
(-5.58) 
Log L -223.80 -220.39 -220.73                     -212.35 -364.39                  -362.50 -361.67 -345.16            
Pseudo-R2 2,20% 3,54% 3,69% 7,20% 2,27% 3,00% 2,77% 7,42% 
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Comparison across rating agencies 
To check the predictive power of the Distance to Default and the systemic risk on banks’ and 
sovereigns’ propensity to be downgraded, and also to compare the impact of DD and systemic risk 
across agencies we incorporate the lag value of the DD (DDI) for different horizons: 1, 3, 6 and 
12 months simultaneously and one year non-overlapping changes in both indicators for each credit 
rating agency: S&P, Fitch and Moody’s. The results of these specifications are reported in the table 
5.5. 
Model 1 of each agency includes changes in the banks’ DD over different horizons: 1, 3, 6 and 12 
months before the rating change announcement. It can be seen that the coefficient related to the 
first three fixed horizons are negative and significant for S&P and Fitch, while only 1-month and 
3-month lags are significant for Moody’s indicating that a change in the DD of one bank 1, 3 and 
6 months prior to the event has an impact on S&P and Fitch ratings. By introducing control 
variables, the results remain unchanged and the performance of the model increases subsequently 
according to the pseudo R-squared and the log likelihood (the results are reported in appendix 
A.8). In addition, if we compare the marginal effect of different horizons, we notice that the 
Moody’s ratings react strongly to a 1-month DD change (0.19%) and much less to a 3-month DD 
change (0.11%), while the Fitch’ ratings react more to a 3-month change in the DD (0.17%) and 
S&P’ to a 6-month change (0.16%) meaning that Moody’s incorporates the information more 
quickly compare to S&P and Fitch. 
Models 2 in table 5.5 display the results of changes in banks’ DD over the entire year before the 
rating change event. For S&P and Moody’s, the coefficient of the first window is the only 
significant one, suggesting the deterioration of credit rating of a bank is driven by changes in DD 
between three and one month prior to the rating change: While the Fitch credit rating is determined 
by changes in DD between six and one month prior to the rating change (is significant at the 10% 
level). By comparing the two models (M1 and M2) we can state that there is no improvement in 
the performance between the different lag horizons and that with one year non-overlapping change, 
the pseudo-R2 and the log Likelihood are unchanged.  
In addition, the results show a difference across the three agencies. S&P downgrades are the ones 
that react most to the deterioration in credit risk quality of banks proxied by DD, followed by Fitch. 
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Table 5.5. Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on bank ratings over the 
entire sample 
 
Notes: Table 5.5 reports coefficients, z statistics (in parentheses) and marginal effects (in percentage) of random probit estimations. In model 1 of each rating 
agency, the independent variables are lag value of DD for different horizons: 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. In Model 2, the independent variables are one year non-
overlapping changes in DD. The dependent variable is change in banks’ downgrade for S&P, Fitch and Moody’s.  (***) indicates statistical significance at the 1 
percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The sample period extends from 01/01/2007 to 01/08/2013
 S&P Fitch Moody’s  
 M1 Marginal effects M2 
Marginal 
effects 
M1 Marginal 
effects 
M2 Marginal 
effects 
M1 Marginal 
effects 
M2 Marginal 
effects 
ΔDD-1M -0.17**    
(-2.10)    -0.11% 
-0.63***     
(-4.03)    -0.41% 
-0.17*  
 (-1.95)    -0.08% 
-0.76***    
(-5.29)    -0.39% 
-0.26***    
(-3.49)    -0.19% 
-0.57***    
(-3.51)    -0.42% 
ΔDD-3M
 
-0.24***    
(-3.27)    -0.16% 
  -0.33***    (-5.33)    -0.17% 
  -0.15*    (-1.66)    -0.11% 
  
ΔDD-6M
 
-0.24***    
(-3.58)    -0.16% 
 
 
-0.24 ***  
(-3.44)   -0.12% 
 
 
-0.10   
(-0.97)   -0.07% 
 
 
ΔDD-12M
 
0.03     
(0.27)    0.02% 
 
 
-0.03   
(-0.24)    -0.01% 
 
 
-0.06   
(-0.61)    -0.05% 
 
 
ΔDD-(3M-1M)   -0.45***    
(-3.01)    -0.30% 
  -0.59***    
(-4.25)    -0.30% 
  -0.31*   
 (-1.92)    -0.23% 
ΔDD-(6M-3M)   -0.21    
(-1.64)    -0.14% 
  -0.26**    
(-2.14)    -0.13% 
  -0.16    
(-1.21)    -0.12% 
ΔDD-(12M-6M)   0.03   
(0.27)    0.02% 
  -0.03    
(-0.24)    -0.01% 
  -0.06    
(-0.61)    -0.05% 
Constant  -2.88***    
(-65.74)    
 -2.88***    
(-65.74)    
 -2.98***    
(-58.42)    
 -2.98***    
(-58.42)    
 -2.84***    
(-94.67)    
 -2.84***    
(-94.67)    
 
Log L -812.67                     -812.67                -776.49                     -776.49                     -830.49                  -830.49                    
Pseudo-R2 3,61%  3,61%  4,33%  4,33%  6,54%  6,54%  
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Table 5.6 reports the results of the effect of the DDI on changes in banks’ credit downgrade over 
different horizons for the three credit rating agencies. All coefficients have the expected signs. As 
for the DD, a change in a banks’ downgrade is driven by a change in the DDI 1 month and 3 
months prior to the event for Moody’s, 1, 3 and 6 months for S&P. As for Fitch, in addition to the 
first three lags, the one-year lag value of the DDI is also significant at 10% level with a relatively 
small marginal effect (0.09%). Model 2 of the three agencies shows that the first window DDI-(3M-
1M) is informative for the three agencies, in addition, DDI-(6M-3M) is also informative for S&P and 
Fitch, furthermore DDI-(12M-6M)  is significant for Fitch .  
Marginal effects indicate that the Moody’s ratings are more sensitive to changes in the DDI 1 
month before the event (0.22%), while the S&P ratings react more to the 3-month change in the 
DDI (0.27%) and Fitch to the 6-month change (0.19%) meaning that Fitch reacts slowly to the 
changes in banks’ DDI. However, Moody’s responds quickly to changes in the DDI (which was 
also the case for DD). 
By comparing marginal effects of the DD (table 5.5) and those of the DDI (table 5.6) for the three 
rating agencies and across different horizons, it is obvious that the DDI has a stronger impact than 
the DD on changes in banks’ credit ratings. This finding only confirms that a systemic shock is 
more informative than the Distance to Default.  
The results here also display differences across the agencies. Among the three agencies, Moody’s 
is the one that reacts least to an increase in banks’ systemic risk in comparison with its competitors, 
S&P and Fitch.
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Table 5.6 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on bank ratings over the 
entire sample 
 
 
Notes: Table 5.6 reports coefficients, z statistics (in parentheses) and marginal effects (in percentage) of random probit estimations. In model 1 of each rating 
agency, the independent variables are lag value of DDI for different horizons: 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. In Model 2 the independent variables are one year non-
overlapping changes in DDI. The dependent variable is change in banks’ downgrade for S&P, Fitch and Moody’s.  (***) indicates statistical significance at the 1 
percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level. The sample period extends from 01/01/2007 to 01/08/2013
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s 
M1 Marginal 
effects 
M2 Marginal 
effects 
M1 Marginal 
effects 
M2 Marginal 
effects 
M1 Marginal 
effects 
M2 Marginal 
effects 
ΔDDI-1M -0.23***    
(-3.03)    -0.15% 
-0.92***    
(-5.67)    -0.60% 
-0.20*** 
(-2.42)    -0.10% 
-0.90***    
(-5.93)    -0.54% 
-0.30***   
( -4.16)    -0.22% 
-0.43*    
(-1.89)    -0.31% 
ΔDDI-3M
 
-0.41***     
(-6.61)    -0.27% 
  -0.38***    (-5.80)    -0.17% 
  -0.22**    (-2.51)    -0.16% 
  
ΔDDI-6M
 
-0.29***   
(-3.82)    -0.19% 
 
 
-0.37***    
(-6.06)    -0.19% 
 
 
0.18    
(1.05 )   0.13% 
 
 
ΔDDI-12M
 
0.00   
(0.02)    0.00% 
 
 
-0.17*     
(-1.94)    -0.08% 
 
 
-0.10    
(-0.79 )   -0.07% 
 
 
ΔDDI-(3M-1M)   -0.70***   
( -4.37)    -0.45% 
  -0.92***    
(-7.39)    -0.44% 
  -0.13    
(-0.55)    -0.09% 
ΔDDI-(6M-3M)   -0.28**  
(-2.00)    -0.19% 
  -0.54***   
(-5.25)    -0.27% 
  -0.09    
(0.42)    -0.06% 
ΔDDI-(12M-6M)   0.00    
(0.02)    0.00% 
  -0.17*    
 (-1.94)    -0.08% 
  -0.10    
(-0.79)    -0.07% 
Constant  -2.90***    
(-65.90)    
 -2.90***    
(-65.90)    
 -2.99***    
(-58.08)    
 -2.99***    
(-58.08)    
 -2.84***   
 (-94.07)    
 -2.84***    
(-94.07)    
 
Log L -795.51                     -795.51                     -766.29                  -766.29                  -826.01                     -826.01                      
Pseudo-R2 5,65%  5,65%  5,59%  5,59%  7,04%  7,04%  
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As already explained in the methodology, to analyze the impact of the Distance to Default and the 
systemic shocks on the probability of a downgrade at the sovereign level, we cluster the two 
indicators. In other words, we consider all banks in one country as a subsystem. Therefore, the 
DDS of this subsystem is the weighted average of individual banks’ DD’s of that given sovereign. 
Similarly, we estimate the DDIS for each sovereign as a weighted average of all banks’ Distance 
to Default in the sample excluding the banks of that sovereign. 
Tables below exhibit probit estimation of monthly DD (table 5.7) and DDI (table 5.8) for different 
horizons on a 20-point and a 58-point sovereign rating scale. The results of the estimation models 
including the one-year non overlapping windows and the market controls, are reported in appendix 
(Tables: A.12 to A.19). All the significant coefficients here have the expected sign. Comparing the 
marginal effect of DD and DDI, once again, DDI is more able to predict the future movement in 
countries’ credit rating for both the 20-point and the 58-point sovereign rating scale. In addition, 
the results reveal that the two indicators are less informative for sovereign’ ratings than banks’ 
ratings. Looking at the first table, it can be seen that the S&P downgrade based on the 20-point 
rating scale is driven by change in DD 3 and 6 months before the event and the Moody’s 
downgrade is driven only by a 1-month change in DD. However, the coefficients related to Fitch 
are not statistically significant indicating that a change in DD does not affect the probability of a 
downgrade by Fitch. The second table shows that the S&P downgrade reacts to changes in banks’ 
systemic risk 3, 6 and 12 months afterwards. The other two agencies respond well to changes in 
the systemic risk after 1 year. 
Looking at the 58-point rating scale for countries, changes in 3-, 6- and 12-month DD and DDI 
prior to the event, increase the probability of a downgrade by S&P. Fitch and Moody’s downgrades 
do not react to the changes in DD. Nevertheless, the Fitch rating responds to the change in DDI 3, 
6 and 12 months after the event, while the Moody’s downgrade is driven only by the change in 
one year DDI lag value. These results indicate that of the three private agencies, S&P is more 
reactive to changes in the Distance to Default and the systemic risk of banks in assessing countries’ 
credit ratings. Besides, the results are stronger for the 58-point ratings, which consider watch and 
outlook status compared to the 20-point ratings for S&P and Fitch. These results are robust after 
controlling for market-based indicators. 
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Table 5.7. Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lag of DD for different horizons on sovereign ratings over the entire sample 
 
Table 5.8. Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lag of DDI for different horizons on sovereign ratings over the entire sample 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
20-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
58-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
20-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
58-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
20-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
58-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
ΔDDS-1M 0.05    
(0.65)    0. 01% 
-0.02    
(-0.46)    -0. 01 %  
-0.10 
(-1.30)    -0.03%  
0.02    
(0.27)    0.01% 
-0.15*    
(-1.66)    -0.05%     
-0.06    
(-0.97)    -0.03%   
ΔDDS-3M
 
-0.17*    
(-1.67)    -0.04% 
-0.10*   
 (-1.67)    -0. 06%   
-0.05   
(0.76)    -0.02%  
-0.09  
(-0.93)    -0.04% 
-0.16    
(-1.39)    -0.05%  
-0.02    
(-0.26)    -0.01%    
ΔDDS-6M
 
-0.09*    
(-1.79)    -0. 05%  
-0.11***    
(-3.40)    -0. 07% 
-0.03   
(-0.92) -0.01%  
-0.03  
(-0.57)    -0.02%     
-0.09    
(-1.16)    -0.03%   
0.04    
(0.86)    0.02%    
ΔDDS-12M
 
-0.04    
 (-1.44)    -0. 01%  
-0.05**     
(-2.50)    -0. 03 % 
-0.04    
(-1.19)    -0.01% 
-0.02   
(-1.09)    -0. 01%    
-0.02    
(-0.81)    -0.01%   
-0.03   
(-1.32)    -0.02%     
Constant  -2.69*** 
(-29.78)  
-2.55***    
(-36.18)  
-2.73*** 
(-16.95)  
-2.71***    
(-19.43)     
-2.73*** 
(-17.13)  
-2.64***  
(-20.11)  
Log L -218.15  -353.61                 -198.16  -293.88                     -193.75  -315.95                     
Pseudo-R2 4,67% 
 
5,16% 
 
3,09% 
 
4,10% 
 
5,65% 
 
4,40% 
 
 
S&P Fitch  Moody’s 
20-point 
scale  
Marginal 
effects 
58-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
20-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
58-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
20-point 
scale   
Marginal 
effects 
58-point 
scale 
Marginal 
effects 
ΔDDIS-1M 0.10  
(1.56)    0.02% 
-0.06    
(-1.49)    0.04% 
  -0.06   
(-0.87)    -0. 00%    
0.05    
(0.96)    -0.02%    
-0.02    
(-0.32)    
-0.00% -0.02   
(-0.36)    -0. 01 % 
ΔDDIS-3M
 
-0.20**  
(-2.38)    -0.06% 
-0.22***      
(-3.50)    -0. 12% 
-0.03    
(-0.33)    -0. 01%    
-0.12*   
(-1.87)    -0.05%  
-0.08   
 (-1.02)    
-0.02% -0.03  
 (-0.40)    0. 01 % 
ΔDDIS-6M
 
-0.13***  
(-2.95)    -0.03% 
-0.17***    
(-5.22)    -0.09% 
-0.02  
(-0.44)    -0. 01%    
-0.08**   
(-2.24)    -0.03% 
-0.04   
 (-0.76)    
-0.01% -0.00  
 (-0.02)    0.00 %   
ΔDDIS-12M
 
-0.06**  
(-2.47)    -0.01% 
-0.07***    
(-3.46)    -0.04% 
 -0.05**    
(-1.98)    -0. 01%   
-0.04**    
(-2.06)    -0.02% 
-0.04*    
(-1.74)    
-0.01% -0.03**    
(-2.07)    -0. 02 %    
Constant  -3.06*** 
(-14.54)     
-2.64***     
(-24.08)     
-2.87***    
(-12.61)     
-2.68***    
(-22.61)     
-2.91***   
 (-18.92)     
-2.67***    
(-22.07)     
Log L 217,22  -345.73                        198,95  -303.64                         -202.21                      -319.10                         
Pseudo-R2 
5,07%  
7,27%  2,65%  
4,15%  1,53%  
3,45% 
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 Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate the crucial role played by systemic shocks in the forecasting of 
changes in a credit rating downgrade. Based on European data covering the financial crisis, we 
analyse empirically the impact of both Distance to Default and systemic risk on changes in the 
credit ratings of banks and sovereigns.  
In line with previous research by Aggarwal et al.(2012) and Gropp et al. (2002, 2006), our 
empirical results show that Distance to Default is able to predict future changes in a credit rating. 
Furthermore, the main finding of this paper is that the proxy of systemic risk (DDI) appears to 
have better predictive properties about the likelihood of a downgrade compared to credit risk 
measured by Distance to Default. In other words, the DD of a bank is an early warning of the 
change in a bank's and a sovereign's credit rating, but DDI provides marginally more additional 
information. The two indicators taken together have more discriminatory power in predicting 
defaults than individually. Also, as expected, the marginal effect of DD and DDI is much higher 
for banks than for sovereigns.  
On the whole, at the level of a bank, we find robust predictive performances for the Distance-to-
Default and systemic risk indicator, with this being between 1 to 6 months in advance of S&P and 
Fitch and from 1 to 3 months ahead for Moody’s. However, this finding differs for sovereigns’ 
ratings. The 20-point rating scale for sovereigns is more influenced by changes in DD close to 
default (3 and 6 months for S&P and 1 month for Moody’s), while for the predictive properties of 
DDI  is good for longer maturities. Yet, DDI represent an early signal of the 58-point rating for 
countries, showing up 3 to 12 months before the announcement by S&P and Fitch and 12 months 
before for Moody’s, However, DD is an early signal of the 58-point rating for sovereigns only for 
S&P. Finally, both indicators have more predictive power on the 58-point rating scale for 
sovereigns, meaning that watch and Outlook status are important and should be considered. 
These results show that the three rating agencies react differently to the deterioration in banks' 
credit risk proxies: Distance to Default and systemic risk. Regarding banks' ratings, Moody’s is 
the agency that reacts least (compared to its competitors S&P and Fitch) to an increase in banks' 
systemic risk and Distance to Default. As regards sovereign ratings, S&P is the agency that takes 
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banks' systemic risk factors more into account in its assessment of the sovereigns risk profile. Fitch 
comes next.  
Systemic risk represents a critical part of global banking risk, and has a big influence on an 
individual bank's and a sovereign's financial profile. Despite our examination demonstrating that 
this component is considered by credit rating agencies, they ought to take it more into consideration 
when they evaluate default risk. 
In future research, we would like to use another systemic risk measure that estimates precisely the 
correlations between different banks,   and we would also like to expand the sample being studied. 
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Chapter Six  
6 General conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
Given the major role of credit risk in the recent financial crisis and its impact on financial stability, 
in this thesis we have analysed credit risk in Europe during the financial crisis, using different 
perspectives. We considered different markets: Credit Default Swap (CDS), options on equities 
and exchange rates, and finally, equities. We also looked at a range of different entities: corporates, 
banks and sovereigns, with a focus on banks. This dissertation contributes to the literature in 
several ways and we draw the following conclusions: 
In Chapter 2 we investigated empirically the relative informational efficiency of stock, options 
and credit default swaps. A lead-lag relation is found between the CDS market and other markets, 
in which changes in CDS spreads forecast changes in stock prices and equity options’ implied 
volatilities. Moreover, in contrast to results of US studies, the stock market is found to forecast 
changes in the other two markets. Therefore, the findings suggest the existence of two different 
groups of investors: the most sophisticated will consider entering the CDS market, with the least 
sophisticated tending to prefer more traditional capital markets of which they have greater 
knowledge. Interestingly, these patterns have only emerged during the recent financial crisis, while 
before the crisis, the option market was found to be of major importance in the price discovery 
process. Additionally, we find those relationships being substantially stronger for financial firms 
relative to non-financial firms. This is as a result of the increased importance of financial firms in 
market participants’ investment decisions during the crisis periods.  
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In Chapter 3 we exploit the theoretical link between CDS spreads and put options to derive an 
indicator of credit deterioration (“the default arrival rate”) in a novel way. Altogether, our results 
indicate that the estimated default arrival rates do not only reflect the angst of the financial markets 
with respect to the deteriorating credit risk profile of European banks (systematically important 
banks). They can also serve, at times, as early warning signals. Furthermore, our findings suggest 
that higher financial guarantees from sovereigns lead to lower default risk and hence a lower CDS 
spread along with a lower estimated default arrival rate. Ultimately, the government guarantee 
explains the differences in the level of estimated default arrival rates across banks, as well as the 
observed differences between estimated (i.e derived from Carr&Wu ‘s model) and historical ( CDS 
spreads scaled by (1-recovery rate)) default arrival rates. 
In Chapter 4 we analysed the impact of Eurozone member countries’ credit risk on the stability 
of the euro, and we proposed two indicators for measuring currency stability. The credit risk of a 
country can be measured through its sovereign credit default swap (CDS). The stability of the euro 
is examined by decomposing dollar-euro exchange rate options into the moments of the risk-
neutral distribution. We pointed out that the changes in the creditworthiness of a member country 
on one day have a significant impact on the stability of the euro on the following day. On the one 
hand, an increase in member countries’ credit risk results in an increase of the volatility of the 
dollar-euro exchange rate. There is also a strong increase in tail risk induced through the risk-
neutral kurtosis. On the other hand, we find that member countries’ credit risk is a major 
determinant of the euro’s crash risk, as measured by the risk-neutral skewness. We propose a new 
indicator for currency stability by combining the risk-neutral moments into an aggregated risk 
measure, and then we show that our results are robust to this change in measure. In line with 
previous research, these findings apply to the period of the sovereign debt crisis, but not necessarily 
to the subprime crisis period.  
In Chapter 5 we analysed the impact of Distance to Default and systemic risk on the probability 
of downgrading banks and sovereigns. We estimate Distance to Default using a standard option 
pricing framework. The systemic risk indicator is estimated by an aggregation procedure which is 
the standard practice in financial stability publications. The results show that both indicators 
impact the downgrade probability of banks and countries. However, systemic risk goes beyond 
Distance to Default to explain the deterioration of the financial stability of banks and sovereigns. 
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In addition, the results indicate that the marginal effect of DD and DDI is much higher for banks 
than for sovereigns. The results show also that the three main credit rating agencies react 
differently to the deterioration in banks’ credit risk proxies by Distance to Default and systemic 
risk. As regards banks’ ratings,  Moody’s is the credit rating agency that reacts least (in comparison 
to its competitors S&P and Fitch) to an increase in banks’ systemic risk and Distance to Default. 
As for sovereign ratings, S&P is the agency that takes more into account banks systemic risk in its 
assessment of the sovereigns’ risk profiles. Fitch is second, in this regard. 
These results suggest that in order to ensure the financial stability of the whole system, it is 
important to regulate the CDS market. This is because it influences other financial markets and 
has an impact on the euro. In addition, systemic risk represents a critical part of global banking 
risk, and has a big influence on individual bank's and sovereign's financial profiles. Despite our 
examination demonstrating that this component is considered by credit rating agencies, they ought 
to take it more into consideration when they evaluate default risk. 
Overall, our results have implications for risk management and they contribute to better 
understanding, estimation, management and forecast for credit risk by practitioners, as well as 
policymakers.  
Future work  
Our conclusions and research work opened avenues for further research: 
In the second chapter we have shown that price discovery dynamics across three markets (stock, 
options and credit default swaps) changed during the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis 
period. It would be insightful to look at a finer division of the sub-periods in order to have a better 
understanding of the dynamics across the three markets. In addition, our study does not fully cover 
the sovereign debt crisis period, hence it would be interesting to conduct similar work for that 
period.  
Furthermore, in chapter four, we analyze the impact of Eurozone member countries’ credit risk on 
euro stability. When looking at currency stability we only consider the dollar, so future work could 
include a panel of other currencies.  
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Moreover, in chapter five, we consider only one measure of systemic risk that arises from the 
interconnectedness between financial institutions. In future work, one could estimate the systemic 
risk based on the interdependence between the financial sector and the real economy. This would 
capture shock effects that go beyond their direct impact and so causing disorder in the real 
economy. Finally, in this research we look only at the precise moment the impact of systemic risk 
on the banks’ and countries’ credit ratings. It could be revealing to examine the evolution of this 
impact in recent years. We think that this relationship had become stronger after the financial crisis 
2007-2008. Rating agencies have realized the importance of systemic risk and the necessity of 
incorporating such factors in their risk assessment. 
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Appendixes  
Chapter One 
 
Figure A.1 Global Credit Default Swap Outstanding (trillions of dollars) 
 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements 
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Chapter Three 
Table A.1 List of Banks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Code  Bank Name Ticker 
BARC Barclays BARC:LN 
BBVA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA:SM 
PNPPA BNP Paribas BNP:FP 
CAGRA Credit Agricole ACA:FP 
CBKG COMMERZBANK CBK:GR 
CRDI UniCredit SpA UCG:IM 
CSGN Credit Suisse Group AG CSGN:VX 
DBKGn Deutsche Bank DBK:GR 
DEXI DEXIA DEXB:BB 
ERST ERSTE Bank Group EBS:AV 
ING ING DIRECT INGA:NA 
KBC KBC Bank KBC:BB 
RBS Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) RBS:LN 
STAN Standard Chartered Bank STAN:LN 
UBSN UBS UBSN:VX 
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Table A.2 Summary statistics of   Strikes prices and Stocks Prices 
Table reports summary statistics of the DOOM put options strikes K1, K2 along with the underlying stock price S for each bank 
over the period of January 2006 to December 2009. 
 
 
 
 Mean Median STDEV Min Max Q1 Q3 Skew Kurto 
Barclays 
K1
 
3,30 4,20 1,48 0,48 6,4 1,70 4,20 -0,47 -1,19 
K2 3,61 4,20 1,56  6,5 2,30 4,60 -0,47 -1,15 
S 667,53 688,49 277,90 72,32 1086,74 439,19 926,48 -0,32 -1,16 
BBVA 
K1
 
27,37 17,00 17,70 9 80 14,50 38,00 1,07 -0,17 
K2 29,82 17,50 19,33 9,75 80 15,00 42,00 0,97 -0,51 
S 12,18 13,01 3,30 4 17,16 10,02 14,95 -0,57 -0,82 
CAGRA 
K1
 
23,17   24,50 10,13 4,8 50 14,76 31,48 0,30 -0,10 
K2 23,77 25,84 10,49 4,8 50 14,76 32,00 0,04 -0,94 
S 20,37  21,35 8,00 6,11 32,71 12,85 27,99 -0,20 -1,53 
CBKG
 
K1
 
1,13 1,40 0,66 0,13 2,79 0,48 1,60 -0,18 -1,19 
K2 1,24 1,59 0,75 0,13 2,39 0,36 1,80 -0,28 -1,37 
S 123,56 149,50 64,90 13,51 223,38 44,49 175,13 -0,38 -1,35 
CRDI
 
K1
 
32,22 38,00 15,66 6,4 76 17,00 48,00 -0,26 -1,24 
K2 37,99 44,00 18,46 6,4 90 20,00 54,00 -0,37 -1,04 
S 337,72 390,23 133,00 51,61 632,81 235,58 443,68 -0,43 -1,02 
DBKG
 
K1
 
4,15 4,00 2,28 0,74 9,2 1,20 6,00 -0,11 -1,31 
K2 4,02 4,20 2,36 0,72 9,2 1,20 6,60 -0,07 -1,27 
S 66,25 75,10 24,62 15,535 107,162 44,94 86,09 -0,41 -1,06 
DEXIA
 
K1
 
11,61 14,00 6,30 0,8 20 4,40 18,00 -0,43 -1,49 
K2 12,48 16,00 6,67 1 21 4,80 19,00 -0,46 -1,50 
S 13,08 16,08 6,84 1,03 22,46 5,31 18,94 -0,40 -1,49 
ING
 
K1
 
16,31 16,00 9,55 1,23 25 4,80 24,00 -0,09 -1,72 
K2 13,81 20,00 10,11 1,6 30 6,00 25,00 -0,16 -1,50 
S 17,30 19,79 8,17 1,91 27,61 7,40 24,60 -0,49 -1,37 
KBC
 
K1
 
41,80 44,00 28,55 4,4 88 10,00 72,00 0,09 -1,67 
K2 45,15 41,00 30,44 4,8 92 11,00 76,00 0,05 -1,70 
S 102,51 89,50 69,04 5,5 223,38 32,20 168,12 0,18 -1,43 
RBS
 
K1
 
10,20 13,50 5,36 1,67 17 4,00 14,00 -0,68 -1,30 
K2 10,67 13,50 5,44 1,83 18 4,83 14,50 -0,72 -1,25 
S 4430,91 4908,72 2940,02 145,49 8512,39 754,64 7144,26 -0,25 -1,59 
UBS
 
K1
 
11,12 5,80 7,80 1,6 44,82 4,40 18,68 0,47 -0,66 
K2 13,55 6,40 10,51 1,6 85,91 4,80 22,41 0,87 1,55 
S 37,98 30,36 22,02 8,57 71,147 16,52 62,37 0,24 -1,67 
BNP
 
K1
 
42,20 48,00 13,59 12 76 36,00 49,61 -0,63 -0,23 
K2 47,52 54,57 15,22 14 90 40,00 54,57 -0,35 0,06 
S 64,12 68,08 16,37 20,77 91,60 54,56 76,25 -0,71 -0,22 
CSGN
 
K1
 
39,89 59,69 37,75 3,8 119,38 4,60 59,69 0,50 -1,02 
K2 41,70 43,77 34,13 4 139,28 5,20 67,65 0,28 -1,09 
S 38,11 38,54 10,19 14,81 55,86 31,15 46,30 -0,26 -0,81 
ERSTE
 
K1
 
3,30 3,20 2,04 1 9,5 1,60 4,80 0,88 0,12 
K2 3,48 3,40 2,09 1 9,5 1,70 5,00 0,88 0,04 
S 38,18 41,99 14,07 6,59 57,93 28,73 49,51 -0,60 -0,78 
STAN
 
K1
 
11,51 11,50 0,98 10 17 11,00 12,00 0,99 3,57 
K2 11,93 12,00 1,16 10 17,5 11,00 13,00 0,62 1,54 
S 1263,52 1247,23 123,80 1024,6 1652,85 1176,39 1339,15 0,66 0,23 
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Figure A.2  Plots of daily strikes prices and the underlying asset for each banks 
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Plots of  daily strikes prices, K1, K2 and the underlying asset for each banks. The strikes prices K1, K2 are comprised in the ‘default 
corridor’ described by the model, which the asset prices should never enter. For certain banks of our sample, this assumption is 
not materialized throughout the whole period of study.  
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Chapter Four   
Table A.3  Summary Statistics: Implied Volatilities for puts 
Note: OTC European quotes at fixed maturities 1, 3, 6 , 9 months of out-of-the-money put (10-20-delta) and at-the-money-options (50-
delta).  The quotes are in terms of delta-implied-volatilities of Black-Scholes. Statistics are computed based on daily data. The overall 
sample period spans from 05/09/2008 to 31/01/2012. The first sub-period (subprime crisis) is from 05/09/2008 to 13/10/2009 and the  
second sub-period (sovereign debt crisis) is from 14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012. 
PUT 
10 Delta 25 Delta At the Money 
1M 3M 6M 9M 1M 3M 6M 9M 1M 3M 6M 9M 
Overall sample period  from 05/09/2008  to 31/01/2012 
Mean 15.42 16.44 17.00 17.24 14.23 14.78 15.04 15.16 13.40 13.67 13.82 13.88 
Median 14.34 15.35 16.19 16.53 13.45 14.01 14.47 14.62 12.55 12.93 13.25 13.35 
Maximum 33.60 28.65 25.55 24.33 31.05 25.70 22.49 20.95 29.00 24.25 21.70 20.15 
Minimum 9.75 6.10 6.40 12.59 9.10 5.28 5.35 11.41 8.95 5.00 5.00 10.63 
Std.Dev 4.15 3.46 2.93 2.66 3.64 2.94 2.39 2.12 3.48 2.79 2.23 1.94 
Skewness 1.27 1.02 0.67 0.60 1.36 1.12 0.74 0.73 1.48 1.37 1.07 1.11 
Kurtosis 1.36 0.48 -0.19 -0.67 1.91 1.03 0.41 -0.31 2.18 1.74 1.30 0.67 
Q1 12.20 13.80 14.80 15.26 11.45 12.58 13.25 13.55 10.80 11.70 12.25 12.49 
Q3 17.56 18.43 18.93 19.25 15.93 16.28 16.53 16.56 14.80 14.80 14.70 14.72 
Subprime crisis from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Mean 17.49 17.74 17.65 17.70 16.34 16.18 15.88 15.80 15.95 15.66 15.22 15.11 
Median 15.76 16.06 16.34 16.54 14.88 15.05 15.03 15.00 14.85 14.80 14.68 14.53 
Maximum 33.60 28.65 25.55 24.33 31.05 25.70 22.49 20.95 29.00 24.25 21.70 20.15 
Minimum 9.75 6.10 6.40 12.59 9.10 5.28 5.35 11.41 9.00 5.00 5.00 10.63 
Std.Dev 5.51 4.64 3.92 3.45 4.81 3.94 3.23 2.80 4.46 3.60 2.96 2.51 
Skewness 0.56 0.44 0.22 0.21 0.57 0.42 0.13 0.22 0.51 0.37 0.05 0.19 
Kurtosis -0.72 -1.05 -1.15 -1.47 -0.54 -0.87 -0.79 -1.37 -0.61 -0.77 -0.54 -1.22 
Q1 12.59 13.56 13.98 14.45 12.22 12.68 13.06 13.33 12.03 12.60 12.79 13.10 
Q3 22.11 22.13 21.50 21.20 20.14 19.68 18.71 18.45 19.40 18.71 17.75 17.41 
Sovereign debt crisis from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Mean 14.42 15.81 16.69 17.01 13.21 14.10 14.64 14.85 12.17 12.71 13.13 13.28 
Median 13.83 15.23 16.16 16.50 12.95 13.73 14.27 14.48 11.85 12.38 12.90 13.06 
Maximum 22.45 23.13 22.94 22.83 19.88 20.05 19.60 19.47 18.10 17.55 17.05 16.88 
Minimum 10.23 11.49 12.19 12.62 9.50 10.83 11.75 12.15 8.95 9.95 10.70 11.07 
Std.Dev 2.80 2.49 2.24 2.15 2.29 1.97 1.72 1.62 1.91 1.56 1.30 1.20 
Skewness 0.85 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.65 0.72 0.75 0.65 0.61 0.62 0.69 
Kurtosis -0.13 -0.28 -0.24 -0.21 -0.22 -0.29 -0.19 -0.09 -0.28 -0.33 -0.16 0.00 
Q1 12.89 14.48 15.64 16.03 11.30 12.52 13.30 13.61 10.60 11.50 12.10 12.34 
Q3 15.78 17.19 17.87 18.11 14.45 15.24 15.58 15.72 13.34 13.79 13.95 13.99 
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Table A.4 Summary Statistics: Implied Volatilities for calls 
 
Note: OTC European quotes at fixed maturities 1, 3, 6 and, 9 months of out-of-the-money call (10-20-delta) options.  The quotes are in terms of 
delta-implied-volatilities of Black-Scholes 
 
Call 
10 Delta 25 Delta 
1M 3M 6M 9M 1M 3M 6M 9M 
Overall sample period  from 05/09/2008  to 31/01/2012 
Mean  13.22 13.76 14.16 14.39 13.01 13.28 13.46 13.57 
Median 11.95 12.80 13.38 13.62 12.03 12.50 12.89 13.06 
Maximum  28.68 27.55 24.83 23.95 28.05 25.08 22.35 21.00 
Minimum  8.38 6.30 6.70 10.74 8.43 5.13 5.45 10.64 
Std.Dev 3.96 3.44 2.99 2.76 3.58 2.95 2.43 2.14 
Skewness 1.61 1.61 1.44 1.42 1.57 1.54 1.37 1.41 
Kurtosis 2.18 2.09 1.44 1.31 2.33 2.17 1.69 1.47 
Q1 10.60 11.63 12.16 12.46 10.50 11.40 11.85 12.14 
Q3 14.20 14.30 14.78 15.25 14.06 13.95 14.03 14.07 
Subprime crisis from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Mean  16.98 17.24 17.26 17.38 16.06 15.89 15.64 15.57 
Median 16.24 16.50 16.64 16.89 15.19 15.21 15.15 15.01 
Maximum  28.68 27.55 24.83 23.95 28.05 25.08 22.35 21.00 
Minimum  9.65 6.30 6.70 11.43 9.10 5.13 5.45 10.64 
Std.Dev 4.69 3.92 3.30 2.88 4.43 3.62 2.97 2.50 
Skewness 0.41 0.38 0.08 0.21 0.47 0.36 0.04 0.22 
Kurtosis -0.80 -0.73 -0.62 -0.82 -0.69 -0.71 -0.46 -1.00 
Q1 12.75 14.07 14.68 15.25 12.10 12.98 13.23 13.74 
Q3 20.34 20.39 20.05 19.83 19.38 18.76 18.13 17.72 
Sovereign debt crisis from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Mean  11.40 12.08 12.65 12.95 11.52 12.02 12.41 12.60 
Median 11.20 12.08 12.65 12.91 11.43 11.90 12.35 12.52 
Maximum  16.75 15.63 15.41 15.24 16.88 15.95 15.55 15.36 
Minimum  8.38 9.63 10.41 10.74 8.43 9.43 10.25 10.68 
Std.Dev 1.57 1.20 1.02 0.94 1.67 1.30 1.04 0.93 
Skewness 0.47 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.44 0.27 0.27 0.29 
Kurtosis -0.27 -0.55 -0.86 -0.86 -0.38 -0.50 -0.47 -0.40 
Q1 10.62 11.15 11.81 12.08 10.18 11.03 11.58 11.86 
Q3 12.46 12.98 13.50 13.71 12.52 13.00 13.22 13.30 
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Table A.5 Summary statistics of risk-neutral moments and the dollar-euro exchange 
rate 
Note: Statistics are computed based on daily data. The overall sample period spans from 05/09/2008 to 31/01/2012. The first sub-period 
(subprime crisis) is from 05/09/2008 to 13/10/2009 and the  second sub-period (sovereign debt crisis) is from 14/10/2009 to 
31/01/2012.Skew, Kurt and IV, respectively: Skewness, kurtosis and implied volatility are the independent variables. 
 
 Exchange rate risk-neutral Skewness 
risk-neutral 
Kurtosis 
risk-neutral 
Volatility 
Overall sample period  from 05/09/2008  to 31/01/2012 
Mean 1.37 -0.10 5.85 0.15 
Median 1.37 -0.24 5.12 0.14 
Maximum 1.51 1.58 15.12 0.27 
Minimum 1.19 -0.91 3.90 0.06 
Std.Dev 0.07 0.46 1.61 0.03 
Skewness -0.13 0.60 2.16 1.41 
Kurtosis -0.75 -0.34 5.22 1.75 
Q1 1.31 -0.41 4.88 0.12 
Q3 1.42 0.29 6.25 0.16 
Subprime crisis from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Mean 1.36 0.47 7.64 0.17 
Median 1.36 0.45 7.06 0.16 
Maximum 1.49 1.58 15.12 0.27 
Minimum 1.25 -0.17 5.04 0.06 
Std.Dev 0.07 0.25 1.75 0.04 
Skewness -0.07 1.06 1.34 0.41 
Kurtosis -1.22 2.57 2.05 -0.90 
Q1 1.30 0.30 6.28 0.13 
Q3 1.42 0.56 8.61 0.20 
Sovereign debt crisis from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Mean 1.37 -0.37 4.99 0.14 
Median 1.37 -0.36 4.96 0.13 
Maximum 1.51 0.29 5.94 0.19 
Minimum 1.19 -0.91 3.90 0.10 
Std.Dev 0.07 0.23 0.25 0.02 
Skewness -0.16 -0.01 0.75 0.66 
Kurtosis -0.59 -0.22 1.62 -0.18 
Q1 1.32 -0.54 4.78 0.12 
Q3 1.42 -0.23 5.12 0.15 
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Table A.6 Regression Results: Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall ratios 
 
VaR ratio ES ratio 
Betas T-stat Betas T-stat 
Overall sample period   from  05/09/2008  to 31/12/2012 
Belgium -0.01 -0.315 -0.03 -0.585 
France -0.05 -1.114 -0.06 -1.000 
Germany -0.01 -0.282 -0.02 -0.392 
Netherlands -0.04 -0.771 -0.06 -0.853 
Finland -0.07 -1.202 -0.09 -1.264 
Austria -0.02 -0.621 -0.04 -0.876 
Ireland -0.04 -1.925 -0.04 -1.411 
Spain -0.07 -1.404 -0.08 -1.290 
Portugal -0.05 -1.100 -0.06 -1.010 
Greece -0.06 -1.123 -0.06 -1.292 
Italy -0.09* -1.750 -0.10 -1.503 
Subprime crisis   from  05/09/2008  to 13/10/2009 
Belgium 0.03 0.365 0.00 -0.014 
France -0.02 -0.192 -0.02 -0.159 
Germany 0.02 0.199 0.02 0.156 
Netherlands -0.03 -0.374 -0.05 -0.442 
Finland -0.05 -0.478 -0.08 -0.517 
Austria -0.02 -0.251 -0.04 -0.500 
Ireland -0.03 -0.864 -0.02 -0.462 
Spain -0.05 -0.416 -0.04 -0.272 
Portugal 0.02 0.220 0.03 0.191 
Greece -0.01 -1.151 -0.03 -0.951 
Italy -0.08 -0.740 -0.07 -0.445 
Sovereign debt crisis  from  14/10/2009 to 31/01/2012 
Belgium -0.08 -1.518 -0.09 -1.359 
France -0.08 -1.573 -0.09 -1.423 
Germany -0.07 -1.298 -0.10 -1.404 
Netherlands -0.06 -1.078 -0.08 -1.119 
Finland -0.09 -1.554 -0.12 -1.674 
Austria -0.01 -0.274 -0.02 -0.269 
Ireland -0.12** -2.195 -0.14** -2.007 
Spain -0.08* -1.925 -0.11** -1.991 
Portugal -0.10** -2.024 -0.12** -2.006 
Greece -0.07 -1.371 -0.10 -1.364 
Italy -0.12*** -2.495 -0.15*** -2.530 
PCAH -0.034 -1.21 -0.043 -1.23 
PCAV -0.055** -2.26 -0.069** -2.27 
Note: For each country, the dependent variables are the Value-at-Risk ratios and Expected Shortfall ratios of the 
daily moments of the 3-months risk-neutral distribution of dollar-euro exchange rate options (the variance is 
expressed in terms of annualized volatility). T-stats are computed based on the Wald test. . (***) indicates 
statistical significance at the 1 percent level, (**) at the 5 percent level and (*) at the 10 percent level.  
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Chapter Five 
Bloomberg definition of short and long term debt:  
ST debt (BS047):  Includes bank overdrafts, short-term debts and borrowings, repurchase 
agreements (repos), short-term portion of long-term borrowings and current obligations under 
capital(finance) leases Due to other banks (including central bank) or any other  financial 
institutions. Includes call money, bills discounted. Includes federal funds purchased. Includes 
securities sold, not yet purchased. 
LT Debt (BS051): All interest-bearing financial obligations that are not current. Includes 
convertible debentures, bonds, loans, mortgage debts, sinking funds, long-term bank overdrafts 
and capital (finance) lease obligations. Excludes short-term portion of long term debt, pension 
obligations, deferred tax liabilities and preferred equity. Includes subordinated capital notes. 
Includes mandatory redeemable preferred and trust preferred securities in accordance with FASB 
150 effective June 2003 
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Figure A.4  Implicit asset value 
Figure A.4 shows the evolution of individual implicit asset value time-series averages of the entire sample banks (41 banks) over the 
period 01 January 2007  to 01 August 2013. Implicit asset value are estimated based on Merton model.  
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Table A.7 Final List of banks 
The table below is the final list of banks extracted from the European Banking Authority stress test. Our sample consist on  41 banks from 
14 European countries: Austria (1), Belgium (2), Denmark (4), France (3), Greece (6), Germany (2), Italy (4),  Ireland (2),Norway (1),  Poland  
(1),  Portugal (2),   Spain (4),   Sweden (4),  UK (5). 
 
48 Gruppo Bancario Intesa 
Banks Sovereigns Banks Sovereigns 
Erste Group Bank AG Austria Bank of Ireland Ireland 
Dexia
 
Belgium Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland 
KBC Group
 
Belgium DNB Bank ASA Norway 
Danske Bank A/S Denmark PKO Bank Polski Poland 
JYSKE Denmark Banco BPI SA Portugal Portugal 
Nordjyske Bank A/S  Denmark BPI Portugal 
Sydbank A/S Denmark Denmark Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
SA 
Spain 
BNP Paribas France Banco de Sabadell SA Spain Spain 
Société Générale France Banco Popular
 
Spain 
Crédit Agricole Group  France Bankinter SA  Spain 
Agricultural Bank of Greece SA  Greece Banco Santander SA Greece 
Alpha Bank AE Greece Nordea Bank AB (publ) Sweden 
Piraeus Bank Greece Skan Enskilada SEB Sweden 
Ergasias  Greece SHBA Sweden 
National Bank of Greece Greece Swedbank AB Sweden 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) UK 
Commerzbank AG (CBK) Germany TSB Bank plc UK 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Italy HSBC UK 
Gruppo Banco Popolare de 
Milan 
Italy Barclay UK 
Intesa Sanpaolo48 Sanpaolo Italy LLyods UK 
Gruppo UniCredit Italy   
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Table A.8 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on bank ratings over the 
entire sample 
 
 
 S&P Fitch Moody’s  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDD-1M -0.17**    
(-2.10)    
-0.63***     
(-4.03)    
-0.19**     
(-2.23)    
-0.59***    
(-3.90)    
-0.17*  
 (-1.95)    
-0.76***    
(-5.29)    
-0.17**    
(-2.01)    
-0.73***    
(-5.15)    
-0.26***    
(-3.49)    
-0.57***    
(-3.51)    
-0.27***    
(-3.54)    
-0.59***    
(-3.61)    
ΔDD-3M
 
-0.24***    
(-3.27)    
 -0.20***    
(-2.66)    
 -0.33***    
(-5.33)    
 -0.31***   
(-4.90)     
 -0.15*   
 (-1.66)    
 -0.15*    
(-1.68)    
 
ΔDD-6M
 
-0.24***    
(-3.58)    
 -0.24***    
(-3.35)    
 -0.24 ***  
(-3.44)   
 -0.23***    
(-3.26)    
 -0.10   
(-0.97)   
 -0.11   
(-1.10)     
 
ΔDD-12M
 
0.03     
(0.27)    
 0.04   
(0.37)    
 -0.03   
(-0.24)    
 -0.02    
(-0.16)    
 -0.06   
(-0.61)    
 -0.06   
(-0.56)    
 
ΔDD-(3M-1M)  -0.45***    
(-3.01)    
 -0.40***    
(-2.77)    
 -0.59***    
(-4.25)    
 -0.55***    
(-4.06)    
 -0.31*   
 (-1.92)    
 -0.33**    
(-1.98)    
ΔDD-(6M-3M)  -0.21    
(-1.64)    
 -0.20    
(-1.62)    
 -0.26**    
(-2.14)    
 -0.24**   
 (-2.06)    
 -0.16    
(-1.21)    
 -0.17    
(-1.27)    
ΔDD-(12M-6M)  0.03   
(0.27)    
 0.04    
(0.37)    
 -0.03    
(-0.24)    
 -0.02    
(-0.16)    
 -0.06    
(-0.61)    
 -0.06   
(-0.56)    
Volatility   -0.04    
(-0.40)    
-0.04    
(-0.40)    
  -0.20    
(-1.63)    
-0.20    
(-1.63)    
  0.11   
(1.21)    
0.11    
(1.21)    
Relative size   -8.34***    
(-4.63)    
-8.34***    
(-4.63)    
  -10.74 ***   
(-4.47)    
-10.74***    
(-4.47)    
  -2.84**    
(-2.56)    
-2.84***    
(-2.56)    
leverage   0.00    
(1.62)    
0.00   
(1.62)    
  0.00   
(1.56)    
0.00    
(1.56)    
  -0.00    
(-0.32)    
-0.00    
(-0.32)    
vstoxx   0.01***   
(3.77)    
0.01***    
(3.77)    
  0.01**    
(2.45)    
0.01**    
(2.45)    
  0.00    
(0.31)    
0.00    
(0.31)    
Constant  -2.88***    
(-65.74)    
-2.88***    
(-65.74)    
-2.98***      
(-27.23)    
-2.98***      
(-27.23)    
-2.98***    
(-58.42)    
-2.98***    
(-58.42)    
-2.87 ***   
(-23.09)    
-2.87***    
(-23.09)    
-2.84***    
(-94.67)    
-2.84***    
(-94.67)    
-2.85***    
(-25.25)    
-2.85***    
(-25.25)    
Log L -812.67                    -812.67               -790.16                   -790.16                  -776.49                     -776.49                     -757.48                   -757.48                     -830.49                  -830.49                    -825.08                   -825.08               
Pseudo-R2 3,61% 3,61% 6,28% 6,28% 4,33% 4,33% 6,67% 6,67% 6,54% 6,54% 7,15% 7,15% 
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Table A.9 Marginal  effect of  probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on bank 
ratings over the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
M1 M3 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDD-1M -0.11% -0.41% -0.13% -0.41% -0.08% -0.39% -0.10% -0.41% -0.19% -0.42% -0.19% -0.43% 
ΔDD-3M
 -0.16%  -0.14%  -0.17%  -0.17%  -0.11%  -0.11%  
ΔDD-6M
 -0.16%  -0.17%  -0.12%  -0.13%  -0.07%  -0.08%  
ΔDD-12M
 0.02%  0.03%  -0.01%  -0.01%  -0.05%  -0.04%  
ΔDD-(3M-1M) 
 -0.30%  -0.28%   -0.30%  -0.31%   -0.23%  -0.24% 
ΔDD-(6M-3M) 
 -0.14%  -0.14%   -0.13%  -0.14%   -0.12%  -0.13% 
ΔDD-(12M-6M) 
 0.02%  0.03%   -0.01%  -0.01%   -0.05%  -0.04% 
Volatility 
  -0.03% -0.03%     -0.11% -0.00%    0.08% 0.08% 
Relative size 
  -5.87% -5.87%   -6.00% -6.06%   -2.08% -2.08% 
leverage 
  0.00% 0.00%   0.00% 0.00%   0.00% 0.00% 
vstoxx 
  0.01% 0.01%   0.00% 0.00%   0.00% 0.00% 
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Table A.10 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on bank ratings over 
the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDDI-1M -0.23***    
(-3.03)    
-0.92***    
(-5.67)    
-0.24***     
(-3.10)   
-0.89***    
(-5.60)    
-0.20*** 
(-2.42)    
-0.90***    
(-5.93)    
-0.19** 
(-2.42) 
-0.86***    
(-5.52)    
-0.30***   
( -4.16)    
-0.43*    
(-1.89)    
-0.31***    
(-4.22)    
-0.45*   
 (-1.94)    
ΔDDI-3M
 
-0.41***     
(-6.61)    
 -0.38***    
(-5.75)    
 -0.38***    
(-5.80)    
 -0.35***    
(-5.26)     
 -0.22**    
(-2.51)    
 -0.22**     
(-2.54)    
 
ΔDDI-6M
 
-0.29***   
(-3.82)    
 -0.28***   
(-3.63)     
 -0.37***    
(-6.06)    
 -0.36***     
(-5.82)    
 0.18    
(1.05 )   
 0.18    
(0.99)    
 
ΔDDI-12M
 
0.00   
(0.02)    
 -0.00    
(-0.03)    
 -0.17*     
(-1.94)    
 -0.17*    
(-1.92)    
 -0.10    
(-0.79 )   
 -0.09    
(-0.75)    
 
ΔDDI-(3M-1M)  -0.70***   
( -4.37)    
 -0.66***    
(-4.28)    
 -0.92***    
(-7.39)    
 -0.88***    
(-7.00)    
 -0.13    
(-0.55)    
 -0.14   
 (-0.59)    
ΔDDI-(6M-3M)  -0.28**  
(-2.00)    
 -0.28 **   
(-2.10)    
 -0.54***   
(-5.25)    
 -0.53***    
(-5.16)    
 -0.09    
(0.42)    
 -0.08    
(0.40)    
ΔDDI-(12M-6M)  0.00    
(0.02)    
 -0.00   
(-0.03)    
 -0.17*    
 (-1.94)    
 -0.17*   
(-1.92)    
 -0.10    
(-0.79)    
 -0.09   
(-0.75)     
Volatility   -0.04    
(-0.37)    
-0.04    
(-0.37)    
  -0.24    
(1.00)    
-0.24   
(1.00)    
  0.11    
(1.27)    
0.11    
(1.27)    
Relative size   -8.49***   
(-4.61)    
-8.49***    
(-4.61)    
  -11.04***    
(-4.50)    
-11.04***    
(-4.50)    
  -2.79**    
(-2.50)    
-2.79**    
(-2.50)    
leverage   0.00*    
(1.69)    
0.00*   
(1.69)    
  0.00*    
(1.73)    
0.00*    
(1.73)    
  0.00    
(0.35)    
0.00   
 (0.35)    
vstoxx   0.01***     
(2.80)    
0.01***      
(2.80)    
  0.00*    
(1.65)    
0.00*    
(1.65)    
  0.00  
 (0.02)     
0.00    
(0.02)    
Constant  -2.90***    
(-65.90)    
-2.90***    
(-65.90)    
-2.93***    
(-26.28)    
-2.93***    
(-26.28)    
-2.99***    
(-58.08)    
-2.99***    
(-58.08)    
-2.80***    
(-22.27)    
-2.80***    
(-22.27)    
-2.84***   
 (-94.07)    
-2.84***    
(-94.07)    
-2.83 ***   
-(24.71)    
-2.84***    
(-24.71)    
Log L -795.51                    -795.51                    -775.46                  -775.46                    -766.29                 -766.29                 -748.23                    -748.23                 -826.01                    -826.01                     -820.74                   -820.73                     
Pseudo-R2 5,65% 5,65% 8,02% 8,02% 5,59% 5,59% 7,81% 7,81% 7,04% 7,04% 7,64% 7,64% 
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Table A.11 Marginal  effect  of probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on 
bank ratings over the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s 
M1 M3 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDDI-1M -0.15% -0.60% -0.16% -0.62% -0.10% -0.54% -0.11% -0.57% -0.22% -0.31% -0.23% -0.33% 
ΔDDI-3M
 -0.27%  -0.26%  -0.17%  -0.18%  -0.16%  -0.16%  
ΔDDI-6M
 -0.19%  -0.19%  -0.19%  -0.20%  0.13%  0.13%  
ΔDDI-12M
 0.00%  -0.00%  -0.08%  -0.09%  -0.07%  -0.07%  
ΔDDI-(3M-1M) 
 -0.45%  -0.46%   -0.44%  -0.47%  -0.09%  -0.10% 
ΔDDI-(6M-3M) 
 -0.19%  -0.20%   -0.27%  -0.29%  -0.06%  -0.06% 
ΔDDI-(12M-6M) 
 0.00%  -0.00%   -0.08%  -0.09%  -0.07%  -0.07% 
Volatility 
  -0.03% -0.03%     -0.12% -0.12%   0.08% 0.08% 
Relative size   
-5.88% -5.88% 
  
-6.15% -6.15% 
  
-2.03% -2.03% 
leverage   
0.00% 0.00% 
  
0.00% 0.00% 
  
0.00% 0.00% 
vstoxx   
0.01% 0.01% 
  
0.00% 0.00% 
  
0.00% 0.00% 
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Table A.12 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on sovereign ratings (20-
point rating scale) over the entire sample 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  
ΔDD-1M 0.05    
(0.65)    
-0.06**    
(-2.27 )   
0.11    
(1.10)    
-0.06**    
(-2.27)    
-0.10 
(-1.30)    
-0.10*** 
(-2.65)    
-0.07 
(-0.51)    
-0.10** 
(-2.02)    
-0.15*    
(-1.66)    
-0.10*** 
(-2.71)    
-0.19**  
(-2.45)    
-0.20*** 
(-2.81)    
ΔDD-3M
 
-0.17*    
(-1.67)     
-0.22**    
(-1.97)     
-0.05   
(0.76)     
-0.03 
(-0.22)     
-0.16    
(-1.39)     
-0.19   
(-1.34)     
ΔDD-6M
 
-0.09*    
(-1.79)     
-0.03    
(-0.56)     
-0.03   
(-0.92)  
-0.05  
(-0.60)     
-0.09    
(-1.16)     
-0.24  
(-1.04)     
ΔDD-12M
 
-0.04    
 (-1.44)     
-0.02    
(-0.59)     
-0.04    
(-1.19)     
-0.02 
(-0.56)     
-0.02    
(-0.81)     
-0.04   
(-1.03)     
ΔDD-(3M-1M) 
 -0.13    (-1.56)     
-0.21**    
(-2.06)    
-0.00 
(-0.06)     
-0.04 
(-0.36)     
-0.05   
(-0.63)     
-0.01   
(-0.09)    
ΔDD-(6M-3M) 
 -0.05 (-0.26)     
-0.02   
(-0.33)    
-0.05 
(-0.79)     
-0.07 
(-0.98)     
-0.12*   
(-1.66)  
-0.21*   
(-1.94) 
ΔDD-(12M-6M) 
 -0.04   (-1.47)     
-0.02  
(-0.59)    
-0.05 
(-1.39)     
-0.02 
(-0.54)     
-0.02   
(-0.18)     
-0.04   
(-1.03)    
Volatility 
   -9.83   (-0.92)    
-9.83  
(-0.92)     
-9.85 
(-0.00)    
-9.94 
(-0.00)      
-8.10  
(-0.01)    
-8.10  
(-0.01)    
Relative size 
  -13.27*    (-1.85)    
-13.27*   
( -1.85)      
-11.29 * 
(-1.75)    
-11.20* 
(-1.73)      
-8.19  
(-1.19)    
-8.19  
(-1.19)    
leverage 
  -0.57    (-0.61)    
-0.57   
(-0.61)     
8.88 
(0.00)    
8.97 
(0.00)      
5.80  
(0.00)    
5.80  
(0.00)    
vstoxx 
  0.00 (0.36) 
0.00   
(0.36)     
0.00 
(-0.17)    
0.00 
(-0.21)      
-0.01 
(-0.77) 
-0.01 
(-0.77) 
Constant  -2.69*** 
(-29.78) 
-2.89*** 
(-16.03) 
-1.87*** 
(-3.91) 
-1.87*** 
(-3.91) 
-2.73*** 
(-16.95) 
-2.74*** 
(-16.96) 
-1.92*** 
(-4.00) 
-1.90*** 
(-3.96) 
-2.73*** 
(-17.13) 
-2.73*** 
(-16.95) 
-1.87*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.94*** 
(-3.91) 
Log L 
-218.15 -218.15 -211.37 -211.37 -198.16 -193.06 -188.49 -188.19 -193.75 -193.06 -184.61 -184.61 
Pseudo-R2 4,67% 4,67% 7,63% 7,63% 3,09% 5,53% 7,77% 7,91% 5,65% 5,98% 10,10% 10,10% 
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Table A.13 Marginal  effect  Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on 
sovereign ratings (20-point rating scale) over the entire sample 
% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s 
M1 M3 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDD-1M 
0. 01% -0.02% 0.04%    -0.04% -0.03%  -0.03% -0.02% 
-0.04% 
-0.05%     
-0.03% -0.06% -0.07% 
ΔDD-3M
 -0.04%  -0.08%     -0.02%   -0.01% 
 
-0.05%  
 -0.06%  
ΔDD-6M
 -0. 05%  -0.01%   -0.01%   -0.02% 
 
-0.03%   
 -0.08%  
ΔDD-12M
 -0. 01%   -0.01%   -0.01%  -0.01% 
 
-0.01%   
 -0.01%  
ΔDD-(3M-1M) 
 -0.04%  -0.07%  -0.00%  
-0.01% 
 
-0.01%  0.00% 
ΔDD-(6M-3M) 
 -0.01%  -0.01%  -0.01%  
-0.03% 
 
-0.04%  -0.07% 
ΔDD-(12M-6M) 
 -0.01%  -0.01%  -0.01%  
-0.01% 
 
-0.01%  -0.01% 
Volatility 
  -0.28%  -0.28%   -3.44% 
-3.47% 
 
 -2.71% -2.71% 
Relative size 
  -4.52%  -4.52%   -3.94% 
-3.91% 
 
 -2.74% -2.74% 
leverage 
  -0.19%    -0.19%   3.10% 
3.13% 
 
 1.94% 1.94% 
vstoxx 
  0.00%   0.00%   0.00% 
0.00% 
 
 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table A.14 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on sovereign ratings (20-
point rating scale) over the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  
ΔDDI-1M 0.10  
(1.56)    
-0.03 
(-1.21)       
0.12 
(1.51)    
-0.04  
(-1.33)      
  -0.06   
(-0.87)    
-0.06* 
(-1.67)    
-0.10 
(-1.07)    
-0.12** 
(-2.43)    
-0.02    
(-0.32)    
-0.02 
(-0.69)       
-0.02 
(-0.18)    
-0.06 
(-1.54)       
ΔDDI-3M
 
-0.20**  
(-2.38)     
-0.21 ** 
(-2.48)     
-0.03    
(-0.33)     
-0.04  
(-0.52)     
-0.08   
 (-1.02)     
-0.06  
(-0.74)     
ΔDDI-6M
 
-0.13***  
(-2.95)     
-0.09* 
(-1.89)     
-0.02  
(-0.44)     
-0.02 
(-0.00)     
-0.04   
 (-0.76)     
-0.08 
(-1.27)     
ΔDDI-12M
 
-0.06**  
(-2.47)     
-0.05* 
(-1.93)     
 -0.05**    
(-1.98)     
-0.04** 
(-1.77)     
-0.04*    
(-1.74)     
-0.02* 
(-1.70)     
ΔDDI-(3M-1M) 
  -0.13** (-2.07)        
-0.17**  
(-2.23)        
-0.00  
(-0.06)     
-0.07  
(1.09)     
-0.01 
(-0.15)         
-0.03 
(-0.49)       
ΔDDI-(6M-3M) 
  -0.07**    (-2.18)     
-0.04    
(-1.18)     
-0.03 
(-0.74)     
-0.01 
(-0.27)     
-0.07    
(-1.49)     
-0.10    
(-1.86)    
ΔDDI-(12M-6M) 
  -0.06** (-2.47)        
-0.05*  
(-1.93)       
-0.05** 
(-1.98)     
-0.04 
(-1.47)     
-0.04** 
(-1.75)        
-0.04** 
(-1.86)       
Volatility 
   -1.42 (-1.29)    
-1.42    
(-1.29)      
-15.87 
(-0.00)    
-15.87 
(-0.00)      
-16.03 
(-0.00)    
-16.04 
(-0.00)    
Relative size 
  -16.65 ** (-2.42)    
-16.65**   
 (-2.42)      
-16.25 ** 
(-2.74)    
-16.25 ** 
(-2.78)      
-15.56 *** 
(-2.65)    
-15.60 *** 
(-2.65)    
leverage 
  0.71 (0.71)    
0.71    
(0.71)      
15.18 
(0.00)    
15.18 
(0.00)      
14.90 
(0.00)    
14.90 
(0.00)    
vstoxx 
  0.01 (0.54)    
0.01   
(0.54)      
-0.01 
(-0.52)    
0.01 
(-2.00)      
0.01 
(0.03)    
0.01 
(0.03)    
Constant  -3.06*** 
(-14.54)    
-3.06***  
(-14.54)      
-2.35*** 
(-4.11)    
-2.35***  
(-4.11)       
-2.87***    
(-12.61)    
-2.87*** 
(-12.61)    
-1.68*** 
(-2.89)    
-1.68*** 
(-2.89)    
-2.91***   
 (-18.92)    
-3.05***  
(-14.42)      
-1.84*** 
(-3.08)    
-1.80*** 
(-3.08)    
Log L 217,22 217,22 210,29 210,29 198,95 192,21 187,27 187,27 -202.21                     -196.95                     -189.55 -189.43 
Pseudo-R2 5,07% 5,07% 8,10% 8,10% 2,65% 5,95% 8,37% 8,37% 1,53% 4,09% 7,69% 7,75% 
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Table A.15 Marginal  effect  Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on 
sovereign ratings (20-point rating scale) over the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
M1 M3 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDDI-1M 
0.02% 
-0.01% 
0.04% 
-0.01% 
-0. 00%    -0.02% 
-0.06% -0.05% -0.00% -0.00% -0.01% -0.02% 
ΔDDI-3M
 -0.06% 
 
-0.07% 
 
-0. 01%     
-0.03%  -0.02%  -0.02%  
ΔDDI-6M
 -0.03% 
 
-0.03% 
 
-0. 01%     
-0.01%  -0.01%  -0.03%  
ΔDDI-12M
 -0.01% 
 
-0.02% 
 
-0. 01%    
-0.01%  -0.01%  -0.01%  
ΔDDI-(3M-1M) 
 
-0.03% 
 
-0.06% 
 -0.00% 
 -0.03% 
 
-0.00%  -0.01% 
ΔDDI-(6M-3M) 
 
-0.02% 
 
0.01% 
 -0.01% 
 -0.00% 
 
-0.02%  -0.04% 
ΔDDI-(12M-6M) 
 
-0.01% 
 
-0.02% 
 -0.01% 
 -0.01% 
 
-0.01%  -0.01% 
Volatility 
  -0.47% 
-0.47% 
 
 -5.43% -5.43% 
 
 -5.57% -5.57% 
Relative size 
  -5.47% 
-5.47% 
 
 -5.54% -5.54% 
  
-5.40% -5.42% 
leverage 
  0.23% 
0.23% 
 
 5.20% 5.20% 
  
5.18% 5.18% 
vstoxx   0.00% 
0.00% 
 
 -0.01% -0.01% 
  
0.00% 0.00% 
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Table A.16 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on sovereign ratings (58-
point rating scale) over the entire sample 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch  Moody’s 
M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  
ΔDD-1M -0.02    
(-0.46)    
-0.06***  
(-2.92)    
-0.08 
(-1.32)    
-0.05** 
(-2.26)    
0.02    
(0.27)    
-0.06***  
(-2.58)    
-0.09* 
(1.66)    
-0.08* 
(2.40)    
-0.06    
(-0.97)    
-0.08***  
(-2.99)    
-0.09 
(1.06)    
-0.13*** 
(3.43)    
ΔDD-3M
 
-0.10*   
 (-1.67)     
-0.16** 
(-2.36)     
-0.09  
(-0.93)     
-0.16* 
(-1.72)     
-0.02    
(-0.26)     
-0.03 
(-0.35)     
ΔDD-6M
 
-0.11***    
(-3.40)     
-0.08** 
(-2.00)     
-0.03  
(-0.57)     
-0.06 
(-0.96)     
0.04    
(0.86)     
-0.02 
(-0.47)     
ΔDD-12M
 
-0.05**     
(-2.50)     
-0.05** 
(-2.04)     
-0.02   
(-1.09)     
-0.00 
(-0.13)     
-0.03   
(-1.32)     
0.01 
(0.53)     
ΔDD-(3M-1M) 
 -0.04  (-0.94)     
-0.13** 
(-2.28)     
-0.08  
(-1.28)     
-0.23** 
(-2.54)     
-0.01  
(-0.24)     
-0.04 
(-0.52)    
ΔDD-(6M-3M) 
 0.06**  (2.41)     
0.03 
(1.00)     
-0.01  
(1.65)     
-0.06 
(-1.24)     
0.01  
(0.17)     
-0.01 
(-0.24)    
ΔDD-(12M-6M) 
 -0.05**  (-2.49)     
-0.05** 
(-2.04)     
-0.02  
(-1.23)     
-0.00 
(-0.13)     
-0.03  
(-1.32)     
-0.01 
(-0.53)    
Volatility 
   -0.90 (-1.13)    
-0.90 
(-1.13)       
-10.77 
(-0.01)    
-10.77 
(-0.01)      
-1.44 
(-1.53)    
-1.44 
(-1.53)    
Relative size 
  -12.22*** (-2.65)    
-12.22*** 
(-2.65)      
-13.27** 
(-2.33)    
-13.27** 
(-2.33)      
-12.73** 
(-2.19)    
-12.73** 
(-2.19)    
leverage 
  0.24 (0.30)    
0.24 
(0.30)      
9.36 
(0.01)    
9.36 
(0.01)      
0.34 
(0.36)    
0.34 
(0.36)    
vstoxx 
  0.01** (2.33)    
0.01** 
(2.33)      
0.01  
(1.58)    
0.01  
(1.58)      
0.01  
(1.30)    
0.01  
(1.30)    
Constant  -2.55***    
(-36.18) 
-2.67*** 
(-21.11)    
-2.45*** 
(-7.73)    
-2.45*** 
(-7.73)    
-2.71***    
(-19.43)    
-2.71*** 
(-19.43)    
-1.97*** 
(-4.89)    
-1.97*** 
(-4.89)    
-2.64***  
(-20.11) 
-2.64*** 
(-20.11)    
-1.03** 
(-2.34)    
-1.03** 
(-2.34)    
Log L 
-353.61                -353.32 -344.19 -344.19 -293.88                    -293.69 -282.88 -281.88 -315.95                    -315.95                    -302.68 -302.68 
Pseudo-R2 5,16% 5,23% 7,68% 7,68% 4,10% 4,16% 7,69% 8,01% 4,40% 4,40% 8,42% 8,42% 
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Table A.17 Marginal effect  Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on 
sovereign ratings (58-point rating scale) over the entire sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
M1 M3 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDD-1M -0. 01 %  -0.03% -0.05% -0.04% 0.01%  -0.03% -0.06% -0.05% -0.03%  -0.04% -0.06% -0.08% 
ΔDD-3M
 -0. 06%    -0.11%  -0.04%  -0.09%  -0.01%    -0.02%  
ΔDD-6M
 -0. 07 %  -0.05%  -0.02%     -0.03%  0.02%    -0.01%  
ΔDD-12M
 -0. 03  %  -0.03%  -0. 01%    -0.00%  -0.02%     0.01%  
ΔDD-(3M-1M) 
 -0.03%  -0.09%  -0.04%  -0.12%  -0.01%  -0.02% 
ΔDD-(6M-3M) 
 0.04%  0.02%  -0.00%  -0.03%  0.00%  -0.01% 
ΔDD-(12M-6M) 
 -0.03%  -0.03%  -0.01%  0.00%  -0.02%  -0.01% 
Volatility 
  -0.61% -0.61%   -5.92% -5.92%   -0.89% -0.89% 
Relative size 
  -8.25% -8.25%   -7.29% -7.29%   -7.84% -7.84% 
leverage 
  0.16% 0.16%   5.15% 5.15%   0.21% 0.21% 
vstoxx 
  0.01% 0.01%   0.01% 0.01%   0.01% 0.01% 
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Table A.18 Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on sovereign ratings (58-
point rating scale) over the entire sample 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s  
M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  M1  M2   M3  M4  
ΔDDI-1M -0.06    
(-1.49)    
-0.05** 
(-2.30)    
-0.17  
(-1.11)    
-0.04 
(-1.51)    
0.05    
(0.96)    
-0.07*   
(-1.79)    
-0.09** 
(-1.97)    
-0.09** 
(-2.23)    
-0.02   
(-0.36)    
-0.09* 
(-1.69)    
-0.03 
(-0.52)    
-0.18*** 
(-2.69)    
ΔDDI-3M
 
-0.22***      
(-3.50)     
-0.28***    
(-4.09)     
-0.12*   
(-1.87)    
 
-0.17**  
(-2.15)    
 
-0.03  
 (-0.40)    
 
-0.02  
(-0.36)    
 
ΔDDI-6M
 
-0.17***    
(-5.22)     
-0.12***    
(-3.27)     
-0.08**   
(-2.24)    
 
-0.03    
(-0.65)    
 
-0.00  
 (-0.02)    
 
-0.06   
(-1.17)    
 
ΔDDI-12M
 
-0.07***    
(-3.46)     
-0.06***    
(-2.95)     
-0.04**    
(-2.06)    
 
-0.03  
(-1.32)    
 
-0.03**    
(-2.07)    
 
-0.02  
(-0.86)    
 
ΔDDI-(3M-1M)  -0.12** 
(-2.51)    
 -0.22*** 
(-3.46)    
 
-0.09*   
(-1.74)    
 
-0.25**  
(-2.35)    
 
-0.01 
(-0.23)    
 
-0.04  
(-0.72)    
ΔDDI-(6M-3M) 
 -0.10*** 
(-4.39)    
 -0.06** 
(-2.13)    
 
-0.04  
(-1.45)    
 
-0.00    
(0.02)    
 
-0.03 
(-0.95)    
 
-0.07  
(-1.61)    
ΔDDI-(12M-6M) 
 -0.07*** 
(-3.46)    
 -0.06*** 
(-2.95)    
 
-0.04**    
(-2.19)    
 
-0.03**  
(-2.32)    
 
-0.04**    
(-2.09)    
 
-0.02  
(-0.86)    
Volatility 
   
-1.58***    
(-1.79)    
-1.58*** 
(-1.79)     
 
-16.31  
(-0.01)    
-16.31  
(-0.01)    
  
-3.46***  
(-2.61)    
-3.45***  
(-2.60)    
Relative size 
  
-14.35***    
(-3.18)    
-14.35*** 
(-3.18)     
 
-16.81***    
(-3.10)    
-16.81***    
(-3.10)    
  
-18.94***    
(-3.38)    
-18.92***    
(-3.37)    
leverage 
  
1.12    
(1.40)    
1.12 
(1.40)     
 
15.23    
(0.01)    
15.23    
(0.01)    
  
2.02*   
(1.69)    
2.02*   
(1.69)    
vstoxx 
  
-0.02***    
(2.22)    
-0.02** 
(-2.22)     
 
-0.01    
(0.35)    
-0.01    
(0.35)     
 
-0.00    
(-0.18)    
-0.00    
(-0.18)    
Constant  -2.64***     
(-24.08)    
-2.75*** 
(-17.52)    
-2.69***    
(-6.16)    
-2.69*** 
(-6.16)    
-2.68***    
(-22.61)    
-2.82***    
(-15.75)    
-1.89***    
(-3.85)    
-1.89***    
(-3.85)    
-2.67***    
(-22.07)    
-2.78***    
(-16.01)    
-1.27***    
(-2.63)    
-1.27***    
(-2.63)    
Log L -345.73                       -345.74 -348.47                        -336.53 -303.64                        -293.71                        -282.34                        -282.34                        -319.10                        -318.67                       -305.15 -300.22 
Pseudo-R2 7,27% 7,27% 6,54% 9,74% 4,15% 4,15% 7,86% 7,86% 3,45% 3,58% 7,67% 8,56% 
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Table A.19 Marginal  effect  Probit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DDI for different horizons on 
sovereign ratings (58-point rating scale) over the entire sample  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s 
M1 M3 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDDI-1M 
0.04% 
-0.02% 0.11% -0.03% 
-0.02%    
-0.04% -0.05% -0.07% 
-0. 01 % -0.06% -0.02% -0.10% 
ΔDDI-3M
 -0. 12  % 
 -0.18%  
-0.05%  
 -0.09%  
0. 01 %  0.01%  
ΔDDI-6M
 -0.09 % 
 0.08%  
0.03% 
 0.01%  
0.00 %    -0.03%  
ΔDDI-12M
 -0.04   % 
 -0.04%  
-0.02% 
 -0.01%  
-0. 02 %     -0.01%  
ΔDDI-(3M-1M) 
 
-0.06%  -0.14% 
 
-0.03%  -0.14% 
 0.00%  -0.02% 
ΔDDI-(6M-3M) 
 
0.05%  0.04% 
 
0.02%  0.00% 
 -0.01%  -0.04% 
ΔDDI-(12M-6M) 
 
-0.04%  -0.04% 
 
-0.02%  -0.01% 
 -0.02%  -0.01% 
Volatility 
 
 -1.02% -1.02% 
 
 -8.86% -8.86% 
  -2.08% -2.07% 
Relative size 
  
-9.28% -9.28% 
  
-9.13% -9.13% 
  -11.38% -11.36% 
leverage 
  
0.72% 0.72% 
  
8.27% 8.27% 
  1.21% 1.21% 
vstoxx   
0.01% 0.01% 
  
0.01% 0.01% 
  0.00% 0.00% 
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Table A.20 Logit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on bank ratings over the 
entire sample 
 
 
 
 
S&P   Fitch Moody’s 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDD-1M -0.38*    
(-1.88 )   
-1.45***    
(-3.69)    
-0.40**    
(-1.98)   
-1.37***  
 (-3.87)      
-0.57  
(-1.62)    
-1.05**   
(-2.23 )    
-0.66*    
(-1.90)    
-0.82*    
(-1.77)    
-0.55***    
(-3.06 )   
-1.31***    
(-3.11)    
-0.56***    
(-3.09)    
-1.33 ***   
(-3.13)    
ΔDD-3M
 
-0.58***    
(-3.40)    
 -0.51***   
(-2.98 )   
 -0.82***    
(-5.83)    
 -0.76***    
(-5.31)    
 -0.35    
(-1.44)    
 -0.35    
(-1.43)    
 
ΔDD-6M
 
-0.61 ***   
(-3.91)    
 -0.60***    
(-3.80)   
 -0.70***   
 (-4.61)    
 -0.67***   
(-4.38)    
 -0.27    
(-0.96)    
 -0.29    
(-1.02)    
 
ΔDD-12M
 
0.13    
 (0.38)    
 0.15    
(0.55)    
 -0.10  
(-0.38 )   
 -0.04  
 (-0.14)    
 -0.14     
(-0.46)    
 -0.12    
(-0.39)    
 
ΔDD-(3M-1M)  -1.07***    
(-2.67)    
 -0.96***   
 (-2.74)    
 -1.62***    
(-4.99)    
 -1.47***    
(-4.70)    
 -0.77*    
(-1.69)    
 -0.77*     
 (-1.68)    
ΔDD-(6M-3M)  -0.49   
( -1.37)    
 -0.45    
(-1.49)    
 -0.80***    
(-2.79)    
 -0.71***    
(-2.60)   
 -0.42    
(-1.09)    
 -0.41    
(-1.08)    
ΔDD-(12M-6M)  0.13     
(0.38)    
 0.15    
(0.55)    
 -0.10  
(-0.38)    
 -0.04 
(-0.14)    
 -0.14   
(-0.46)    
 -0.12   
( -0.39)    
Volatility   -0.16   
 (-0.51)    
-0.16    
(-0.51)     
  -0.65*    
(-1.67)    
-0.65 *   
(-1.67)    
  0.29    
(1.12)    
0.29   
(1.12)    
Relative size   -26.16***     
(-4.47)    
-26.16***    
 (-4.47)    
  -34.38***    
(-4.38)   
-34.38***    
(-4.38)    
  -9.40**    
(2.52)    
-9.40**   
 (-2.52)    
leverage   0.00*    
(1.76)    
0.00*    
(1.76)    
  0.00*    
(1.77)    
0.00*    
(1.77)    
  -0.00    
(-0.32)    
-0.00    
(-0.32)    
vstoxx   0.03***    
(3.97)    
0.03 *** 
(3.97)    
  0.02**    
(2.52)    
0.02**    
(2.52)    
  0.00   
(0.45)    
0.00   
( 0.45)    
Constant  -6.20***   
 (-46.30)    
-6.20***    
(-46.30)    
-6.46***    
 (-19.64)    
-6.46***     
(-19.64)    
-6.51***    
(-40.54)    
-6.51***   
 (-40.54)    
-6.14***    
(-16.29)    
-6.14***    
(-16.29)    
-6.07***   
 (-65.11)    
-6.07***    
(-65.11)    
-6.13***    
(-17.83)    
-6.13***    
(-17.83)    
Log L -814.46                     -814.46                   -791.58                    -791.58                    -779.30                    -779.30                 -760.08                    -760.08         -832.15                 -832.15                     -826.75             -826.75                    
Pseudo-R2 3,41% 3,41% 6,12% 6,12% 4,00% 4,00% 6,37% 6,37% 6,35% 6,35% 6,96% 6,96% 
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Table A.21 Logit estimations of the effect of monthly changes in lagged DD for different horizons on bank ratings over the 
entire sample 
 
 
 
 
S&P Fitch Moody’s 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ΔDDI-1M -0.57***    
(-3.15)    
-2.19***    
(-4.59)   
-0.61***    
(-3.24)    
-2.16***   
 (-4.87)    
-0.46**    
(-2.27)    
-1.03***    
(-3.51)    
-0.48**    
(-2.30)    
-0.95***    
(-3.28)    
-0.71***    
(-4.02)    
-0.90    
 (-1.23)    
-0.73***    
 (-4.10)    
-0.90 
(-1.21)    
ΔDDI-3M
 
-1.00***    
(-7.21)    
 -0.90***    
(-6.20)    
 -0.93***    
(-5.79)    
 -0.85***    
(-5.09)    
 -0.59***    
(-2.56)    
 -0.60**    
(-2.54)    
 
ΔDDI-6M
 
-0.83***    
(-4.68)    
 -0.81***    
(-4.50)    
 -1.06***    
(-7.72)    
 -1.04***    
(-7.45)    
 0.63  
(1.03)    
 0.64 
(1.03)    
 
ΔDDI-12M
 
0.22    
(0.49)    
 0.16    
(0.42)    
 -0.37    
(-1.60)   
 -0.32    
(-1.40)    
 -0.23 
(-0.62)    
 -0.21  
(-0.57)    
 
ΔDDI-(3M-1M)  -1.62***    
(-3.27)    
 -1.55***    
(-3.50)    
 -0.98***    
(-3.39)    
 -0.93***    
(-3.41)    
 -0.19    
(-0.25)    
 -0.17 
(0.83)      
ΔDDI-(6M-3M)  -0.62    
(-1.32)    
 -0.65     
(-1.59)    
 -0.30    
(1.21)    
 -0.31  
(-1.33)    
 0.39   
 (0.56)    
 0.43 
 (0.55)     
ΔDDI-(12M-6M)  0.22   
(0.49)    
 0.16    
(0.42)    
 0.31    
(1.53)    
 0.28   
(1.47)    
 -0.23   
 (-0.62)    
 -0.21    
(0.57)     
Volatility   -0.11    
(-0.35)    
-0.11    
(-0.35)    
  -0.57   
(-1.50)     
-0.62   
(-1.62)    
  0.31   
(1.20)    
0.31  
(1.20)    
Relative size   -26.54***   
( -4.48)    
-26.54***   
(-4.48)     
  -34.60***    
(-4.44)    
-35.08***     
(-4.41)    
  -9.44**    
(-2.51)    
-9.44***     
(-2.51)    
leverage   0.00*    
(1.67)    
0.00*    
(1.67)   
  0.00*    
(1.74)    
0.00***    
(1.71)    
  -0.00    
(-0.34)    
-0.00   
(-0.34)    
vstoxx   0.02***    
(3.14)    
0.02***     
(3.14)    
  0.02*    
(1.85)    
0.02***    
(2.64)    
  0.00   
(0.28)    
0.00  
(0.28)    
Constant  -6.27***    
(-46.63)    
-6.27***    
(-46.63)    
-6.40***    
(-19.23)    
-6.40****    
(-19.23)    
-6.57***    
(-41.28)    
-6.50***    
(-40.71)    
-6.10***    
(-16.29)    
-6.17***   
(-16.41)    
-6.09***   
 (-64.55)    
-6.09***    
(-64.55)    
-6.11***     
(-17.67)    
-6.11***   
(-17.67)    
Log L -797.97             -797.97                    -777.08                     -777.08                     -764.72                 -777.59                     -746.70                    -757.96                 -827.38                  -827.38                    -821.93               -821.93                  
Pseudo-R2 5,36% 5,36% 7,84% 7,84% 5,80% 4,21% 8,02% 6,63% 6,89% 6,89% 7,50% 7,50% 
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